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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a study of the development of the 
notion of freedom in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. We 
shall attempt to discover the origin of Sartre's notion of 
freedom with reference to his theory of consciousness and in- 
tentionality. Our studies lead us to the conclusion that the 
notion of freedom in Sartre germinates from his psycho- 
ontological confrontation with the world and not from his 
ontological outlook. We hold that the inner motivations of 
Sartre's ontological concern are fundamentally psychological 
and not ethical or metaphysical, a position which stands in 
opposition to those of various interpreters of Sartre. In 
order to clarify and to substantiate our claim, we shall 
evaluate these other views logically and systematically. The 
ethical view is represented by Robert Champigny and Alvin 
Plantinga, and the metaphysical view by Fred Newman.
We shall devote the first section of this work to an 
examination of the validity of these views and to an exposi­
tion of our own view in contradistinction to their conclu­
sions. The second section will be directed toward an analysis 




This analysis should serve two purposes: a) to show
that there is a direct connection between Sartre's pre- 
ontological works and Being and Nothingness, b) to show that 
an understanding of his pre-ontological works is prerequisite 
to the understanding of his ontology. In Chapter III we shall 
see that the major concepts of Being and Nothingness were 
first developed in his works The Psychology of Imagination 
and The Psychology of Human Emotions.
As a result of this analysis we arrive at the conclusion 
that Sartre's psychological modes of being-in-the-world cannot 
be divorced from his confrontation with the other. This will 
support our contention that Sartre's conception of freedom 
from the other in-the-world is basically related to his psy­
chological modes of experiencing the other and not, in its 
inception anyway, to any ontological ground. Thus, the origin 
of Sartre's conception of freedom appears to be psychological 
and not ontological.
In the first two chapters we attempt to refute different 
assumptions made in regard to the nature and origin of Sartre's 
philosophy. The first of these assumptions is made by Fred 
Newman, who claims that Sartre's philosophy is basically meta­
physical in its origin and also ethically relativistic, and 
that the relativism is derived from his ontology. We will 
evaluate Newman's argument, and we shall demonstrate the 
discrepancies of his argument, and we shall defend the view 
that Sartre's ontology is neither relativistic nor
objectlvisticj but humanistic; and that his ontological 
humanism is based on a form of intersubjectivity which, in
our view, differs greatly from relativism.
The second view is represented by Alvin Plantinga and 
Robert Champigny, who claim that Sartre’s philosophy is 
essentially ethical in its origin, and that ethical concerns 
are the dominant theme in his philosophy. It should be noted 
here that while these two figures make the same claim, they 
differ in their approach to the problem. While Plantinga 
pursues his argument from an analyst’s approach, Champigny 
develops his position from a literary perspective. Because 
of this variation in methodology we will examine their argu­
ments independently, and each on its own level.
Concerning Plantinga we shall show the contradiction 
which takes place in his arguments, and we shall also examine 
his claim about the nature of some Sartrean notions (bad 
faith, anguish, and responsibility), which he interprets to 
be essentially ethical notions. As a result of an intensive 
analysis of these notions, we conclude that they are funda­
mentally psychological in origin and not ethidal.
In regard to Champigny’s argument the error, as we con­
ceive it, is related chiefly to viewing Sartre’s philosophy 
from one side, namely, its effects or implications, and not 
in the light of its causes or motivations. We will conclude 
this analysis by pointing out that if an understanding of 
Sartre’s conception of freedom is to be hoped for, then an
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understanding of his philosophy, as a whole, is needed. In 
the light of this approach it will be possible to trace the 
origin and nature of Sartre's conception of freedom.
In the third chapter we will evaluate Sartre's pre- 
ontological work in relation to his ontology. Our purpose is 
twofold: the first is to show the continuity between his pre-
ontological works (which consist mainly of his psychology) and 
his ontology. The second purpose is to point out that the 
key concept of Being and Nothingness is originally discovered 
in his psychology. At this point vie can clearly see that 
while Sartre's basic concepts, for example, nothingness, for- 
itself, in-itself, intentionality, are discovered and defined 
in his psychology, they are simply applied in Being and No­
thingness . This supports our thesis that the origin of 
Sartre's philosophy is not ethical or metaphysical, but psy­
chological. In order to demonstrate our claim we feel that 
it is necessary to examine Sartre's notion of the other, which, 
as we shall see, bears a psychological Impact.
The purpose of chapter four is to show the struggle 
between the for-itself and the for-other. This struggle is 
mainly a struggle of self-identity and of freedom. The 
other, to Sartre, appears to be the hindrance to achieving 
this goal. Why? Because the for-other is another conscious­
ness which tends to affirm its subjectivity and its freedom 
by objectifying the for-itself. In order to reach the goal 
one of the others has to be nihilated. As a result of this.
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Sartre does not foresee any "peaceful coexistence" between 
the for-itself and the for-other. As a result of this the 
other remains a hindrance to my freedom as much as I remain 
a hindrance to the freedom of the other.
As we examine Sartre's analysis we arrive at two con­
clusions; the first is that Sartre's ontology is not free 
from his psychology; the second is that Sartre's phenomen­
ological ontology cannot be understood independently from his 
psychology. We justify this claim by tracing the psychologi­
cal modes in which Sartre experiences the other, and which 
also show the influence of his psychological states on his 
ontology. We also point out that while Sartre makes an on­
tological claim about shame and the look, he pursues the 
analysis of these two notions chiefly from a psychological 
approach. Thus, when Sartre describes the ontological re­
lation with the other his description does not appear to be 
free from his psychological awareness of the other. This 
brings us to our claim that for this reason Sartre's ontology 
is an expression of his psychology; this is also related to 
his notion of freedom.
In the conclusion we shall attempt to specify the dif­
ficulties which we feel remain unresolved in Sartre's phil­
osophy, and which, therefore, need further exploration and 
interpretation.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF SARTRE'S 
CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM
CHAPTER I 
AN EXPOSITION OF SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY
The Existentialists and especially Jean-Paul Sartre 
have received almost universal notoriety. It is almost im­
possible to find a philosophical movement or figure that has 
attracted such approval and criticism. It is impossible to 
disassociate the name of Jean-Paul Sartre from existentialism 
or existentialism from Jean-Paul Sartre, and it is almost as 
difficult to find an objective interpretation and a clear 
understanding of the major philosophical insights of Sartre, 
especially his conception of the nature of freedom. In spite 
of all the essays and commentaries, we feel that the treat­
ments are arbitrarily critical at times, and at other times 
naively glorified. Alfred Stern, for example, describes 
Sartre, in the introduction of his book Sartre: His Philos­
ophy and Psychoanalysis, as a cafe habitue with a tendency 
toward pornographic taste. -- -
We shall see later that to Freud's Oedepus complex, to 
Adler's inferiority complex, and to Bachelard's prome- 
theus complex, Sartre adds his own Aetaen and Jonah
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complex. There may exist even another complex, from 
which Sartre himself is suffering, and which may be 
called the "Pascal complex." With this name we do not 
refer to Prance’s great philosopher and mathematician, 
but to the Armenian trader, Pascal, who in I672 opened 
the first Parisian cafe near Saint Germain des pres.^
This is not provacative but ironic, and the irony of 
the matter is that we find Alfred Stern making assumptions 
about Sartre’s cafe complex for three and a half pages, and 
then exhausting his analysis of existence and essence in three 
pages. For this reason and other similar reasons^ we feel 
that an objective attempt to analyze Sartre’s philosophy is 
still needed, and we will attempt to clarify the origin of 
Sartre’s conception of freedom.
Various commentators interpret the nature of freedom 
from different viewpoints. Some emphasize its ethical ori­
gin, and others conceive of it within a metaphysical or an 
ontological framework. Our thesis is that freedom in Sartre 
is an outgrowth of his psychology, from which ontological 
and ethical meaning emerges. In order to clarify this claim 
we shall examine other views which are made in regard to 
these concepts in Sartre’s philosophy, and we shall also test 
the conclusions which are reached in relation to the nature 
of freedom.
^Alfred Stern, Sartre: His Philosophy and Psychoanal­
ysis (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p . xvi.
2por example Marjorie Grene, Dreadful Freedom (Chicago; 
The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 41-43, 53- 
Marjorie Grene’s evaluation of Sartre’s conception of God, 
pp. 41-43, and her evaluation of freedom, p. 53, represent 
another misunderstanding of Sartre’s philosophy.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
section is "An Examination of Newman's Approach to Sartre's 
Ontology." Fred Newman claims that Sartre's ethical relativism 
is an outgrowth of his ontological relativism. Our intention 
here is to show the invalidity of this notion.
In the second section we shall describe the nature of 
Sartre's ontology with the purpose of demonstrating that rel­
ativism is not a characteristic of Sartre's ontology or ethics.
An Examination of Newman's Approach 
to Sartre's Ontology
In a recent paper Fred Newman discusses the origin of
Sartre's existentialism, and he attempts to demonstrate the
following claim.
The relativism that provokes the existentialistic 
response is an ontological rather than an ethical one. 
Perhaps disagreement between people or peoples over 
ethical issues— a fact on which ethical relativists 
focus— interests the existentialist. But the exis­
tential attitude does not evolve from series of per­
ceptual observations of the world. It is not based on 
empirical facts. It is not contingent. God's death 
was not seen. Precisely for this reason existentialism 
is a philosophical position. And only in so far as it 
focuses on a supposed feature of the nature of things 
does it remain a philosophical v i e w .3
This exposition conveys the following propositions:
(1) The existentialist response to the human situation 
emerges from the ontological outlook rather than from the 
ethical situation. (2) Ethical relativism in existentialism
3pred Newman, "The Origins of Sartre's Existentialism," 
Ethics, LXXVI (April, 1966), 1/8.
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Is an outgrowth of ontological relativism. (3) The exis­
tentialism is a philosophical position.
As we proceed in our discussion we shall demonstrate 
that at least two of these propositions are false: namely,
those alleging that Sartre’s ethics rests upon ontological 
relativism and that he denies perception as a way of observ­
ing the world. This will show that Newman's conclusion 
(existentialism is a philosophical position) appears to be 
based on false premises.
The problem that we encounter in Newman's argument can 
be related to two sources: (a) the classifications and the
categories which Newman uses in his approach to the problem, 
and (b) the questionable nature of these classifications with 
respect to Sartre's original view. In regarding the former 
(a), we find it very difficult to discuss existential problems 
from a preconceived structured framework; but that is just 
what Newman does in order to press his view that both the 
analyst and the existentialist agree fundamentally with what 
he calls ontological relativism. "But this view that provokes 
the attitude is shared by the existentialist and the analyst."^ 
With reference to the latter point (b), we question whether 
Sartre espouses the views which Newman claims in propositions 
two and three, namely, that ethical relativism is an outgrowth 
of ontological relativism and that the existentialist
4%bid., p. 179.
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observations of the world are not based on perceptual observ­
ations . 5
At first glance when one reads Newman's description of 
existentialism in general and Sartre's philosophy in particu­
lar, one cannot but be stunned by this misleading representa­
tion. After careful interpretation we cannot but arrive at 
the conclusion that a basic misunderstanding of Sartre's exis­
tentialist view of the world is occurring. Thus if we test 
the validity of Newman's argument in the light of Sartre's 
philosophy, we find that this argument not only misrepresents 
Sartre's view of the world, but that it also contradicts and 
violates the fundamental philosophical concerns which Sartre 
has developed. In order to refute this argument we do not 
need to go to Sartre's major work, although in the following 
sections of this dissertation we shall give this work our 
consideration.
We believe that Sartre answered this question long ago 
in his pre-ontological treatises L 'imagination, The Transcend­
ence of the Ego, and La Nausée. In The Transcendence of the 
Ego Sartre establishes his empirical position in relation to 
his ontological phenomenology. While he expresses agreement 
with Husserl that consciousness is always a consciousness of 
something, he rejects the Husserlian hypothesis which posits 
the transcendence of the ego in consciousness.^ Sartre
5lbid., p. 178.
^Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans
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clearly Indicates what he is attempting to demonstrate in the 
opening of The Transcendence of the Ego: "We should like to
show here that the ego is neither formally nor materially in 
consciousness: it is outside, in the world. It is a being
of thé world, like the ego of a n o t h e r . T h i s  implies that 
the ego is extrinsic in quality and in relation to conscious­
ness- it is extrinsic because it cannot possibly exist before 
the confrontation of consciousness with the world. Therefore 
the ego is nothing but whatever consciousness nihilates^ of 
the world through its own activities. Now it is these activ­
ities of consciousness which are in question. If we accept 
Newman's explanation (namely, that the ego does not evolve 
from perceptual observation of the world), then the ego should 
possess some innate qualities which enable man to experience 
the world without any perceptual observations. But if this 
were the case, there would be no reason for Sartre to write 
The Transcendence of the Ego to clarify what he accepts and 
rejects from Husserl and Descartes.
On the contrary, Sartre emphasizes that perception is a 
fundamental mode of experiencing the world, but perception to 
Sartre does not appear passive as in Locke and Hume. Rather, 
perception appears in the presence of consciousness where the
Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: The Noon­
day Press, 1957), p. 46.
Ibid. , p. 31.
^"Nihilation" in the Sartrean sense means whatever con­
sciousness is able to grasp or to know from the world.
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individual perceiver is engaged in the act of perceiving. In 
this respect Sartre could be considered as non-empirical in 
the traditional sense only, where the ontological relation 
between mind and matter is explained in terms of the phenom­
enal spontaneity of cause and effect, where material objects 
appear to be the cause of the phantasms and the images of the 
mind. But in the real sense Sartre is not non-empirical, 
because the empirical world is the only world where conscious­
ness performs its activities in an empirical manner; in fact 
the world is always the object for consciousness. Sartre ex­
plains his views on the matter in the following: "Perception
is articulated only on the ontological foundation of presence 
to the world, and the world is revealed concretely as the 
ground of each individual p e r c e p t i o n ."9 Whether this is true 
or not is not our concern at the moment, but it is our con­
cern to make it clear that Sartre considers perception a 
fundamental phenomenon through which man articulates his re­
lationship with the world.
So far we have shown that Newman’s claim about the 
existentialist way of observing the world is not true. This 
appears to be the case, at least with Sartre, who emphasizes 
perception as a way of experiencing both the world and the 
other. To perceive the world is to know the world, and know­
ing the world is contingent upon our willingness to articulate
9jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel 
E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. l8l.
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its presence through perception; and this is precisely what 
Sartre means by contingency, the notion which seems to be un­
clear to Newman.
Perception to Sartre is not imposed on consciousness, 
nor is it produced by the world or material stuff in order to 
avail itself and make itself present to consciousness; 
rather, the reverse is true. The world appears to us when we 
are present in it. When we become aware of the vitality of 
perception through consciousness, then we realize the pres­
ence of the world. It is in this sense that Sartre talks 
about the contingency of existence when he confronts the 
chestnut tree in the park at Beauville.H
I was there, motionless and icy, plunged in a horrible 
ecstasy; I understood the Nausea, I possessed it. To 
tell the truth, I did not formulate my discoveries to 
myself. But I think it would be easy for me to put 
them in words now. The essential thing is contingency.
I mean one cannot define existence as necessity. To 
exist is simply to be there; those who exist let them­
selves be enountered, but you can never deduce any thing 
from them. I believe there are people who have under­
stood this, only they tried to overcome this contingency 
by inventing a necessary, causal being.
The message which Sartre is delivering here is that 
existence is contingent upon our presence, for if we are not 
present in the world there will be no consciousness; and if 
consciousness is absent, there will be no way to affirm the
l^Newman, Ethics, LXXVI, 179.
lljean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander 
(New York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1964), p. 172.
l^ibid., p. 176.
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presence of existence. Conscousness is the key to existence. 
To be present and to be conscious, therefore, mean the same 
thing. For to be present we have to be present in relation 
to something which is consciously affirmed. Only our arti­
culation of the present can signify our presence. A student, 
therefore, who raises his hand when his name is called is not 
necessarily totally present, nor are those present who are 
simply sitting in the classroom. For even though they occupy 
a location in the space of the classroom, it does not follow 
that they are there, because they might be there in body, 
which is occupying a definite location in space, but absent 
in consciousness; and if they are absent in consciousness, 
there will be no way for them to articulate the present nor 
to affirm existence. In this way existence appears to be 
contingent to Sartre, namely, contingent upon our willingness 
to be.
To be means to exist; to exist is to be present; and to 
be present implies to be conscious of being immersed in the 
world. It is also in this sense that existence does not 
appear as a necessity to Sartre because he does not see any 
primordiality in being before consciousness, nor does he see 
any intrinsic constructive pattern within consciousness. For 
this purpose Sartre explains consciousness in terms of its 
intentionality or in its willingness to bring itself out into 
the w o r l d . 13 it should be understood that consciousness is
13jean-Paul Sartre, L*imaginaire (Paris: Librairie
Gallimard, 1940), p. 22.
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always a consciousness of something which is a representa­
tional phenomenon of consciousness. Sartre explains, "Per­
cevoir, concevoir, imaginer, tels sont en effet les trois 
types de consciences par lesquelles un même objet peut nous 
être d o n n e . This, we hope, explains Sartre’s position on 
man’s relation to the world. It is a relation which is 
grounded in empirical phenomenal experiences and not as Fred 
Newman presupposed it to be.^5 Also it should be clear that 
Sartre views existence as contingent and not as necessary.
It is interesting here to contrast John Wild’s descrip­
tion of existentialism with Newman’s. Wild in expressing his 
views about existentialism takes a radically opposite view to 
that of Newman.
The existentialist philosophers accept the radical 
empiricism of Kierkegaard. They are not interested 
in artificial problems, nor in theoretical construc­
tions. They are interested rather in the concrete 
data of immediate experience, and in describing these 
data so far as possible exactly as they are given.
This is the phenomenological method. They have applied 
this method to many regions not previously explored, 
but especially to the pervasive data of existence, 
awareness, and human value which lie at the root of the 
disciplines of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.
In all their fields, their descriptions have revealed 
certain facts which are quite at variance with major 
trends of modern thought and contemporary analytic 
philosophy.17 _
l^Ibid., p. 18.
l^Newman, Ethics, LXXVI, 178.
l^Sartre, Nausea, p. 176.
17john D. Wild, "The New Empiricism," Sartre: A Col­
lection of Critical Essays, ed. Edith ^ern (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 136.
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We are not stating Wild's explanation in order to find 
support for our argument, but to show the extreme opposite 
views that each individual interpreter is making in regard 
to existentialism. We will not attempt to analyze John 
Wild's statement here, because his generalized view is not 
pertinent to the major problem with which we are dealing in 
this dissertation, and also because Wild's misleading state­
ments are so enormous; to dwell on evaluating their authen­
ticity would be a tremendous project in itself.
The major theme that the existentialists in general 
and Sartre in particular would like to emphasize in regard 
to this problem is not in carefully describing the concrete 
data of immediate experience, nor simply in analyzing the 
nature of our experience to find out whether it is empirical 
or n o n - e m p i r i c a l . 19 Rather, the fundamental concern which 
Sartre, as other existentialists, expresses here is the ques­
tion of how man can establish concrete relations with the 
world. This leads us to evaluate another notion which New­
man assumes, namely, that Sartre's ontology is relativistic, 
and that ethical relativism is an outgrowth of his ontologi­
cal relativism. In the following we shall demonstrate that 
this interpretation of Sartre is misleading.
Prom his earliest works, Sartre accepted the Husserlian
l^Ibid.
l^Newman, Ethics, LXXVI, 179,
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explanation of the nature of consciousness; that is, "con­
sciousness is always a consciousness of something," which 
implies that consciousness cannot exist without being directed 
to something. The upsurge of consciousness is realized, 
therefore, by its being in the world, and without the world 
there would be no consciousness. Furthermore, Sartre's 
phenomenological ontology in Being and Nothingness is funda­
mentally concerned, as we see it, with describing the onto­
logical relations between consciousness and the world, or be­
tween the for-itself and the in-itself.
The for-itself is responsible in its being for its 
relation with the in-itself or, if you prefer, it pro­
duces itself originally on the foundation of a relation 
to the in-itself. This is what we already anticipated 
when we defined consciousness as a being such that in 
its being, its being is in question in so far as this 
being implies a being other than i t s e l f .^0
In this sense we view Sartre's shaping of the project of his 
ontology as an attempt to find the fundamental co-relation 
between the for-itself and the in-itself or between con­
sciousness and the w o r l d . Accordingly, the claim that 
Newman makes in regard to what he considers an "ontological 
relativism" in Sartre is misleading, especially if we take 
seriously his assumption that this doctrine should be con­
sidered the cornerstone of Sartre's philosophy.-^
20sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 172
21 l b i d ., pp. 626-632.
22Newman, Ethics, LXXVI, 174.
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Newman’s interpretation of Sartre is not only mislead­
ing, but also misrepresents the fundamental outlines which 
Sartre attempts to design for phenomenological ontology. For 
if it is true that Sartre’s ontology is relativistic, he 
would not be so concerned with bringing about a reconcilia­
tion between the for-itself and the in-itself; in fact, through 
ontology Sartre hopes to study the structures of being in its 
totality and as a synthetic unity of consciousness and the 
world. To say that Sartre's ontology is relativistic is to 
imply that consciousness constructs its own concepts of the 
world as it pleases. As a matter of fact Newman explains 
ontological relativism as a form of intellectual activity in 
which the mind imposes certain categories or concepts on the 
g i v e n . 23 To our understanding this type of interpretation 
reflects a strong form of conceptualism which does not have 
any relevance to any existentialist position because at heart 
existentialism represents a reaction against any form of re- 
ductionism or abstraction from reality. The difference, 
therefore, between ontological relativism and existentialism 
is that, according to the former view, the mind appears as 
arbitrarily imposing its concepts upon the world and deter­
mining the structures of values; whereas, according to the 
latter, consciousness appears as an explorer of itself in the 
in-itself, or rather consciousness appears searching for
23ibid., 181.
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itself in the world. The world does not appear in the form 
of concepts or categories, but as a concrete presence which 
is revealed through consciousness. The consequence of this 
position is that since all consciousness is temporal, finite, 
and limited in its comprehension of the world, and also since 
it derives its judgment solely from itself and not from any 
eternal all-comprehensive Being, whatever appears to be re­
vealed through consciousness has to appear subjectively and 
not otherwise.
To be subjective and to be relativistic do not mean the 
same thing. The misunderstanding which arises in Newman's 
argument is partly due to his failure to make distinction be­
tween a subjective judgment and a relativistic one. A sub­
jective judgment, from the existential viewpoint, means that 
the subject alone is responsible for making decisions in re­
lation to the human situation. The vision of the subject 
involved and his feelings are the only ground for decision­
making. The value of this subjective activity is not meas­
ured in the light of the well-being only of the individual 
subject involved, but in the light of the well-being of all 
other subjects as well. The relative judgment is that through 
which we view the interest of the individual subject as the 
only concern. If we borrow Kant's way of evaluating moral 
judgments, the subjective judgment in Sartre appears similar 
to the categorical imperatives; whereas the relative judgment 
seems to be similar to a hypothetical category.
20
In the preceding evaluation we have shown that Newman's 
argument does not correspond to the basic notions of Sartre's 
philosophy. His claim of ontological relativism appears to 
be false. His assumption that the existential attitude In 
observing the world Is not based on perceptual observation 
Is also false.
In the following we will sketch Sartre's ontology, with 
an attempt to show Its Intersubjective element, which we be­
lieve reflects the true nature of Sartre's ontology.
Why Intersubjectlvlty?
While In the previous section we attempted to show that 
Sartre's ontology Is not relativistIc, In the ensuing one we 
will attempt to expose Its Intersubjective nature.
The Inescapablllty of subjectivity could not be related 
to the ontological relatlvlstlc Incentives of the for-ltself; 
rather, subjectivity appears as the only way In which the for- 
Itself can articulate the other In the world. It Is there­
fore the 1, as a subjective consciousness, which emerges out 
of Itself as a possibility In making judgments and decisions. 
Subjectivity (In this sense) and ontological relativism do 
not mean the same thing; and the difference Is that between 
one who conceptualizes the world according to his own arbi­
trary liking and one who finds himself In the midst of the 
world and accepts the risks and the responsibilities Involved 
In relating himself to the world. Thus Sartre's assertion
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that "existence precedes essence" conveys the ontological 
nature of his s u b j e c t i v i t y . This subjectivity is related 
to man's throwrjpss into the world, in which man appears as 
the maker of his own essence.
Furthermore, if Sartre proclaims ontological relativism, 
why should he be concerned with viewing the ontological 
ground of the for-itself, as well as its ethical judgments in 
correlation with others? Insofar as the ontological question 
about being is concerned, Sartre affirms that this question 
has meaning only if it is posited in a w o r l d . ^5 After this 
proposition Sartre proceeds in his analysis of the problem.
The following statement should be helpful in clarifying this 
statement. "The original presence of the for-itself is pres­
ence to being. Shall we say then that it is presence to all 
being?"2^ This implies that the activity of consciousness is 
the factor which brings man into the present.
That means that the for-itself as a realizing presence 
to all being realizes itself as a realizing presence to 
the "thises," and as a realizing presence to the 
"thises" it realizes itself as a realizing presence to 
all being. In other words, the presence of the for- 
itself to the world can be realized only by its pres­
ence to one or several particular things, and conversely 
its presence to a particular thing can be realized only 
on the ground of a presence to the w o r l d . ^7
2^Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, 
trans. Bernard Prechtman and Hazel Barnes (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 17-




This passage does not seem to convey any relatlvlstlc view 
of the world, but rather emphasizes that the only possibility 
for the for-itself to realize Itself as a being In the world 
Is through the dialectical dimensions of the presence In 
which the "thises" and the world appear articulated In the 
presence of the for-itself.
Thus Sartre Interprets the world through totalization, 
and It should be clear that the process of this totalization 
Is neither Hegelian In Its objectivity nor Klerkegaardlan In 
Its subjectivity, but a synthesis of both. It Is what Sartre 
calls Intersubjectlvlty. Sartre explains the term In the 
following :
The other Is Indispensable to my own existence as well 
as to my knowledge about myself. This being so. In 
discovering my Inner being I discover the other person 
at the same time, like a freedom placed In front of me 
which thinks and wills only for or against me. Hence, 
let us at once announce the discovery of a world which 
we shall call Intersubjectlvlty; this Is the world In 
which man decides what he Is and what others are.2°
The axlologlcal modes of Sartre's Intersubjectlvlty 
appear explicitly expressed In two ways. The first way oc­
cupies his ontological description of the for-itself In Its 
relationship to the In-ltself; whereas the second way appears 
to be carried out In his ethical concerns. In expressing the 
freedom of the Individual In correlation with a sense of 
responsibility to others. In the following we shall attempt 
to show Sartre's notion of Intersubjectlvlty as It appears
28Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 38.
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directing his ontological approach as well as his ethical 
concerns.
His ontological descriptions can be glimpsed in the 
following :
It is through the world that the for-itself makes known 
to itself as a totality detotalized, which means that by 
its very upsurge the for-itself is a revelation of being 
as a totality inasmuch as the for-itself has to be its 
own totality in the detotalized mode. Thus the very 
meaning of the for-itself is outside in being, but it is 
through the for-itself that the meaning of being ap­
pears . 29
Ontologically, so to speak, the for-itself appears to be 
causing its own emergence in the world, and this emergence 
into the world is caused by its pure nothingness. Paradoxi­
cally, out of this nothingness the for-itself hunts for its 
own being in the world. Hence the world appears as the only 
possibility, a possibility not for its own but for the for- 
itself to hunt its own being. The world, therefore, appears 
as the ground for being, or the project^O which the for- 
itself is aiming at, namely, to come into possession of a 
being which is what it is.
If we reflect seriously on Sartre's ontological proj­
ects for the for-itself, we can find an element of projective 
idealism through which the for-itself is projecting in the 
w o r l d .31 What- we mean by saying that we find an element of
29sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. I8I.
30"Project" in this context is meant to signify the 
ontological concern of man, namely, his infinite desire to 
become what he is not.
31sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. I8I.
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projective Idealism in Sartre is that the for-itself appears
to be faced with the imposition upon itself of an infinite
desire to be what it is not. Sartre defines the for-itself
as being what it is not, and not being what it is, while he
defines the in-itself as being what it is.32 The for-itself,
therefore, faces its own lack, its own incompleteness, or its
own detotalization. As a result of this confrontation, the
for-itself emerges in consciousness to desire what it lacks,
namely, the permanence of the in-itself. Ostensibly, the
desire to nihilate the world becomes a permanent desire.
In other words the for-itself projects being as for- 
itself, a being which is what it is. It is as being 
which is what it is not, and which is not what it is, 
that the for-itself projects being what it is. It 
is consciousness that it wishes to have the impermea­
bility and infinite density of the in-itself.33
The totalization with the world appears to be the ideal which 
the for-itself is striving to fulfill. Thus when Sartre says 
"To be man means to reach toward being God or if you prefer, 
man fundamentally is the desire to be God,"3^ it corroborates 
our contention that Sartre represents man as a being who pro­
jects himself toward an ideal. The ideal does not appear in 
abstract categories in the form of necessity, but in the con­
crete sense of contingency, namely, the contingency which 
rests upon man's desire to be what he is not.
32%bid., p. Ixv. 
33ibid. , p. 566. 
3^Ibid.
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Sartre does not offer any synthesis In Being and Nothing­
ness between the for-itself and the in-itself (the desire and 
what is desired); but he states the ultimate goal of man’s 
desire: the desire to be God. The important point in regard
to this analysis is to find out how the for-itself should ful­
fill its desire for the in-itself. Should it be executed 
arbitrarily? The answer is negative. Sartre rejects this 
approach because the for-itself appears to be asserting, if 
not dictating, what the in-itself ought to be, or at least 
appears to be abstracting an image from its totality through 
which the in-itself appears according to whatever the for- 
itself assumes it to be.
Sartre’s objection to this view is based on his rejec­
tion of any solipsistic description of the world. For this 
reason we find it difficult to see the validity of Newman’s 
consideration of Sartre’s ’’ontological relativism” (as we 
have shown in the previous section of this chapter), because 
"ontological relativism” cannot escape solipsism, the posi­
tion which Sartre strongly rejects.35
Accordingly, if Sartre rejects solipsism it would hardly 
be possible to imagine that he accepts "ontological rela­
tivism.” The for-itself does not intend to conceptualize the 
in-itself according to its own arbitrary judgment, but to 
know it as it is. Paradoxically, while the major objective
35ibid. , p. 229.
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of the for-itself is knowledge, and knowledge, as Sartre puts 
it, is the w o r l d , 36 this objective cannot be achieved without 
subjectivity.
Yet it is not a purely subjective modification of the 
for-itself since it causes all subjectivity to be 
possible. But if the for-itself is to be the nothing­
ness whereby "there is" being, then being can exist 
originally only as totality. Thus knowledge is the 
world. To use Heidegger’s expression, the world and 
outside of that— nothing. But this "nothing" is not 
originally that in which human reality emerges. This 
nothing is human reality itself as the radical negation 
by means of which the world is revealed.37
The goal that Sartre is seeking in his ontology is not 
to postulate references about the in-itself according to what 
might be conceptualized through the volitions of the for- 
itself; rather, Sartre is looking to know the world as it is. 
Knowing the world appears to be an ontological possibility, 
and through ontology Sartre attempts to actualize this possi­
bility. The major goal of knowing is, therefore, objective; 
likewise objectivity is the end of ontology.
But ontology as such is a subjective undertaking. It 
is so, and it cannot be otherwise because there is no way to 
carry out an ontological plan without the involvement of a 
subject. The subject, or the for-itself, through its own 
negation, appears to be the only possibility which is aware 
of itself as consciousness. Accordingly, since ontology is 




mathematical abstraction, or logic and scientific method, it 
has to be carried out by man as a subject. Now one might ask
why it could not be carried out other than by a subject? The
answer is that ontology is fundamentally based on man’s con­
cern about his relationship to the world, and that this con­
cern can only be expressed through the existential modes of 
man as a subject when he confronts the world face-to-face.
It is from this confrontation that the for-itself becomes 
aware of itself as a being whose nothingness is in question; 
and it is only man as a subject who is concerned with ques­
tioning the nature of his own being. Ontology, therefore, 
cannot escape subjectivity because of its nature; and the 
nature of ontology is not constructed in a dialogue form, but
rather as a monologue; so it is. not dialectical in a sense
because it is one-sided. That is, the for-itself alone does 
the reflection, while the in-itself is only an object for 
reflection. Consequently, de facto subjectivity remains as 
long as the for-itself does not become united with the in- 
i t s e l f .^8 Sartre, in this respect, is not Hegelian simply 
because synthesis does not take place between the for-itself 
and the in-itself or between mind and reality. For this rea­
son Sartre emphasizes that the for-itself can only become a 
de-totalized totality, namely, being in the world, while at 
the same time having a certain autonomy within it.39
33ibid., p . 6l8.
39ibid., p. I8l.
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In the light of the preceding discussion we feel that 
Sartre's ontological position is clarified, at least in re­
spect to Newman's claim that Sartre espouses an "ontological 
relativism" from' which he substantiates his ethical relativism.
We have attempted to convey to the reader that Sartre's 
subjectivity should be considered a means toward objectivity. 
This illustrates what we mean by the term intersubjectivity, 
namely, when consciousness opens up to the world and attempts 
to see it as it is, and not as consciousness conceives it at 
will or as it pretends to see it. In view of these inten­
tions, Sartre attempts to carry out his ontological plan.
For this reason we claim that Sartre's ontology is neither 
relativistic nor ultimately subjectivistic, but intersubjec- 
tive, which means that while the subject is the only being 
through which the knowledge of the world is revealed, this 
knowledge is not arbitrarily conceptualized by the subject, 
but only discovered. For this reason we claim that inter­
subjectivity, and not relativism, characterizes Sartre's on­
tology.
In the preceding discussion we have observed how inter­
subjectivity is carried out in Sartre's ontology, and in the 
following we shall attempt to demonstrate how it is carried 
out in his ethics.
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Humanism and not Relativism: the Ground
for Ethical Action
In the following we shall show the element of inter­
subjectivity in Sartre’s ethical thought. First, we would 
like to clarify the meaning of (and to justify the use of) 
our term "Sartre's ethical thought," instead of "Sartre’s 
ethics." This clarification has a direct bearing on illumin­
ating the misunderstanding which so many interpreters fall 
into in their evaluation of Sartre’s philosophy and its di­
rection. We do not use the term "Sartre's ethics" simply be­
cause Sartre has not confirmed his ethical thinking yet in 
any conclusive way. Thus, when we speak of Sartre’s ethics 
or someone’s ethics, we would appear to be referring to a 
standard of reference to check against in case we would like 
to know the notions of right and wrong, good and evil, or 
one’s duties, responsibilities and moral obligations. We 
feel that the term "ethical thought" expresses more flexi­
bility or at least some openness to what may be conceived at 
any particular situation or another: whereas when we say
"ethics" it implies that our ethical thinking is already made, 
or that it is already conceptualized conclusively. It is 
this type of ethics that Sartre is hesitant to embrace, in 
spite of the fact that he concludes Being and Nothingness 
with a promise to devote his future work to ethics.
However, Sartre, as it is well known, has not fulfilled
40Ibid., p. 628.
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his promises yet, and he probably never will. Instead of 
devoting his future work to ethics, he presented his largest 
work. Saint Genet, in 1952, and then followed with his mas­
terpiece, Critique de la raison dialectique, in i960. In the 
interim between these works he wrote the first three volumes 
of his long-range autobiography. Situations ; and then after 
the publication of Critique de la raison dialectique he wrote 
another three volumes of the Situations and the short auto­
biography of his childhood and adolescent years. Les Mots, 
the latter in 1964.
Sartre has not confined his ethical ideas in any speci­
fic structure which represents, as we said, his ethic, but 
this does not imply that Sartre does not have any ethics. To 
hold this position would be evidence of total ignorance, be­
cause in the main Sartre's work is infused with an ethical 
concern about the individual man and all men: humanity.
Sartre's ethical concern is thematic rather than systematic; 
that is to say, it constitutes a fundamental theme throughout 
his works, as in his philosophical work Being and Nothingness, 
in his literary The Dirty Hands, No Exit, and the Respectable 
Prostitute, and in his psychological work Esquisse d'une 
théorie des émotions. In all of these Sartre expresses his 
ethical concerns only indirectly; it is in his short essay 
L'existentialisme est un humanisme, that he makes his most 
direct pronouncements about existential ethics.
If existentialism concerns itself with human reality.
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it does not have to presuppose a teleological goal for this
reality: and if it does so, basically it would not be dif­
ferent from Kantian idealism, the philosophy which Sartre 
attempted to reject, although he could not totally free him­
self from its influence. The influence of Kant upon Sartre’s 
ethical thought can be clearly recognized in the address that 
he made about his existential position.
Quand nous disons que l ’homme se choisit, nous 
entendons que chacun d ’entre nous, se choisit, mais par
là nous voulons dire aussi qu’en se choisissant il
choisit tous les hommes. En effet, il n ’est pas un de 
nos actes qui, en créant l’homme que nous voulons être, 
ne crée en même temps une image de l’homme tel que nous 
estimons qu’il doit être. Choisir d ’être ceci ou cela, 
c’est affirmer en même temps la valeur de ce que nous 
choisissons, car nous ne pouvons jamais choisir le mal;
ce que nous choisissons, c'est toujours le bien, et
rien ne peut être bon pour nous sans l’être pour tous.^^
This proclamation is clearly reminiscent of Kantian 
idealism in laying down the universal moral law under which 
all men are treated as ends.
In fact, here Sartre goes a little further than Kant. 
While Kant considers the kingdom of ends as the ideal for 
which rational beings ought to be striving, Sartre affirms 
this ideal as a living reality in the decisions that we make 
in our confrontation with the human situation. Thus, the 
ideal does not remain any more a mere possibility, but appears 
in actuality incorporated in our activities while we execute
our decisions which ought to be good for us as well as for
^^Jean-Paul Sartre, L ’existentialisme est un humanisme 
(Paris: Les Editions Nagel^ 1963), p . 231
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others. Through decisions the Ideal and the practical become 
synthesized In our actions, and outside of this there Is no­
thing. In other words, there Is no Independent good which Is 
good In Itself. There Is only the good of human reality, and 
this good Is the manifestation of good decisions. Before this 
activity there Is no good, only self-deception and bad faith.
While Sartre agrees with Kant that we should not treat 
others as means toward our ends but as ends In themselves, he 
rejects the notion of a priori "decisions" or judgments, on 
the ground that It does not answer all the problems Involved 
In human situations. Therefore, the subject Involved In 
any given human situation cannot escape subjectivity because 
there Is no other possibility. Decisions are not made In 
heaven, nor already conceptualized In a given moral law; they 
are man-made, and they are made by man In relation to human 
situations.^3 when Sartre was approached by one of his stu­
dents asking him for help In deciding whether he should stay 
with his old and 111 mother or join the underground to fight 
the Germans, Sartre refused to make the decision for the stu­
dent, and referred him to his own emotions In the light of 
which a decision should be made.^^ it Is only according to 
human compassion that we can take the decisive forward steps
42lbld., p. 42.
43ibld., p. 43.
^^Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotion, pp. 24-26
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in making a commitment.
Traditional morality, according to Sartre, cannot pro­
vide an answer for a case like this. Sartre assumes that it 
is only man's feelings and sentiment that can dictate the 
direction which he should f o l l o w . ^5 por this reason Sartre 
has been accused of anti-intellectualism and of radical sub­
jectivism. This would appear to be the case if one does not 
reflect enough on the nature of this philosophy to realize 
the importance of its ethical involvements. Traditionally 
we are told to be involved rationally, and probably spirit­
ually, in our ethical life; whereas involvement in feeling, 
compassion, and emotion are minimized if not rejected. But 
Sartre emphasizes the acceptance of whatever feeling dictates 
in making judgments.
It is very conceivable that the accusation of anti- 
intellectualism is based on Sartre's consideration of human 
feeling in decision making. It is obvious that this miscon­
ception appears magnified if we do not understand clearly the 
nature of feeling, on one hand, and its relation to conscious­
ness on the other. The nature of feeling could not be com­
prehended without taking into consideration its basic activ­
ities. This activity can be viewed in two ways: (1) as re­
lated to reflective consciousness within feeling; (2) as 
related to what man feels his situation to be with others in
^^Ibid., p . 26.
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the world. In regard to the first, it must be dear that ex­
istentialism in general and Sartre in particular would like 
to emphasize the wholeness of man as an existential possi­
bility .
For Sartre man as body, man as consciousness, and man 
as a being in the world are all considered equally important 
modes of man’s existentiality. Thus, man as mind is equally 
important as body, and also man as body is as uniquely impor­
tant as m i n d . w e  view Sartre from this perspective we 
should be able to recognize that he is attempting to replace 
the traditional ethical activities, which are based on a uni­
versal rational measurement of good and evil, with judgments 
which are made according to our reflective activities within 
the particular situation.
46sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 303-359.
^^There is no priority of mind over matter, nor does 
such a division take place intrinsically or extrinsically 
simply because there is no substance that determines the status 
of man's being; nor are there any preconceived directions for 
man's projects because before consciousness there was only 
spontaneity, and in spontaneity there is no "I". The "I" can 
break through the continuity of spontaneity and become aware 
of itself as a subject only after reflection. Sartre em­
phasizes that there is no "I" on the -unreflective level; it 
is out of reflective consciousness that the I as a synthetic 
unity emerges in the world (Sartre, Existentialism and Human 
Emotion, p. 23). What is important here is Sartre's attempt 
to escape idealism and solipsism in his formulation of the 
"I" as consciousness (Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, pp. 
48-104). In doing so Sartre is able to place the ethical 
feeling of man between the passive and the active form of 
feeling. The passive feeling lacks the reflection of con­
sciousness, whereas the active feeling involves reflection.
As a result of this activity a person can appear as a sub­
ject who assumes responsibilities and is willing to risk mak­
ing decisions in relation to himself and to others.
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From these activities the "I” emerges as an activity of 
consciousness which is not concerned about itself in isola­
tion, but about its relationship to others in the world. The 
element of irrationalism on the part of the subject exists on 
the pre-reflective level only; whereas on the reflective 
level the wholeness of one’s being appears to be engaged in 
the ethical act. Now this wholeness is in question, and from 
this question arises the basic difference between some tradi­
tional views and existentialism. Reason is expected to pre­
vail for the traditional rationalist, and idealist as well, 
and also the human situation should be viewed according to 
the justification of a rational judgment. Reason always 
tends to be optimistic about the fate of man, and so reason 
affirms this optimism by emphasizing what appears to be ra­
tional and denouncing what appears to be contrary.
But existentialism holds that this image of man repre­
sents only one-half of the picture. An existentialist can 
see that man’s fate also unavoidably involves anguish and 
despair, fear and trembling, sickness and death, loneliness 
and alienation. All of these modes are situations that man 
lives through, and through which consciousness experiences 
the human situation. Feeling, then, appears to be important 
to Sartre because through feeling man is aware of his im­
mediate relations with the world.
Sartre may appear, to some extent, similar to Whitehead 
in emphasizing feeling as a fundamental mode of experiencing
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reality. For Whitehead, however, feeling is in fact a mode 
of ingression of an eternal object into the actual occasion. 
And for Sartre feeling has priority in experiencing the world 
and also in making ethical d e c i s i o n s . ^9 But the basic d i f ­
ference between Whitehead and Sartre is that, to Whitehead, 
feeling does not necessarily involve consciousness; whereas 
for Sartre it does. This represents, in the main, the basic 
difference between the Whiteheadian organic philosophy, which 
emphasizes the continuity of nature, and the Sartrean phenom­
enology, which attempts to represent consciousness as a power 
which breaks out of nature to create its own identity within 
it.
Consciousness is, therefore, the means by which the 
freedom of the subject becomes a possibility. In fact con­
sciousness is freedom, and it is considered so because the 
realization of one's freedom becomes a possibility through 
the activity of consciousness. Without consciousness the 
for-itself would not be what it is not, because it would have 
been, like the in-itself, determined to be what it is. In 
other words, without consciousness man would have been like 
any other natural entity, determined to be what he is accord­
ing to his location in space and time; or he would have been 
an objectified entity known to be what he is, not according
^^Afred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay
in Cosmology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p . 131•
^^Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions , p. 26.
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to his individualityj but an instance of a generalized classi­
fication. Without consciousness there would be no individu­
ality .
However, the truth of the matter, as Sartre would say, 
is the converse. That is, there is an individuality because 
there is consciousness, and since consciousness is not for 
itself its own object, the object of consciousness by nature 
exists outside of it.^O short, individuality cannot be
its own object either. While on the ontological level Sartre 
reminds us that to be conscious is always to be conscious of 
the world,51 on the ethical level, according to what we can 
infer from his essay on existentialism, there is the implica­
tion that to be conscious is to be conscious of humanity.52 
Newman's charge of "ethical relativism" cannot be justified, 
because the subject involved does not appear to make judg­
ments according to his own arbitrary interest, but with the 
intention of being in the interest of all men. (When I am 
choosing my freedom, I am choosing the freedom of all men.) 
This is the basic difference between intersubjectivity in 
ethics and ethical relativism. From the previous exposition 
it should be clear that Sartre expresses his ethical concern 
in an intersubjective, and not in a relative, manner.
50sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, p. 4l.
51sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 334.
52gartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, pp. 38-39-
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Another major point should be clear, and that is that 
Sartre is not an exponent of atomistic individualism. If 
this were the case he would not emphasize intersubjective 
relations in the human situation, nor would he reject the 
Husserlian transcendental "I".53
In the following we shall attempt to bring the notion 
of intersubjectivity into focus within the human situation. 
Simone de Beauvoir’s explication of Sartre’s ethical thought 
is valuable in clarifying this point.
If this kind of ethics individualistic or not?
Yes, if one means by that that it accords to the in­
dividual an absolute value and that it recognizes in 
him alone the power of laying the foundations of his 
own existence. It is individualism in the sense in 
which the wisdom of the ancients, the Christian ethics 
of salvation, and the Kantian ideal of virtue also 
merit this name; it is opposed to the totalitarian 
doctrines which raise up beyond man the mirage of Man­
kind. But it is not solipsistic, since the individual 
is defined only by his relationship to the world and 
to other individuals; he exists only by transcending 
himself, and his freedom can be achieved only through 
the freedom of others. He justifies his existence by 
a movement which, like freedom, springs from his heart 
but which leads outside of him.
This individualism does not lead to the anarchy 
of personal whim. Man is free; but he finds his law 
in his very freedom. First, he must assume his free­
dom and not flee it; he assumes it by a constructive 
movement; one does not exist without doing something; 
and also by a negative movement which rejects oppression 
for oneself and others. In construction, as in rejec­
tion, it is a matter of reconquering freedom on the con­
tingent facticity of*existence, that, of taking the 
given, which, at the start, is there without any reason, 
as something willed by m a n .5^
53Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, p. 40.
5^Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. 
Bernard Prechtman (New York: The Citadel Press, 1948), p.
156.
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This is a condensed description of Sartre's ethical 
thought toward others. It is in this humanistic sense only 
that man can reach out for his being. Man in this sense is 
inseparable from humanity. To put it more precisely, man is 
humanity inasmuch as humanity is all men. Nothing intervenes 
which separates man from his total humanistic conditions, nor 
are there any factors, as intellectual or spiritual substances, 
which determine man's ethical and humanistic attitude. There 
is only consciousness, a consciousness of man as a being in 
the world whose being always stands outside of himself with 
others and among others, and also man as consciousness who 
always is in a human situation. Sartre describes this case in 
the following:
Car 1'homme n'est pas ramassé en lui-meme, mais dehors, 
de ciel a là terre. Le galet a un intérieur, l'homme 
non: mais il se perd pour que le galet existe. Et tous
ces hommes "infects" que Ponge veut fuir ou supprimer, 
ils sont aussi "rats, lions, filets, diamante." Ils 
le sont, précisément parce qu'ils "sont-dans-le-monde." 
Seulement ils n'y prennent pas garde. Il faut le leur 
révéler. Ainsi s'agit-il moins, a mon avis, d'acquérir 
des sentiments nouveaux que d'approfondir notre condition 
humaine.55
This presents us with a vivid picture of man as a sub­
ject who searches for himself among others and who also dis­
covers others as he discovers h i m s e l f . 55 This interplay be­
tween oneself and others appears to be dialectical necessity
55jean-Paul Sartre, Situations, I (Paris: Gallimard,
1947), 291.
55gee also Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions,
p. 38.
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for authenticity. Others, that is to say, are important for 
the surge of man's individuality inasmuch as man is important 
for others. This is the human condition; it is rather an im­
perative mode for individuality in which we encounter our­
selves if we become aware of our individuality. Individuality 
appears to be possible only within these conditions, namely, 
within a human situation and not outside of it.
The ensuing question is related to how individuality 
as a potentiality can be actualized. Sartre's answer to this 
question is clear: by means of reflection. At this point we
need to emphasize, as we previously stated, that Sartre does 
not see any possibility for individuality to surge forth with­
out reflection. There is no "I" in the unreflective conscious­
ness, he declares.57 However, Sartre asserts that conscious­
ness is absolute in itself; namely, it is its own structure 
which is defined by intentionality. 58 Chapter IV we shall
devote some attention to defining intentionality.) Sartre 
does not bother to clarify ontologically the nature of this 
intentionality in consciousness, as Husserl attempts to do, 
but rather accepts the hypothesis in relation to the nature 
of consciousness as given.
Sartre does not seem to be able to escape circularity 
in defining his notion of consciousness. This is partly be­
cause Sartre is committed to reject any generic formulation
57sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 47. 
58ibid., p. 38.
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of consciousness which makes consciousness definable in terms 
of social characteristics (as with George Herbert Mead) or in 
terms of drives and needs (as with psychological behaviorism) 
or even in the light of Husserl's Erlebnis. Contrary to 
these approaches, Sartre does not define consciousness as 
other than what it is. In this respect, his definition re­
sembles G. E. Moore's definition of the Good. The Good is 
simply the Good; and Sartre similarly is declaring the same 
by stating that the existence of consciousness is an absolute
cnbecause consciousness is consciousness of i t s e l f , a n d  as 
such it is also a consciousness of something.
But if consciousness is consciousness of itself, it is 
still not simply closed up within ..self in isolation from 
the world, but as a result of being conscious of itself it 
comes to be conscious of the world. This is precisely what 
Sartre means when he defines consciousness in terms of in­
tentionality. "By intentionality consciousness transcends 
itself. It unifies itself by escaping from i t s e l f . U n ­
questionably this is a strong statement as to what intention­
ality can do in relation to the loneliness of consciousness, 
because it appears clear that without intentionality con­
sciousness would have been determined to be an entity defined 
simply in terms of what it is and not in terms of what it is
59ibid., p. 40. 
GOlbid., p. 38.
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not. Intentionality appears to be a directive force of con­
sciousness toward the world. But Sartre does not explain the 
origin or the nature of this self-directiveness in conscious­
ness which appears to be generated out of intentionality.
Does intentionality imply being, or does it have any intrin­
sic characteristic which makes it what it is? Does intention­
ality replace Parmenides’ dilemma between non-being and be­
ing, or is it the leap that consciousness sees itself through 
in order to escape its total nothingness? We do not know 
whether these questions can be answered simply because Sartre 
himself does not elaborate on this issue in spite of its per­
tinence to the ontological problem.
The point which we would like to emphasize in regard to 
the nature of consciousness is that intentionality has to be 
considered the directive force through which consciousness 
comes to see itself as a possibility which is stretching be­
tween its .present isness and the future of its becomingness. 
Therefore, we assume that because of intentionality conscious­
ness comes to be identified as a being which is not what it 
is. Sartre makes one point clear in regard to consciousness 
as it appears before and after the act of reflection. On the 
unreflective level consciousness stands as absolute inward­
ness in the scheme of spontaneity. On this level we sug­
gest that consciousness is passive, or at least is not aware
61Ibid., p . 4l.
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of its intricate relationship to the world. The individual 
involved could not be viewed as an individual human personal­
ity but as an objectified identity, or perhaps as a member of 
a species.
For this reason most existentialists express concern 
for the problem of individuality. This concern is related to 
the possibility of depersonalization or of the dehumanization 
of man. This process of depersonalization can take place if 
consciousness remains a mere "spontaneity," in Sartre's mean­
ing of the term. "Spontaneity" can be considered synonymous 
with collectivity. To break through "spontaneity" or col­
lectivity can only be possible in reflection. For this rea­
son Sartre points out that on the reflective level only does 
the "I" emerge. To be a collective personality or an in­
dividual personality is then totally related to whatever the 
individual consciousness actualizes out of itself. On the 
collective level we suggest that the individual is uncon­
sciously socialized, whereas on the reflective level the in­
dividual consciously emerges in the process of socialization 
and totalization. A misunderstanding of this point in Sartre 
leads some interpreters to conceive of Sartre's position as 
a philosophy of individual atomism, and others to look upon 
it as a philosophy of sociologism.^^
The crux of the issue at this point is that while 
Sartre strives for socialization and humanization, he also
62Ibid., p . 46,
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rejects the element of ought In them. Thus, socialization 
does not appear an inevitability for the "I," but a choice.
It is not an inevitability in the sense that external col­
lective forces do not and cannot make the actualization of 
the "I" possible. Rather, the external forces which emerge 
out of the social and political institutions, as well as from 
the industrial and technological complex, create tempting 
modes for the "I" to negate itself and to surrender in its 
struggle to become. This is undoubtedly the collectivity in 
which the organization man is born instead of the individual 
m a n . ^3 Sartre emphatically rejects this type of socializa­
tion in which the "I" does not appear as a reflective subject 
which makes its own project and accepts the responsibility of 
making its own decision in regard to what it wills to be and 
to do, but rather appears nihilated from its own intention­
ality, robbed of its individuality, and swallowed up in total 
obj ectification.
The difference between the two types of socialization—  
namely, the spontaneous or the collective and the reflective 
processes— is that, in the former, the "I" as consciousness 
will never emerge to the level of self-realization; and the 
individual in this mode of actualization appears as an entity 
objectified by the collective totality without projects or
^3william H. Whyte, The Organization Man (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956) gives a comprehensive
description of man’s alienation in the organization.
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decisions of his own. In the second form of socialization 
the "I" finds itself through reflection in the midst of the 
whole, and then consciously, reflectively, and responsibly 
views itself as an entity, standing in relation to other 
entities in some form of existential necessity, or as an in­
dividual who finds himself among others and realizes that 
the existence of others is as indispensable to his own exist­
ence as his existence is to o t h e r s P r o m  reflection, the 
"I" arises not with the feeling of autonomy, but with the 
feeling of the necessity of being with others. But this 
necessity does not bar the "I" from its own freedom to be 
what it wills to be.
Contrary to what has been told, therefore, it 
is on the reflected level that the ego-life has its 
place, and on the unreflected level that the im­
personal life has its place (which naturally does
not mean that all unreflected life is necessarily
altruistic).
This leads us to the conclusion that reflection is as 
essential to individuality as individuality is to freedom. 
Without reflection the "I" cannot become fully aware of its 
total ontological situation, namely, as a being in the world. 
For if the "I" remains on the unreflective level, conscious­
ness is concerned solely with itself and for itself and not
for the in-itself and others. But since consciousness is
always a consciousness of something, the question of
^^Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 38. 
85sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 58.
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individuality and freedom arises only when consciousness be­
comes conscious of something other than itself. It is in 
this respect that the ontological question is directed, it 
is hoped, to find out whether there is such a thing as human 
reality. We have to stress again that the goal which Sartre 
is seeking in ontologizing is an objective goal. However, 
since the "I," which is striving for this goal, is limited 
to its own nothingness and to its own subjectivity, this 
goal appears unattainable.
At this point we should point out that the feeling of 
Nausea, the confrontation with the absurd, the encounter with 
anguish and despair appear to be the existential modes which 
man faces when discovering the truth of his paradoxical 
nature, namely, the fact of the nothingness which he is and 
the desire to be God which he is not. It is between this 
nothingness and its desire that the authentic individual ful­
fills his desire to be God, and he cannot be considered an 
abstraction of scientific data which function according to a 
definite law of cause and effect. Man is reflected upon as 
man, as emotion and compassion, as love and hate, as limited 
and finite, as consciousness of what he is and what he is 
not, and as freedom. As such Sartre attempts to describe 
the ontological image of man in which he hopes to show the 
realistic elements of all men.
But we have to realize that while the artist attempts 
to perceive the given, he does not become a part of what is
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given but only a recipient. As such, the artist reflects 
upon the object in question with the aim of interpreting its 
real nature. Similarly, Sartre emphasizes that the subject 
engaged in the act of reflection and the object reflected 
upon remain separated. Consciousness is what it is, and the 
objects for consciousness are what they are. The for-itself 
hopes to nihilate the in-itself, but its hope vanishes in 
despair. The impasse remains as strong as ever. Accord­
ingly, in this respect Sartre does not accept "La dispon­
ibilité" of Marcel, in which the synthesis between the sub­
ject and the object takes place in the creative act of par­
ticipation. Nor does he accept in this respect the I-Thou
relationship of B u b e r . T h e s e  notions, in a sense, have a 
mystical flavor over consciousness, and Sartre does not see 
anything before or after consciousness which might encompass 
its manifestations.
Consciousness is then all alone searching for its 
authenticity in the world, and out of feeling its loneliness, 
its upsurge becomes possible. The search for authenticity is 
an ontological excursion. In other words, through ontology 
Sartre hopes to find the authentic roots of human existence. 
We conclude this chapter by suggesting that authenticity is 
revealed as a possibility when man discovers his ontological
^^Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, I, trans. G. S. 
Fraser (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Co., I960), 1954-181,
GTMartin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald G . Smith (New 
York: Scribners, 195871
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situation. We believe that man's ethical life is to be con­
sidered the expression of his authenticity. Without authen­
ticity there is no ethics; conversely, without ethics man 
cannot express his authenticity. Because of this fact the 
existentialism of Sartre is considered a philosophy of ac­
tion, since without action all philosophical speculation 
would be guilty of bad faith.
In this chapter we have dealt with two issues. First, 
we analyzed Fred Newman's argument and we showed that his 
claim— that Sartre's ethical relativism is an outgrowth of 
his ontological relativism— is inconsistent with the essence 
of Sartre's philosophy. Secondly, we attempted to set forth 
some major concepts of Sartre's philosophy, with an emphasis 
on showing its intersubjective nature. With this in mind, 
we traced intersubjectivity in Sartre's ontology and ethics. 
Although, at first glance, this chapter may not appear di­
rectly related to the theme of this thesis, we believe it is 
important in order to settle the question of the image of 
man in Sartre before we attempt to interpret this image. For 
this reason we have dealt with such notions as the for- 
itself and the in-itself, consciousness and intentionality, 
since an understanding of these notions is prerequisite to 
an understanding of man in Sartre. In other words, these are 
the characteristics of the "I", and an understanding of these 
would facilitate our understanding of the "I".
We have concluded this chapter with the suggestion that
H9
the "I" is all alone, unfolding its own nothingness in the 
world. The way this "I" experiences the world is neither 
teleologically determined nor ontologically presupposed. For 
this reason, the "I" is an absolute freedom. Our task in the 
coming chapter is to examine the nature and the origins of 
freedom, which we believe are psychological. We shall attempt 
to demonstrate two points. First, we shall defend our thesis 
that Sartre is first and foremost an ontologist and that 
through ontology he attempts to discover existential human­
istic truths, against the assumptions of Robert Champigny and 
Alvin Plantinga, who assume that Sartre's philosophy is ethi­
cal through and through. Secondly, we shall examine the na­
ture of Sartre's ontological motives, which we feel contain 
psychological overtones. This appears clear when we examine 
the notions of bad faith, responsibility, and anguish.
CHAPTER II
THE PSYCHO-ONTOLOGICAL ORIGINS OP SARTRE'S ETHICS
In the previous chapter we examined Newman's argument 
that Sartre's ontology Is relatlvistic in nature and that 
this ethical relativism is the by-product of his ontological 
relativism. We demonstrated the invalidity of this conclu­
sion, and also we pointed out the intersubjective element in 
both Sartre's ontology and his ethics.
In this chapter we will be concerned with evaluating 
two arguments about the nature of Sartre's philosophy. The 
first argument is represented by Robert Champigny, and the 
second by Alvin Plantinga. These two arguments express a 
common agreement about the nature of Sartre's philosophy.
Both of them contend that Sartre's philosophy is ethical 
through and through. But while Champigny affirms the positive 
nature of Sartre's ethics, Plantinga claims that Sartre's 
ethics is not consistent with any kind of morality. Our 
endeavor is^devoted to demonstrating three major points:
(1) to refute the claim made by Champigny and Plantinga in 
regard to the nature of Sartre's philosophy by showing sys­
tematically tlid invalidity of this claim; (2) to refute 
Plantinga's assumption that the nature of Sartre's morality
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Is amoral; (3) to trace the psychological origins of certain 
Sartrean notions, as bad faith, responsibility, anguish, 
which are considered ethical notions by Plantinga.
Examination of Robert Champigny 
A one-sided approach in viewing Sartre's philosophy 
seems very common among Sartre's interpreters, and unfortu­
nately we find some reputable figures raising serious issues 
in Sartre's philosophy through this approach. Among these 
figures is Robert Champigny, whom we consider among the best 
literary interpreters of Sartre. Champigny's weakness, how­
ever, lies in viewing Sartre's philosophy, as a whole, from 
the literary perspective. In an article on Sartre, Champigny 
states the following.
The main perspective in Sartre's philosophy is 
moral. This has become more and more obvious in the 
works which have followed L 'être et le néanTT L 'être 
et le néant itself, in which the concept of freedom 
is indissolubly linked to that of responsibility, was 
intended to set the stage for an examination of moral 
questions?^
Then Champigny goes on to affirm that being and non-being
suddenly appear in a glaring moral light and that being is
2identified with the good and non-being with evil.
Champigny has written a comprehensive essay entitled 
"Stages on Sartre's Way," and this essay is among the best
^Robert Champigny, "Translations from the Writings of 
Contemporary French Philosophers," The Journal of Philosophy, 
LTV (May, 1957), 314.
2%bid., 314-335.
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literary interpretations of Sartre, not only in its lucid 
and vivid descriptions of Sartre's style, but also in its com­
prehensive analysis of the major characters involved in 
Sartre's literary writing.3 But the shortcoming of this an­
alysis is the one-sidedness which Champigny betrays in his in­
terpretations of Sartre's work.
The purpose of this essay is to trace the develop­
ment of Sartre's thought through his most significant 
works from 1938 to 1952. Sartre has often been com­
mented upon from a purely philosophical point of view.
This point of view generally produces a static picture, 
since the philosophical critic confines himself to the 
study of L'être et le néant. Our own perspective will 
be broader. Most of the essay will be devoted to an 
examination of Sartre's literary work.
The moral question dominates Sartre's production.
It will also be the central theme of our study. In this 
introduction we propose to determine how the moral 
question arises out of Sartre's view of the human con­
dition, as it is expounded in L'être et le néant. ^
According to this exposition it should be clear that 
Champigny believes that the ethical or the moral question 
dominates Sartre's literary work, and at the same time he does 
not allude to any other question or issue which might appear 
to be taking Sartre's consideration. This view of Sartre's 
literature is both one-sided and misleading. If we examine 
Sartre's literary works reflectively, we find that the moral 
question comes up only indirectly, as in L'être et le néant.
^Robert Champigny, Stages on Sartre's Way: 1938-1952
(Indiana University Publications: Humanities Series, No.
43; Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana University, 1959), p. 1*
4Ibid.
5jean-Paul Sartre, L'être et le néant (Paris: Librairie
Gallimard, 1943).
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In which he never discusses directly any moral issues, but 
only furnishes the background for such an issue to be ana­
lyzed in future work, which has never been handled, at least 
directly. Champigny acknowledges this in the first statement, 
in which he says that L’être et le néant is intended to set 
the stage for an examination of moral questions.^ But later, 
in his most elaborate way, he claims that the moral question 
which arises from Sartre’s view of the human condition is ex­
pounded in L ’être et le né ant.?
Our purpose here is not really directed toward finding 
a possible logical contradiction, but to refute the claim 
that Sartre's literary work is dominated by a moral question. 
While we claim that Sartre’s literary works in some cases are 
suffused with metaphysical and ontological overtones, as in 
La Nausee,̂  in other cases he pursues an existential psycho­
analytical approach in which his characters appear to be psy­
chological cases struggling for freedom through subjectivity, 
as in No E x i t ,9 or for self identity through self-assertion, 
as in Saint Genet. T h e  moral question does arise in Le
^Champigny, Journal of Philosophy, LIV, 316.
^Champigny, Stages on Sartre’s Way, p. 1.
^Jean-Paul Sartre, La Nausee (Paris: Gallimard, 1938).
9jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit: and Three Other Plays,
(New York: Vintage Books, 19^6).
lOjean-Paul Sartre, Saint Genet, trans. Bernard Frecht- 
man (New York: The New American Library, 1963).
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Putain respectueuse, b u t  only Indirectly through the parti­
cular mode in which the character is involved. For this 
reason we cannot consider Roquentin in La Nausee as being 
directly involved with the moral question, but rather with an 
ontological search for his relationship to the w o r l d . 42 
Therefore, we cannot accept Champigny’s interpretation of La 
Nausee, namely, that its significance is moral, because we 
believe that its ontological meaning cannot be confined to 
morality alone. Champigny states his concluding or defini­
tive about La Nausee in the following:
Thus La Nausee, though it is mainly descriptive, 
has a moral significance which will be echoed in all 
the subsequent works of Sartre: the rejection of the
morals of being, of the morals of essence. Two forms 
of this type of morals have been indicated and to these 
two forms correspond the two aspects of the signifi­
cance of Nausea.
The first form is hieractic morals. This concept 
of morals is fashioned by the spirit of seriousness. 
Humor, irony, disgust have dealt with it . . . This 
type of morals is essentially passive, sometimes ex- 
hibitionistic, as in the case of the "leaders."
The second form is theatrical morals. It is 
more active. The actor has to interpret the role.
But the actor is not an agent. Even when there is no 
script, as in the case of Anny's perfect moments, the 
actor has somehow to incarnate the esthetic essence 
in his own flesh.
From the morals of being, Roquentin turns to the 
morals of d o i n g . 43
If this is the case, then La Nausée as a whole is in­
terwoven with the moral question, out of which the
41jean-Paul Sartre, Theatre (Paris: Gallimard, 1947).
42jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New 
York: New Directions Publishing Corp., 1964), p. 173.
43champigny, Stages on Sartre's Way, p. 36.
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ontological precariousness of morality appears to be dis­
solved In action. But In fact La Nausee Is not at all so 
precisely structured on the moral question, because both the 
climate and the climax of La Nausee are not surrounded by 
moral decisions, but rather by the anxiety of the ontological 
absurdity which Is expressed In Roquentin's dialogue with 
himself and human existence. In fact, when La Nausée was 
presented for the first time to Galllmard^^ as "Melancholia," 
It was not recommended by Paulhan^^ por publication because 
of Sartre's style of expressing metaphysical truth In liter­
ary form.
Simone de Beauvoir makes the following remarks In regard 
to this case:
Sartre was not too cheerful either. Quite apart 
from his setback over the trip, he suffered another re­
buff which affected him even more. The manuscript—  
entitled Melancholia because of the Dürer engraving 
which he loved so much— had been sent to Nlzan to one 
of Gallimard's readers. Sartre received a note from 
Paulhan advising him that, despite certain qualities 
It possessed, the work had not been accepted. He had 
taken the refusal of La Légende de la vérité cheer­
fully enough; but he had put four years' work Into 
Melancholia, and the book had come out exactly as he 
had planned It: In his own opinion, and In mine, he
had achieved a success. Paulhan, It appeared, disap­
proved of Sartre's central purpose— that Is, the ex­
pression In literary form of metaphysical truths and 
feelings. But the plan was deeply rooted In Sartre's 
mind, and too long established, for him to accept this 
condemnation. All the same. It disconcerted us both.^°
^^Galllmard: A Parisian publisher.
15paulhan: an editorial advisor who worked for Gallimard,
l^Slmone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, trans. Peter 
Green (Cleveland, Ohio: The World Publishing Co., 1962),
p. 227.
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This explanation should at least provide us with a dif­
ferent perspective about La Nausee from the one adopted by 
Champigny, namely that the ontological question of existence 
appears to be the most pertinent issue overwhelming 
Roquentin’s curiousity. When Roquentin analyzes the people 
of Beauville from a distance, how they act, how they live, 
how they go to work and come back home, he does not view them 
in the light of whether they are leading an ethical or non- 
ethical life. Rather he attempts to examine the value and 
meaning of their existence, and whether they are leading an 
authentic or a non-authentic life. The immediate concern is 
not directly related to an ethical issue, but to the ontol­
ogical meaning of the human situation. It is a question of 
being or non-being in the ontological sense (not in the moral 
sense), or simply of being an existing individual who affirms 
his being according to what he wills and decides, of being a 
collective member of the little bourgeois society of Beau­
ville, or of being an individual. The ethical question, in 
this respect, arises indirectly, whereas the ontological 
meaning of one's individuality appears to be the primary con­
cern .
Furthermore, what Roquentin dislikes about the people 
of Beauville is not what they do but how they do it. The 
objectified, collective, and impersonalized bourgeois stand­
ard of doing things nauseates Roquentin; and these, essenti­
ally speaking, are not viewed from a moral perspective, but
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from the ontoliglcal perspective of human existence. It is, 
therefore, the ontological meaninglessness, and not the im­
moral act, which brings nausea. The most pertinent issue in 
La Nausee is ontological and not moral.
Another problem we enounter in reading Champigny is 
his serious acceptance of the notions of good and evil as 
synonymous with being and n o n - b e i n g . ^7 it would be illogical 
to identify being with good and non-being with evil, because 
being as such does not appear in the form of an actuality, 
but only as a possibility. The for-itself remains continuously 
searching for this possibility without ever reaching its 
actualization. It follows also that the good never becomes 
an actuality.
Sartre suggests that in spite of the incomplete status 
of the for-itself (its inability to become what it is), it is 
still possible to make a distinction between good and evil.
This capacity is related to consciousness in its ability to 
affirm itself and to escape from itself, that is, to affirm 
itself in terms of its responsibility, and to escape from 
itself in order to negate its responsibility. Action or non- 
action appears to be equated with good and evil more than 
with being and non-being. To act in good faith or in bad 
faith is the border line between morality and immorality for 
Sartre. (In our evaluation of Plantinga below we shall
^^Champigny, Journal of Philosophy, LIV, p. 318
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explore further the meaning of the notion of good and bad 
faith.) Champigny's argument is misleading because he con­
ceptualizes his conclusion— the main perspective in Sartre's 
philosophy is moral— before analyzing the nature of his pres- 
ise: being is identified with the good and non-being with
evil.
The following analysis of Plantinga's exposition of 
Sartre should be helpful in determining the nature of Sartre's 
philosophy.
Examination of Alvin Plantinga
Alvin Plantinga has written an article in which he at­
tempts to analyze the nature of Sartre's existentialism. In 
this analysis Plantinga makes two claims : the first that
Sartre's philosophy is through and through ethical, the sec­
ond that in spite of the ethical nature of Sartre's philo­
sophy, its moral implication is not consistent with anything 
like the ordinary sense of morality. He concludes that 
Sartre's theory of freedom is quite inconsistent with moral-
We will evaluate Plantinga's argument with two objec­
tives in mind. First, we will demonstrate that these con­
clusions are not only false but that they totally misrepre­
sent the image of Sartre's philosophy. Secondly, in the
^^Alvin Plantinga, "On Existential Ethics," Review of 
Metaphysics, XII (1958-1959). 235-256.
59
course of examining Plantinga's assumptions, we will expose 
the psycho-ontological origins of Sartre's ethics.
Alvin Plantinga's exposition of Sartre's philosophy is 
summarized in the following:
Contemporary existentialist philosophy appears to 
be fundamentally ethical in its origin and motivation. 
Essentially concerned with man's status in the universe 
and its implications for behavior, the existentialist 
often adopts the tone of the Old Testament prophets.
He extolls the virtues of authenticity and legitimate 
anguish; the life of bad faith, the attempted escape 
from freedom, warrant his scornful disapproval. The 
moral— and perhaps moralistic— aspect of existentialism 
is pervasive and unmistakable.
This is especially clear in the case of Jean-Paul 
Sartre's philosophy of freedom. Existentialists in 
general and Sartre in particular argue that an analysis, 
not of human nature, indeed, but of, say, "the universal 
human condition" reveals that certain kinds of behavior 
are morally appropriate and others morally reprehensible. 
My aim in this paper is to show that Sartre's analysis 
of "the universal human condition" is quite inconsistent 
with morality in anything like the ordinary sense. Vie 
might think that attempt otiose in view of Sartre's 
notorious rejection of "absolute values." But in spite 
of his claim to dispense with absolute morality, Sartre's 
philosophy, like other existentialist philosophies, is 
through and through ethical. A concern with the human 
condition and its implications for morality is the mov­
ing force behind Sartre's thought. "Bad faith," "re­
sponsibility," "anguish," these and other ethical notions 
play a central role in Sartre's philosophy of freedom.
Plantinga's conclusion is that
Sartre's theory of freedom is quite inconsistent 
with morality. Any choice is as good as any other: 
there is no possibility of making a moral mistake.
And that is fatal to morality. An absolute freedom, 





Before we begin to analyze the major assumptions made 
by Plantinga in regard to Sartre's philosophical position, 
we will attempt to clarify the existentialists' position in 
general and Sartre's in particular in relation to values. 
Plantinga states that Sartre rejects "absolute values" with­
out giving an explanation of his rejection. Since we feel 
that a clarification of this issue is central to our argu­
ment, we will make a short exposition of Sartre's position 
on values.
If we examine the existential approach to values, we 
find a new development which represents a departure from 
traditional metaphysics. This departure is exemplified in 
the expressions of the metaphysical concern itself. While 
traditional metaphysics expresses its concerns in searching 
for being qua being, existential metaphysics expresses its 
concern generally in searching for man qua being or for man 
qua freedom and authenticity. This transformation in meta­
physics also expresses a transformation in values. To the 
traditionalist, values are absolutely independent of human 
experience, whereas the existentialist emphasizes the meaning 
of values within human experience. It appears clear that as 
a result of this transformation, an existential metaphysics 
cannot possibly be formulated without taking into account the 
meaning of values with reference to a humanistic expression. 
Man becomes the center in defining his existential situation; 
this inverts the traditional approach which emphasizes
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discovering and knowing certain independent metaphysical 
truth in order to understand and define man. While the tra­
ditional metaphysician seeks to understand man through cer­
tain independent metaphysical entities, the existentialist 
would rather begin his search for authenticity with man-in- 
the-world, because the meaning of existence lies in the mean­
ing which man makes out of himself in his relation to the 
world, and not in the things themselves.^1
Sartre can be credited with developing, if not pioneer­
ing, this existential notion of metaphysics through which man 
is not treated in abstraction from his human situation but in 
a concrete dialogue with the human situation. Metaphysics in 
this respect is an engagement with oneself in searching for 
himself in the world, and to be in the world for Sartre means 
to be in a concrete situation in the world and not in isola­
tion from it.
While metaphysics deals with defining or describing 
man's situation and his relation to the world, ethics deals 
with analyzing how man actually relates himself to humanity 
and with the type of undertaking he assumes in participating 
in the human situation.
In view of the above, it is clear that Plantinga fails 
to see that Sartre's rejection of "absolute value" is not 
based on his rejection of value as s u c h , ^ 2  but it is based on
^^Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 38. 
22see pages 55-56.
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his rejection of the absolute in traditional metaphysics from 
which all values are supposed to be derived. Man, for Sartre, 
assumes the role of the absolute in traditional metaphysics.
As such he is the creator and the cognizer of values, for 
without man there would not be any source of values nor any 
agent to recognize their meaning. This concentration on man 
as a judge and as a value-maker is followed by another: man
as a decision-maker and the source of all ethical norms.
Man is, therefore, free, because there is nothing which 
determines his choice, and at the heart of this freedom lies 
his responsibility: a responsibility which man cannot escape
regardless of whether he assumes the responsibility to make a 
choice or not. Plantinga's accusation of " n i h i l i s m " ^ ^  j_s not 
justified, because freedom is always associated with respon­
sibility.
This leads us to the major argument of Plantinga, from 
which we can deduce the following propositions: (1) if any
choice is as good as any other, it would be fatal to morality; 
(2) since Sartre considers that any choice is as good as any 
other, Sartre's morality is inconsistent with any morality.
We shall demonstrate that Sartre does not consider that 
any choice is as good as any other because one can make a 
choice in good faith or in bad faith, choosing to assert one­
self in the face of one's responsibilities or deceiving
23piantinga, Review of Metaphysics, XII, 250.
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oneself In order to escape responsibility. One can make a 
choice to face his human situation or to negate his presence 
in the human situation. Also one can arbitrarily choose his 
own subjective interest over the interest of others, or one 
can choose his interest with the interest of others. None of 
these issues escape Sartre's attention. In fact he has ex­
pressed serious concern for such issues. His opinion can be 
summed up in the following:
This does not entirely settle the objection to sub­
jectivism. In fact, the objection still takes several 
forms. First, there is the following: we are told,
"So you're able to do anything, no matter what!" This 
is expressed in various ways. First we are accused of 
anarchy; then they say, "You're unable to pass judgment 
on others, because there's no reason to prefer one con­
figuration to another"; finally they tell us, "Every­
thing is arbitrary in this choosing of yours. You take 
something from one pocket and pretend you're putting it 
into the other."
These three objections aren't very serious. Take 
the first objection. "You're able to do anything, no 
matter what" is not to the point. In one sense choice 
is possible, but what is not possible is not to choose.
I can always choose, but I ought to know that if I do 
not choose, I am still choosing. Though this may seem 
purely formal, it is highly important for keeping fantasy 
and caprice within bounds. If it is true that in facing 
a situation, for example, one in which, as a person capable 
of having sexual relations, of having children, I am 
obliged to choose an attitude, and if I in any way assume 
responsibility for a choice which, in involving myself, 
also involves all mankind, this has nothing to do with 
caprice, even if no a priori value determines my choice.
If anybody thinks that he recognizes here Gide's 
theory of the arbitrary act, he fails to see the enormous 
difference between this doctrine and Gide's. Gide does 
not know what a situation is. He acts out of pure ca­
price. For us, on the contrary, man is in an organized 
situation in which he himself is involved. Through his 
choice, he involves all mankind, and he can not avoid 
making a choice; either he will remain chaste, or he will 
marry without having children, or he will marry and have 
children; anyhow, whatever he may do, it is impossible
64
for him not to take full responsibility for the way he 
handles this p r o b l e m . ^4
If responsibility and action are inseparable parts of 
our choice, whatever we choose involves responsibility and 
action. It also implies that when we choose responsibly, we 
always choose what is good for us and for all men. Thus 
"whatever we choose cannot be as good as any other choice," 
especially when we choose not to choose, or when we choose 
to be indifferent to the human situation, in contrast to 
choosing responsibly and affirming our responsibility in a 
human situation.
Sartre clarifies these two points in Being and Nothing­
ness and in Anti-Semite and Jew. In the first he makes an 
illustration of the possibility of a psychological negation 
of oneself when confronted with a crucial situation; in the 
second he makes an analysis of one who attempts to escape 
from his situation and from himself in order to escape from 
what he is.
In Being and Nothingness Sartre describes the following
case :
Take the example of a woman who has consented to 
go out with a particular man for the first time. She 
knows very well the intentions which the man who is 
speaking to her cherishes regarding her. She knows 
also that it will be necessary sooner or later for her 
to make a decision. But she does not want to realize 
the urgency; she concerns herself only with what is 
respectful and discreet in the attitude of her compan­
ion. She does not apprehend this conduct as an attempt
24gartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, pp. 40-42.
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to achieve what we call "the first approach"; that is, 
she does not want to see possibilities of temporal devel­
opment which his conduct presents. She restricts this 
behavior to what is in the present; she does not wish 
to read in the phrases which he addresses to her anything 
other than their explicit meaning. If he says to her,
"I find you so attractive!" she disarms this phrase of 
its sexual background; she attaches to the conversation 
and to the behavior of the speaker, the immediate mean­
ings, which she imagines as objective qualities. The man 
who is speaking to her appears to her sincere and re­
spectful as the table is round or square, as the wall 
coloring is blue or gray. The qualities thus attached 
to the person she is listening to are in this way fixed 
in a permanence like that of things, which is no other 
than the projection of the strict present of the quali­
ties into the temporal flux. This is because she does 
not quite know what she wants. She is profoundly aware 
of the desire which she inspires, but the desire cruel 
and naked would humiliate and horrify her. Yet she 
would find no charm in a respect which would be only 
respect. In order to satisfy her, there must be a feel­
ing which is addressed wholly to her personality— i.e., 
to her full freedom— and which would be a recognition 
of her freedom. But at the same time this feeling must 
be wholly desire; that is, it must address itself to 
her body as object. This time then she refuses to ap­
prehend the desire for what it is; she does not even give 
it a name ; she recognizes it only to the extent that it 
transcends itself toward admiration, esteem, respect and 
that it is wholly absorbed in the more refined forms 
which it produces, to the extent of no longer figuring 
anymore as a sort of warmth and density. But then sup­
pose he takes her hand. This act of her companion risks 
changing the situation by calling for an immediate de­
cision. To leave the hand there is to consent in her­
self to flirt, to engage herself. To withdraw it is to 
break the troubled and unstable harmony which gives the 
hour its charm. The aim is to postpone the moment of 
decision as long as possible. We know what happens 
next; the young woman leaves her hand there, but she 
does not notice that she is leaving it. She does not 
notice because it happens by chance that she is at this 
moment all intellect. She draws her companion up to 
the most lofty regions of sentimental speculation; she 
speaks of Life, of her life, she shows herself in her 
essential aspect— a personality, a consciousness. And 
during this time the divorce of the body from the soul 
is accomplished; the hand rests inert between the warm
66
hands of her companion— neither consenting nor resist­
ing— a thing.25
This is a real example of a person who chooses not to choose, 
and also who chooses to negate herself from the presence of a 
human situation in order to escape making a choice. But this 
escape from making a choice is a choice in itself, and it is 
a choice of bad faith. A choice of this kind unquestionably 
is a bad choice, and it is bad in spite of absolute freedom.
To be absolutely free does not grant fallibility or infalli­
bility, authenticity or inauthenticity. But to be free means 
that man is the master of his choice. Freedom does not just­
ify the assumption that any action is as good as any other,
but freedom, in this respect, is a form of awakening which
brings man closer to himself and closer to his inescapable 
responsibility to be himself in making his own choice in the 
human situation. Thus, to be absolutely free does not imply 
that we are absolutely good, nor does it mean that since we 
are free, any choice is as good as any other. But it does 
mean simply that we are free to do this or that, to act or 
not to act, to affirm our existence or to negate our presence, 
to be or not to be within a human situation.2^
If it is agreed that man may be defined as a being
having freedom within the limits of a situation, then
it is easy to see that the exercise of this freedom may 
be considered as authentic or inauthentic according to
25sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 55-56.
2^Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, tran 
J. Becker (New York: Schocken Books, 1946), p . 90.
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the choices made In the situation. Authenticity, It 
Is almost needless to say, consists In having a true 
and lucid consciousness of the situation. In assuming 
the responsibilities and risks that It Involves, In 
accepting It In pride or humiliation, sometimes In 
horror and hate.27
The choice which we make Is not Independent from the 
human situation. In fact It Is our situation, according to 
Sartre, which determines the value of our actions. Escaping 
from one’s situation or consciously accepting one's responsi­
bilities can only be related to our free choice. But the dif­
ference between escaping and accepting is the difference be-
&tween Inauthentlclty and authenticity. Sartre makes this 
distinction In describing the Inauthentic and the authentic 
Jews.
What characterizes the Inauthentic Jews Is that they 
deal with their situation by running away from It; 
they have chosen to deny It, or to deny their respon­
sibilities, or to deny their Isolation, which appears 
Intolerable to t h e m .2°
Sartre further states:
Jewish authenticity consists In choosing oneself 
as Jew— that Is, In realizing one’s Jewish condition.
The authentic Jew abandons the myth of the universal 
man; he knows himself and wills himself Into history 
as a historic and damned creature; he ceases to run 
away from himself and to be ashamed of his own kind.
He understands that society Is bad; for the naive 
monism of the Inauthentic Jew he substitutes a social 
pluralism. He knows that he Is one who stands apart, 
untouchable, scorned, proscribed— and It Is as such 
that he asserts his being.^9
27%bld., p . 90. 
28ibld., p. 92. 
29lbld., pp. 136-137.
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This should be sufficient to show that, for Sartre, freedom 
to make choices does not necessarily determine the nature of 
our choices, or imply that because we are absolutely free, 
"any choice is as good as any other." On this ground we have 
shown that Plantinga's argument is not justified. In the 
following we will evaluate Plantinga's consideration of the 
nature of Sartre's philosophy.
Plantinga has stated that Sartre's philosophy, like 
other existentialist philosophies, is through and through 
ethical; concern with human conditions and their implications 
for morality are the moving forces behind his thought.30 
Plantinga also stresses the fact that "bad faith," "respon­
sibility," "anguish," and other ethical notions play a cen­
tral role in Sartre's philosophy of f r e e d o m .31 Unquestion­
ably these notions play a central part in Sartre's philosophy 
of freedom, but we do not agree with Plantinga's views about 
their ethical origins. It is our contention that these no­
tions are basically psychological and not ethical, and that 
out of the inward psychological tension a great deal of both 
Sartre's ontology and ethics are developed. In order to make 
our point clear and logically sound, we will devote the rest 
of this chapter to a clarification of the nature of these 
notions.




It is inevitable that a layman will infer an ethical 
meaning when confronted with someone talking about "good 
faith." It does sound ethical, the particular interpretation 
varying and according to the intentions of the person in­
volved. For example, while the term "Good Faith" to the 
Muslim means to be straightforward, to the Christian it could 
mean to be humble and forgiving. Consequently, the term, as 
such, if it is used according to the traditional language of 
religion and ethics, could signify more than one meaning; but 
the term "Bad Faith" in Sartre's ontology expresses a central 
psychological attitude which one takes in relation to himself. 
This attitude could be investigated in terms of "self-decep­
tion," which term undoubtedly expresses the psychological 
state of the person involved, not only in viewing himself, 
but also in conceiving his relationship to others and to the 
world. "Bad Faith" is generated when someone is deceptively 
convinced by his own lie. And then after he is convinced he 
will feel certain that the other is convinced also.
This is clear in a love relationship when the lover con­
vinces himself that he is greatly needed by the one he loves. 
Basically the lover is in need of being needed; so he feels 
that he is wanted and that he is indispensable to someone's 
life. But the lover does not acknowledge this need because 
he feels that his ego is threatened by the fear of not being 
wanted; so he reverses his attitude desperately to convince
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himself that he is needed by the other and that his obliga­
tion rests upon fulfilling the need of the other. What the 
lover is doing is simply attempting to assert himself nega­
tively or in self-deception; accordingly he convinces himself 
of his own lies in order to feel his self-importance. The 
roots of bad faith appear to be in the psychological relation 
of oneself to himself, in which consciousness fades away in 
order to give room to the illusion of the unconscious. For 
this reason Sartre considers the act of bad faith a l i e . 32
One does not undergo his bad faith; one is not in­
fected with it; it is not a state. But consciousness 
affects itself with bad faith. There must be an ori­
ginal intention and a project of bad faith; this pro­
ject implies a comprehension of bad faith as such and 
a pre-reflective apprehension (of) consciousness as af­
fecting itself with bad faith. It follows first that 
the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies 
are one and the same person, which means that I must 
know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is 
hidden from me in my capacity as the one d e c e i v e d . 33
This passage clearly supports our claim that the notion 
of bad faith is not fundamentally ethical, but originates out 
of the psychological attitudes of oneself through which the 
person involved looks into himself and others. The following 
makes this point clearer.
To this difficulty is added another which is de­
rived from the total translucency of consciousness.
That which affects itself with bad faith must be con­
scious (of) its bad faith since the being of
32sartre analyzes this problem comprehensively in Being 
and Nothingness, pp. 364-376. This illustration is our own, 
although it reflects the influence of Sartre.
33sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 49.
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consciousness Is consciousness of being. It appears 
then that I must be in good faith, at least to the ex­
tent that I am conscious of my bad faith. But then 
this whole psychic system is annihilated. We must 
agree in fact that if I deliberately and cynically 
attempt to lie to myself, I fail completely in this 
undertaking; the lie falls back and collapses beneath 
my look, it is ruined from behind by the very con­
sciousness of lying to myself which pitilessly consti­
tutes itself well within my project as its very con­
dition. 34
And the following affirms even more unmistakably the 
point that bad faith is a psychic state out of which the in­
dividual conceives himself and the world around him.
Even though the existence of bad faith is very precar­
ious, and though it belongs to the kind of psychic 
structures which we might call "metastable," it pre­
sents nonetheless an autonomous and durable form. It 
can even be the normal aspect of life for a very great 
number of people. A person can live in bad faith, 
which does not mean that he does not have abrupt awaken­
ings to cynicism or to good faith, but which implies a 
constant and particular style of life. Our embarrass­
ment then appears extreme since we can neither reject 
nor comprehend bad faith.
To escape from these difficulties people gladly 
have recourse to the u n c o n s c i o u s .35
The unconscious appears as an escape, an escape from 
oneself and also an escape from reality. The unconscious, as 
such, does not exist; it is only a phantasy, a phantasy which 
is made by man in order to take refuge when man attempts to 
escape from himself, from his situation, from his responsi­
bilities and from his freedom. Sartre rejects the notion of 
the unconscious on the ground that it cannot exist as an
3^Ibid., p p .  49- 50 . 
35ibid., p .  50 .
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Independent psychical entity before consciousness, because 
the psychic always acts coextenslvely with consciousness.3^ 
When Sartre announces that man Is condemned to be free, he 
means simply that man cannot escape from choosing: whether
he chooses to choose or chooses not to choose, he Is still 
choosing.37 Whether he chooses to be In bad faith or to at­
tempt to be In good faith. It Is still his own choice. And 
also If man chooses to live In self-deception or attempts to 
live In self-assertion, he still exercises his own freedom, 
and no "omen" can determine his choice to act or not act 
except himself.
For the above reasons we maintain that bad faith Is 
fundamentally a psychological notion which expresses the un- 
authentlc attitude of man toward himself and the human situa­
tion. Bad faith and good faith are, therefore, existential 
modes which man adopts In conceiving himself and the world, 
and from these modes the Individual generates his actions.
The actions which reflect good faith are ethical actions, 
and those which are motivated by bad faith are unethical ac­
tions. Hence good faith and bad faith are the modes which 
reflect the Inner exigencies of man to himself, and It Is 
according to these exigencies that ethical activities are.
In part, determined.
An example will help clarify what Is at stake. Let us
3^Ibld., p. 570.
37sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 23.
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suppose that two alumni of the same Institution are requested 
to donate money to this institution. Both of these persons 
give whatever they can; the act of giving itself can be con­
sidered ethically good. We assume that these persons' be­
havior can be considered a good moral act, and it follows 
that both of them are morally good persons. But in fact, the 
act of giving itself cannot exhaust the ethical content of an 
act, simply because the psychological motivation of giving is 
as important as the act of giving itself, and it is in part 
according to these inner motivations that the external activi­
ties must be evaluated. Outwardly, when these two alumni are 
asked to offer some financial help they respond identically, 
but with different motives. One, who is practicing medicine 
in the neighborhood of the institution, acts out of vanity 
and self-interest. First, he acts to see his name printed 
among the so-called benefactors of the community; so while he 
performs his act, his motivations are not really focused on 
the cause of learning. His motivations are focused on the 
value of the publicity of such an endeavor and his expecta­
tions of good business from this act. The second person, on 
the contrary, acts with spontaneity and a sense of partici­
pation in something worth-while. When he pays his share he 
does not expect to be granted salvation, nor does he have any 
expectations other than expressing a feeling of gratitude to 
an institution which has helped him to realize his potential. 
The act of giving is an end in itself and not a means for
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glorification and self-interest. It is clear, then, that while 
the two persons involved perform in the same manner, we cannot 
classify their acts on the same level, because the first acts 
in bad faith and the second in good faith.
The difference between the two men in our example is not 
a difference in action but in motivation. For this reason we 
insist that the inner motivations of the individual should be 
considered a determining factor in analyzing the nature of an 
act. The analysis of these motivations can be approached in 
terms of the concepts of good faith and bad faith, which to 
some extent are considered a major part of Sartre's contribu­
tion to ethical theory. This leads us to analyze the notion 
of responsibility, as it appears to be another ethical no­
tion, but which cannot be ascertained independently of the 
psychological motivations.
Responsibility
If the individual negates consciousness in bad faith, 
in responsibility he attempts to affirm it. Also if in bad 
faith he escapes from the present, in responsibility he acts 
in order to assert himself in the present. For this reason 
Sartre emphasizes freedom and responsibility as the coordina­
ting forces of human activities, because it is only in free­
dom with responsible actions that the individual can make out 
of himself what he conceives himself to be. To conceive is 
not enough, because it is also through willing and acting 
upon whatever one conceives himself to be that the thrust
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toward meaningful existence becomes p o s s i b l e . 38 Thus when 
we say that man is condemned to be free, we do not mean that 
this freedom is already granted. We simply mean that man is 
condemned to choose his freedom or not to choose his freedom.
To be free implies that the individual is a possibility 
to be actualized but not already actualized. It is possible 
that this possibility will remain only a possibility as much 
as that it will become an actuality. It is only through 
self-actualization that the individual marches toward free­
dom, and self-actualization can only take place in active in­
volvement with others in the world. Thus, to be free is a 
state of being an undetermined possibility, and man in this 
respect represents his own possibilities; but real freedom 
requires an actualization of whatever these possibilities 
may be. To use Sartre's language, these possibilities are 
considered to be the projects which man has planned for him­
self, and actualization means the authentication of man 
through his projects. Authenticity is a mode of achievement, 
of involvement, of commitment in doing and acting in good 
faith. For this reason existentialism in general and Sartre 
in particular dislike quietism.39 And for the same reason 
we believe that existentialism is not nihilism, but rather a 
positive philosophy of action, of seriousness, and of
3 8 i b i d . , p .  1 5 .  
39ibid., p .  3 5 .
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involvement within a human s i t u a t i o n .
Those who conceive existentialism as an escape from 
responsibilities and as nihilism are in error and/or bad 
faith (in Sartre’s meaning of the latter term). This group 
could be divided into two classes. The first class we will 
call the outsiders and the second the insiders. The out­
siders do not consider themselves existentialists, but they 
feel confident that they know what existentialism is all 
about. So from the outside they look into the inside of 
certain existential approaches, and they usually come up with 
a definitive conclusion. This conclusion often appears to be 
based on preconceived notions, disconnected from any logical 
considerations. The insiders are those who, fortunately or 
unfortunately, consider themselves existentialists, not only 
in theory but in practice. How they understand existentialism 
as a theory is a mystery open for speculation, but our view 
is that their understanding of existentialism is most likely 
based on a series of terms which are used by existentialist 
thinkers, e.g., absurd, freedom, authenticity, despair, and 
anguish. They then interpret these terms according to their 
pathetic illusions of reality, and live according to their 
interpretation of reality by withdrawing and escaping from 
responsibility. Thus, the common agreement between these 
two classes is that both of them look at existentialism from
40Ibid., p . 36.
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a negative attitude and come up with a negative impression 
and a negative meaning. But while the first class, or the 
outsiders, curse existentialism on the ground that it is a 
negative philosophy, the second group, or the insiders, 
accept it because intentionally or unintentionally they feel 
more at home with a negative view which justifies their 
escape from reality. While the first group is in error in 
interpreting existentialism, the second group is in error 
and also in bad faith.
In order to make our point clear we shall use some 
illustrations which exemplify the attitude of both of these 
classes. It should be mentioned that these illustrations are 
real and not fictitious, and therefore we can support these 
cases with verifiable facts. As a student, the writer can 
distinctly recollect different instances in which various 
college professors have made remarks concerning existential­
ism. For example, a professor in education gave a lecture on 
the increase of juvenile delinquency in this century. He 
emphasized that the increase of delinquency is partly due to 
the spread of existentialism. Another, a social science pro­
fessor, once utilized an hour's lecture to convey to the stu­
dents that existentialism and democracy are irreconcilable 
because the first emphasizes ultimate individual freedom, 
disregarding social and political institutions, whereas the 
second emphasizes constructive freedom within the framework 
of social and political responsibilities. One time the
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writer attended a convocation at a church in Oklahoma City, 
at which the preacher gave his sermon on the ills of the 
century which cause the decadent morality of our time. It 
was not a surprise when he included existentialism as one of 
these ills. So far these illustrations convey one major 
theme in utilizing existentialism as a scapegoat. In 19653 
a sociology professor gave a lecture to the philosophy club 
at the University of Oklahoma. His lecture was entitled 
"Escape." It was rather shocking to hear him classify ex­
istentialism as a form of escape. The writer suggested to 
the lecturer that existentialism is aware of this problem 
and that for this reason it is a philosophy which emphasizes 
self-direction, self-assertion and action, and that its major 
task is to orient the individual to the possibilities of ex­
istence and to create a thrust within him through self- 
awareness and to make him feel responsible to authenticate 
himself. The lecturer was stunned for a while, and then he 
said, "Is that so!" The writer substantiated what he said 
by referring to the chapter on freedom and responsibility in 
Being and Nothingness, in which Sartre does not allow excuses 
for any form of e s c a p e . T h e  lecturer was forced to admit 
his insufficient knowledge of existentialism, and he expressed 
himself in good faith, and said that he should know more about 
it and that he should devote some time for that in the future.
^^Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 553-556.
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These are factual examples which show how different in­
dividuals from different professions interpret existentialism 
with preconceived notions, without justifying these notions 
on any logical ground.
But this class, namely the outsiders, do not appear to 
be deceiving themselves as seriously as the second class or 
the insiders. While the first class is partly dominated by 
preconceived notions about existentialism and partly by 
incompetent or scanty scholarship, the second class is dom­
inated by an illusion of existence and by self-deception 
and lies. The illusions which overshadow their perceptions 
prevent them from accepting life or its challenge. On the 
one hand, they tend to impress others that they are disin­
terested observers of the world and its artificial mechanism; 
but on the other hand, they desperately desire to be ob­
served, to be noticed, and to be given attention. These 
descriptions have been gathered by the writer from his ex­
perience in the East Village of New York and from his con­
frontations with different individuals on different campuses 
who can be classified under these categories.
What is so pathetic is that this group of individuals 
are so fond of existentialism and especially Sartre, and 
their attachment to Sartre is fundamentally related to his 
emphasis on freedom. But their conception of freedom does 
not include responsibility, but irresponsibility— a freedom 
to be nothing and to do nothing, a freedom without commitment
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and without obligation to oneself or to others. Exist­
entialism seems to them to be a free game where all kinds of 
tricky justifications can be applied for the purpose of es­
caping responsibilities and also for escaping from the world. 
Freedom in this sense is an escape, whereas the true exist­
ential meaning of freedom is responsibility— responsibility 
in doing, in engagement, and in actions. Sartre puts it this 
way :
The essential consequence of our earlier re­
marks is that man being condemned to be free carries 
the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he 
is responsible for the world and for himself as a 
way of being.
The meaning of freedom lies in the positive attitude 
from which the individual assumes his undertaking. This 
attitude is responsibility itself, through which and out of 
which consciousness affirms its being. Hence, to have good 
intentions without feeling responsible to act accordingly 
does not save us from being in bad faith. It is only through 
our responsible engagement and actions that we can express 
the value of these intentions, and, consequently, it is, 
only through actions that we can make these intentions an 
act of good faith. And Sartre is quite clear on this issue: 
he does not allow any "excuse" for not acting or not de­




fact Sartre takes an extremely radical stand in affirming 
that man is the beginning and the end; he is the master who 
directs the human situation. There is no non-human situation, 
nor are there accidents in life which have any bearing upon 
the human situation in one way or another.^^ Thus, while 
Sartre acknowledges certain impassable barriers which prevent 
man from reaching his authenticity,^5 he does not allow any 
excuses that prevent man from exercising his freedom in making 
his own choices.
Thus there are no accidents in a life : a com­
munity event which suddenly bursts forth and involves 
me in it does not come from the outside. If I am 
mobilized in a war, this was is my war : it is in my
image and I deserve it. I deserve it first because 
I could always get out of it by suicide or by deser­
tion; these ultimate possibles are those which must 
always be present for us when there is a question of 
envisaging a situation. For lack of getting out of 
it, I have chosen it.^°
Here Sartre expresses a radical sense of determining 
the human situation; he does not allow any events or any 
things— other than man himself— to determine the outcome of 
any given situation. In this respect there will be no excuse 
for tragedies either, because if man is the master of all 
his situation, there will be no reason for uncontrollable 
happenings or events which might get out of hand in any
Ibid., p . 554.
^^These barriers are explained in terms of facticity, 
namely, my past, my environment, my place, my death.
46Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 554.
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given situation. We feel that this positive assessment of 
man's autonomy over his situation is somehow questionable, 
and this appears more so if we take into consideration the 
power of the social and the racial structure of a society to 
restrict the freedom of the individual in determining his 
situation. In different cases we find that these structures 
can create impassable barriers which cannot be overcome in 
spite of freedom of choice in directing the human situation. 
Paradoxically, Sartre gives consideration to the ontological 
facticities, which include these social barriers, as the 
forces which prevent the for-itself from achieving its authen­
ticity. But on the same level Sartre does not allow man to 
use the same barriers as causes which prevent him from direct­
ing his situation in any given circumstance. Man is an ab­
solute choice, and as such he determines his situation ab­
solutely. At this point he disregards the forces of circum­
stances in leaping out into events.
Finally, as we pointed out earlier, each person 
is an absolute choice of self from the standpoint of a 
world of knowledges and of techniques which this choice 
both assumes and illumines; each person is an absolute 
upsurge at an absolute date and is perfectly unthinkable 
at another date.^7
This is man's responsibility, to look for no hope other 
than himself, to look for no circumstances other than what 
he makes out of his presence. Each instance counts, and each
Ibid., p . 555•
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action reflects the wholeness of man’s being. There is no 
apology, and no escape, not only from responsibilities, but 
also from determining the events of the human situation.
Sartre represents responsibility in the most serious way 
possible. It takes more of a stoic than an existentialist 
to be able to pursue its ruggedness in terms of self- 
discipline and seriousness in devotion. But all this seems 
possible for him. If the for-itself is in good faith with 
itself, then carrying out one’s projects responsibly appears 
not only natural but also spontaneous. It is only when we 
attempt to deceive ourselves with lies that the abrupt con­
flict between decision and actions takes place, and out of 
this comes the birth of the "unhappy consciousness." Hegel in 
this respect is right in his definition of the "unhappy con­
sciousness" as the "alienated soul in which the consciousness 
of self appears as a divided nature, a doubled and merely con­
tradictory b e i n g . T h i s  description coincides very clearly 
with what Sartre characterizes as "bad faith." In fact, when 
the for-itself lives in bad faith it appears to be a form of 
"unhappy consciousness," because the individual who lives in 
bad faith does not live with his total self as a totality; 
but as he lives with himself he escapes from himself de­
ceptively to live in a shadow of a self other than himself.
W. P. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. 
B. Baillie (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949),
p. 251.
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Thus the individual attempts not to reflect what he really is, 
but whatever he is deceptively convincing himself that he is. 
It is like the liar who is conscious of his lies and yet tries 
to convince others that he is not lying. The irony occurs 
when the liar consciously attempts to believe that he is not 
lying; when he is faced with the truth, he consciously escapes 
to the unconscious in order to avoid admitting his lies to 
himself. At this point we can summarize the phenomenological 
relation between bad faith and responsibility in the follow­
ing.
It is clear that when the for-itself decides not to 
face itself in its presence in the human situation, naturally 
it tends to escape from facing the present. Bad faith appears 
to be the stance which the for-itself adopts in order to es­
cape from itself and from the given situation. Thus, when 
bad faith is present in the for-itself, responsibility is 
absent, because responsibility comes to be an actual aware­
ness in acting only when the for-itself wills to bring it­
self out in the world and assumes the responsibilities of 
being there. And to act as a total self implies being in 
good faith. Thus, responsibility appears to be an ought or 
an ethical category only outwardly, that is to say, as an 
effect of an act and not as a cause.
Moreover, the cause which motivates the for-itself to 
assume its responsibility is ontological and not ethical, an 
ontological awareness which ruptured out of the psychological
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modes of the for-itself in its confrontations with itself and 
the world. Plantinga fails to see the inward motivations of 
the for-itself while it assumes responsibilities, and as a 
result of this failure he interprets responsibility as an 
ethical category without taking into account its inward 
psychological implications; the approach which we believe 
can provide us with a better understanding of Sartre.^9
Anguish
It is impossible to discuss anguish with reference to 
existential thought without discussing Sdren Kierkegaard.
In fact Sartre points out that "the existentialists' feeling 
of anguish is that of K i e r k e g a a r d . " 5 0  For this reason we 
feel it is necessary to contrast Sartre's and Kierkegaard's 
views on this notion.
Kierkegaard credited Abraham with being the father of 
faith, and we shall give credit to Kierkegaard as the father 
of anguish in existential thought. Although anguish and the
^9in fact Plantinga is not the only one who conceives 
bad faith and responsibility in terms of the ethical meaning 
alone. Hazel E. Barnes, for example, has made a comprehensive 
study of bad faith in her book The Literature of Possibility 
(Lincoln, Nebraska; The University of Nebraska Press, 1959); 
yet the study appears mostly descriptive and not reflective.
In other words, she emphasizes extensively the implications 
of bad faith in different human situations, for example in 
politics, in religion, and in human relations. But in spite 
of her comprehensive study of this notion she does not con­
sider analyzing it from the psychological or the ontological 
motives.
50gartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 19, and 
also Being and Nothingness, p. 29.
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feeling of despair in Kierkegaard stem from the paradoxical 
nature of man, which appears as a synthesis of the infinite 
and the finite, this synthesis never reaches the infinite, nor 
does the infinite deign to conceal itself in the finite; for 
this reason man finds himself in despair when he becomes aware 
of his unfinished self.
Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, 
of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, 
in short it is a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation 
between two factors. So regarded, man is not yet a self. 51
Despair arises in the soul when man becomes aware of his 
lack, namely, the lack of what he desires to be. Kierkegaard 
desires to overcome his sickness, the sickness of man's fi- 
nitude by embracing his infinitude; whereas to Sartre these 
desires are basically the desires which emerge out of the 
for-itself to be G o d . 52 Hence the object of desire, inten­
tionally, so to speak, is the same for Kierkegaard and for 
Sartre. The difference is only one of degree. For Kierkegaard 
the absurd results from what man discovers about himself, 
namely, the synthesis which he is, with a never-ceasing desire 
of the finite to embrace the infinite. "For the self is a 
synthesis in which the finite is the limiting factor and the 
infinite is the expanding factor. Infinitude's despair is
51SiZ$ren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, trans 
Walter Lowrie (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co.,
1941), p. 146.
52gartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 566.
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therefore the fantastical, the limitless."53 Despair Is, 
therefore. Incurable simply because the self never becomes 
Itself; it will never actualize its desire, and for this 
reason it ca^ never overcome its sickness. This is, then, 
the sickness unto death which will never depart from man’s 
soul as long as man exists because as long as man exists the 
self constantly strives for its becoming, or constantly 
strives to overcome its sickness. Salvation remains a pos­
sibility for the self and this is not related to the actuali­
zation of the self for itself but only as a hope. Overcoming 
sickness can only be a possibility when the self embraces its 
infinitude. The feeling of despair is also a feeling which 
man experiences in the presence of God. Thus we can assume 
that it is only in death that this sickness departs man— in 
total death, or in the possibility of overcoming death in the 
eternal.54
Sartre's analysis of the feeling of anguish proceeds 
along the same lines, but it takes a different direction. In 
Kierkegaard the self directs itself toward a promised infin­
itude which never becomes fulfilled, and despair in this sense 
is the result of feeling this lack, namely, the lacking pos­
sibilities of fulfillment. In Sartre, on the other hand, the 
for-itself considers itself finite, and out of its finite 
nature it proceeds toward finite projects. Anguish arises in
53xierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 163•
54ibid., pp. 146, 147, 150, 153, 162, 163. In these 
pages we can find support for our discussion of Kierkegaard's 
views on despair.
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the for-itself when it faces its unlimited responsibilities 
and desires with its own limitation. Since there is no God, 
the for-itself cannot expect help from anywhere in facing its 
responsibilities. Thus the feeling of incompleteness, of 
inaptitude, of being under the burden of facticity, and the 
feeling of alienation give rise to the feeling of anguish.
Anguish is not, therefore, simply an ethical awareness 
which can be spotted in our ethical activities; it is a 
psycho-ontological state which springs out of the inner 
awareness of one’s being. It is psycho-ontological in a 
sense because while it ruptures out of man’s inwardness, on 
the one hand, it appears to constitute the mode of being, on 
the other. To be and to be in anguish are one and the same 
thing, because to be and to exist are the same thing; and 
since the very fact of existing involves an anxiety about 
one's presence, it is hardly possible to imagine a being who 
exists without being anxious about his existence. Anguish in 
this sense is the feeling of being alienated from the possi­
bilities of completeness. "Anguish is precisely my conscious­
ness of my being my own future, in the mode of not being."55 
For Sartre as well as for Kierkegaard anguish appears to be a 
permanent mode of being.
We have shown previously why the feeling of despair in 
Kierkegaard is incurable and the reasons why it is considered
55sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 32.
a sickness unto death. It is the same for Sartre. The feel­
ing of anguish is a permanent state of being, and thus it 
cannot be overcome except by suicide or by bad faith.56 With 
suicide, being ceases and anguish ceases; but in bad faith 
consciousness fades away from the present, and the feeling of 
anguish fades away with consciousness. It is like a tranquil­
izer for a cancer pain, negating the permanent sickness until 
the sickness becomes spread through the body and suddenly the 
cancer gets rid of the pain and the body. Consciousness at­
tempts to escape anguish by eliminating it. But then it ap­
pears that anguish cannot be eliminated because it is an in­
trinsic part of being. Hence at this point the truth of the 
matter is that consciousness commits itself to be, to exist, 
and to affirm its existence; then it has to go through an­
guish; otherwise it has to get rid of its being. This is 
precisely what bad faith is all about, a way of getting rid 
of anguish and of oneself hypnotically.
Such then is the totality of processes by which we 
try to hide anguish from ourselves; we apprehend our 
particular possible by avoiding considering all other 
possibles, which we make the possibles of an undiffer­
entiated Other. The chosen possible, we do not wish to 
see as sustained in being by a pure nihilating freedom, 
and so we attempt to apprehend it as engendered by an 
object already constituted which is no other than our­
self, envisaged and described as if it were another per­
son. . . . Thus we flee from anguish by attempting to
apprehend ourselves from without as an Other or as a 
thing. What we are accustomed to call a revelation of 
the inner sense or an original intuition of our freedom 
contains nothing original; it is an already constructed
56Ibid.
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process, expressly designed to hide from ourselves 
anguish, the veritable "immediate given" of our free­
dom. 57
This clearly illustrates the phenomenon of anguish, 
through which and out of which the awareness of freedom be­
comes a task to be realized. We incarnate our anguish in 
freedom, and then we manifest our freedom in anguish; the 
more anguish, the more freedom, and the more freedom, the 
more anguish. This is so because in freedom we realize our 
responsibilities, and then when we feel our incompetence in 
fulfilling our responsibilities anguish arises. Sartre is 
definitely like Kierkegaard in emphasizing the unavoidability 
of anguish. The following is Kierkegaard's position on this 
point.
This comes from the fact that despair is a qualifica­
tion of spirit, that it is related to the eternal in 
man. But the eternal he cannot get rid of, no, not 
to all eternity; he cannot cast it from him once for 
all, nothing is more impossible; every instant he does 
not possess it he must have cast it or be casting it 
from him— but it comes back, every instant he is in 
despair he contracts despair. For despair is not a 
result of the disrelationship but of the relation which 
relates itself to itself. And the relation to himself 
a man cannot get rid of, any more than he can get rid of 
himself, which moreover is one and the same thing, since 
the self is the relationship to oneself.5°
This is also Sartre's position, as the following quota­
tion will attest.
I can in fact wish "not to see" a certain aspect of my 
being only if I am acquainted with the aspect which I
57ibid. , p. 43.
^^Kierkegaard, Op. Git. , p. 150.
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do not wish to see. This means that in my being I 
must indicate this aspect in order to be able to turn 
myself away from it ; better yet, I must think of it 
constantly in order to take care not to think of it.
In this connection it must be understood not only 
that I must of necessity perpetually carry within me 
what I wish to flee but also that I must aim at the 
object of my flight in order to flee it. This means 
that anguish, the intentional aim of anguish, and a 
flight from anguish toward reassuring myths must all 
be given in the unity of the same consciousness. In 
a word, I flee in order not to know, but I cannot avoid 
knowing that I am fleeing, and the flight from anguish 
is only a mode of becoming conscious of anguish. Thus 
anguish, properly speaking, can neither be hidden nor 
avoided.59
Anguish is here to stay. Whenever consciousness reflects upon 
itself, it experiences anguish. In order to escape from it, 
consciousness has to escape from itself, but it is like try­
ing to escape from one's shadow.
So far we have shown the similarity in respect to the 
origin of anguish in Kierkegaard and in Sartre, and how man 
experiences anguish in Kierkegaard and Sartre. In the follow­
ing we will attempt to explore this notion a little further 
in Sartre. At this point we should reiterate that anguish is 
an inward state of the for-itself which grows out of being 
conscious of itself. The mere fact of consciousness entails 
anguish, because without consciousness there is no anguish, 
and without anguish there would be no sign of consciousness. 
Therefore, anguish can be considered an integral attribute of 
consciousness, without which consciousness does not become 
conscious of itself in the world. It is anguish, therefore.
59sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 43.
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which radiates awareness within consciousness; so consciousness 
becomes aware of itself as a consciousness of something.
The for-itself experiences anguish fundamentally in two 
ways. The first way the for-itself experiences anguish is in 
its attempt to nihilate the in-itself. When this hope appears 
far from being realized, the for-itself unfolds itself in an­
guish. The second way the for-itself experiences anguish is 
in its discovery that self-realization is a process which can 
only be undertaken with others. Responsibilities toward the 
others, on the one hand, and the others’ threat in objecti­
fying the for-itself, on the other hand, create a paradoxical 
situation out of which the for-itself encounters itself with 
anguish. In the former the for-itself experiences anguish on 
the ontological level, whereas, in the latter, the for-itself 
experiences anguish on the ethical level.
On the ontological level the for-itself cannot escape 
' anguish inasmuch as it cannot escape its freedom and respon­
sibility which emerges out of its nothingness. In fact, an­
guish is the realization which the for-itself experiences 
when it becomes aware of its pure nothingness. It is through 
nothingness that the for-itself confronts itself all alone in 
absolute freedom, and it is in this feeling of absolute free­
dom that anguish is rooted. Hence, anguish, freedom, and 
responsibility are to be considered the dialectical dimensions 
of consciousness without which consciousness cannot articulate 
the possibilities of its own being. It is, then, through
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these dimensions that consciousness manifests its own ac­
tivities, and also it is through these activities that con­
sciousness faces its paradoxical becomingness.
Thus we are fully conscious of the choice which we are.
And if someone objects that in accordance with these 
observations it would be necessary to be conscious not 
of our being-chosen but of choosing ourselves, we shall 
reply that this consciousness is expressed by the two­
fold "feeling" of anguish and of responsibility. Anguish, 
abandonment, responsibility, whether muted or full 
strength, constitute the quality of our consciousness 
in so far as this is pure and simply f r e e d o m .
In this sense it is paradoxical that consciousness 
finds itself determined to choose, and that when it chooses 
the best of its projects, namely the project to be God, it 
finds itself choosing its own nihilation. Thus when the 
for-itself exercises its potential in nihilating the in-itself 
in order to pursue its projects, it finds itself constantly 
nihilating itself also; and consequently, since the for-itself 
never reaches the stage of synthesizing itself with the in- 
itself, and never will reach an agreement with itself to re­
sign from nihilating itself. Inevitably the for-itself re­
mains facing its own nothingness with anguish. Anguish in 
this respect is identical with the feeling of alienation—  
the alienation of the for-itself from its projected being 
and from itself. This causes a negative and a positive feel­
ing— negative because the for-itself can never satisfy itself.
^Qjbid., p. 464.
^^Ibid., p . 566.
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and positive because, prodded by this dissatisfaction, the 
for-itself continues to reach out for the projected self.
The for-itself, however, remains in anguish because it never 
becomes a finished self.
Paradoxically, in spite of the fact that the for-itself 
realizes its limited possibilities, it never becomes satis­
fied with what it is. Struggling to become what it is not 
creates the feeling of anguish. At this point we suggest 
that anguish is the radiating energy within consciousness, 
without which consciousness cannot continue transcending it­
self into new possibilities. Without anguish it would hardly 
be possible to conceive the for-itself in the light of what 
it is not, simply because without anguish the for-itself 
would not hesitate to conceive itself in terms of what it is. 
Moreover, it is through anguish that consciousness reveals 
to itself its own subjectivity, and as such it appears as a 
subject who confronts existence responsibly in the world of 
anguish.
Conversely, without anguish the for-itself appears like 
a thing, or like an object objectified in an objective world 
where the for-itself appears in the shadow of the ISNESS and 
not in the light of its becomingness. In anguish, therefore, 
man not only becomes aware of the possibilities which lie 
ahead of him, but also he becomes aware of his freedom, his 
dignity, his creativity. Precisely speaking, the involvement 
with anguish is an involvement with creativity and authen­
ticity .
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The anguish which, when this possibility is re­
vealed, manifests our freedom to our consciousness is 
witness of this perpetual modifiability of our initial 
project. In anguish we do not simply apprehend the 
fact that the possibles which we project are perpetually 
eaten away by our freedom-to-come; in addition we ap­
prehend our choice— i.e., ourselves— as unjustifiable.
This means that we apprehend our choice as not deriving 
from any prior reality but rather as being about to serve 
as foundation for the ensemble of significations which 
constitute reality.
The ontological experience of anguish is then an experi­
ence which takes place between consciousness and its being, a 
being whose actualization will never come to pass, but which 
at the same time continues to strive for the fulfillment of 
this possibility. The ontological feeling of anguish is, 
therefore, a mode in which the for-itself confronts its in­
escapable responsibility to fulfill a justified but non- 
attainable project. Hence, between responsibility and un­
attainability anguish persists.
The one who realizes in anguish his condition as 
being thrown into a responsibility which extends to 
his very abandonment has no longer either remorse or 
regret or excuse; he is no longer anything but a free­
dom which perfectly reveals itself and whose being 
resides in this very revelation. But as we pointed out 
at the beginning of this work, most of the time we flee 
anguish in bad faith.
And bad faith in this respect undoubtedly is ontological
suicide. This leads us to analyze the ethical experience of
anguish.
It was rot a matter of accident that we looked into the 
ontological experience of anguish before examining the
62i b i d ., p. 464. 
^3jbid., p. 556.
96
ethical side of it. We purposely planned this because we feel 
that describing anguish in the light of ethical experience 
does not appear relevant if we do not understand its ontol­
ogical foundations. For this purpose we concentrated in our 
presentation on the ontological aspect which, we believe, 
cannot be separated from the inner psychic awareness of one­
self. And for this reason we used the phrase "psycho- 
ontological awareness of anguish." This approach appears to 
be in agreement with Sartre’s own: If we read Being and
Nothingness carefully, we can see the continuity of this 
theme clearly, developing with the ontological analysis of 
anguish. As we mentioned previously, Sartre attempts to 
separate the ontological discourse from ethical impera­
tives .
But at the same time he is strongly convinced that the 
ontological mode of the for-itself has definite implications 
for the nature of its ethical i n v o l v e m e n t .^5 in the same 
manner, there is some form of distinction in the nature of 
anguish between its ontological modes and its ethical modes. 
But this distinction by no means implies a substantial sepa­
ration between the correlative modes of anguish. On the 
ontological level the for-itself experiences anguish as a 




by discovery of its absolute nothingness; whereas on the
ethical level the for-itself experiences anguish when It faces
the human situation with Its own nothingness. By not having
an established standard, or certain given a priori categories
from which the for-itself derives Its actions, the for-itself
finds Itself totally responsible for the resoluteness of Its
situation. The uncertainty which Is the unavoidable outcome
of Its nothingness creates anguish. Sartre explains this
point In the following:
The existentialists say at once that man Is anguish.
What that means Is this: the man who Involves himself
and who realizes that he Is not only the person he 
chooses to be, but also a lawmaker who Is, at the same 
time, choosing all mankind as well as himself, can not 
help escape the feeling of his total and deep respon­
sibility. Of course, there are many people who are 
not anxious; but we claim that they are hiding their 
anxiety, that they are fleeing from lt.°°
How can they flee from anguish on the ethical level?
The answer Is, simply by fleeing from the human situation, 
and this Is possible by veiling the for-itself so that It 
appears abstracted and Isolated from others. Then, this 
artificial abstraction and Isolation will be utilized by the 
for-itself cunningly In order to convince Itself that this 
situation Is not "mine," which deception will be followed by 
another deceptive assumption, that since It Is not mine. It 
Is not my responsibility.
This meta-ethlcal phenomenon Is predominant In this
G^Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. l8.
century, especially among people who are spoiled by the psy­
chology of the time which emphasizes superficial tranquility 
and normality of behavior. As a result of this mechanized 
brain-washing ethics, most people tend to lead the so-called
normal life, and this is possible by avoiding exposure to
curious things, to difficult things, to emotional things, and 
to all things that might be above the normal. This is so be­
cause all these things pertain to anxiety, and anxiety is not
desirable according to the everyday psychology; so in order 
to avoid anxiety people have to detach themselves from their 
situation, from their responsibility, and finally from them­
selves. Thus, by attempting to avoid anguish, inevitably we 
will avoid involvement, which sooner or later will also be 
followed by avoiding ourselves. And this is ethical suicide.
This is so because the self cannot become aware of its 
responsibilities, nor can it realize the meaning of involve­
ment in the human situation, without anguish. For these rea­
sons existential psychoanalysis differs from traditional 
psychoanalysis. The former emphasizes a positive orientation 
of the for-itself to itself in the concrete situation, whereas 
the latter takes a negative attitude in abstracting the for- 
itself from its situation through a tranquilizing methodology 
of escape. In the former the attempt is to bring man face to 
face with his own self-realization, out of which the adjust­
ment to the human situation can only be possible. In the 
latter we find a tendency not to help man to articulate his
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situation, but rather to escape from it in order to face him­
self. Thus the self appears abstracted from the situation.
But ontology and existential psychoanalysis (or 
the spontaneous and empirical application which men 
have always made of these disciplines) must reveal to 
the moral agent that he is the being by whom values 
exist. It is then his freedom will become conscious of 
itself and will reveal itself in anguish as the unique 
source of value and the nothingness by which the world 
exists.
It should be clear that anguish is not only an ethical 
notion, as Plantinga emphasizes in his analysis of the exist­
entialist's e t h i c s . Anguish is, rather, grounded in man's 
nature before even reaching the ethical stage. For this rea­
son Sartre proclaims that man is anguish.^9 Consequently, 
when man becomes conscious of himself, he also becomes con­
scious of his anguish. For this reason we consider anguish 
an inward psychological mode of man's being, out of which the 
for-itself attempts to manifest itself in the world. And 
thus, the for-itself experiences anguish as it attempts to 
manifest itself ontologically, ethically, or even aestheti­
cally in Kierkegaard's sense.
We should remind the reader that in the same perspective 
we previously viewed the notions of bad faith and responsi­
bility, and that they have to be considered unseparated modes 
of consciousness because they are dialectically synthesized
^7gartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 627. 
GBpiantinga, Review of Metaphysics, VII, 235- 
^9sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. I8.
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In the activities of consciousness itself. Hence, they are 
basically interior qualities of consciousness which have to 
be reflected externally in order to give them an existential 
value. Thus, when we feel responsible we cannot consider our­
selves responsible unless we act on the responsibility that 
is in question. This question of our responsibility cannot 
be evaluated in terms of the external act alone, but also in 
the light of the internal feeling as it becomes externalized 
in the activities of our undertaking. To view these notions 
as strictly ethical notions would be similar to saying that 
the effect of an action is its own cause.
Out intention in this argument is to show that the cause 
of an action and the action itself are two different things 
in spite of the fact that they appear fundamentally related. 
This is so because the cause of an action primarily is 
grounded in the intentionality of consciousness, whereas the 
action itself is an activity of the will, which appears re­
sponsible for any accountable activity. For this reason we 
hold that the inward psychological modes in Sartre cannot be 
divorced from the external activities of consciousness in 
forming the ontological and the ethical points of view. In 
the following chapter we shall attempt to show the connection 
of,Sartre’s pre-ontological works— namely his work on psy­
chology— to his ontological phenomenology.
In the two preceding chapters we have demonstrated two 
points: (1) the misunderstanding of Sartre’s interpreters
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in regard to the nature of his philosophy, (2) that beyond 
Sartre’s ontology and ethics there are inward psychological 
modes which help make Sartre's ontology and ethics what they 
are. We have attempted to interpret the second point without 
falling into ontological relativism, the notion which is sup­
ported by Fred Newman.
In regard to the first point we have examined the major 
arguments in regard to the nature of Sartre's philosophy: 
a) Newman's claim that Sartre's ethics is basically relati- 
vistic and that this relativism is an outgrowth of his onto­
logical relativism; b) Champigny's assumption that "Sartre's 
philosophy is dominated by an ethical concern"; c) Plantinga's 
argument that in spite of the fact "that Sartre's philosophy 
expresses a moral concern through and through" his morality 
is not really a morality. And we demonstrated the invalidity 
of their conclusions.
In regard to the second point we have discussed this 
notion in the first chapter by attempting to understand the
nature of the "I." The "I" does not appear to possess any
immediate purpose, any ontological nature, or any teleologi- 
cal structure. The "I" appears to be naked with its own 
nothingness and intentionality. How does this "I" experience 
the world and the other? We suggested that the immediate 
spontaneous experiences are psychological and that out of the
psychological modes the "I" (in Sartre) formulates its onto­
logical relation with the world and its ethical activities
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with the other. In order to make this claim clear we devoted 
a section in the second chapter to show how the "I" inter­
prets certain existential notions, e.g., bad faith, respon­
sibility, and anguish, in the light of its psychological 
modes. This seems to support our thesis that the I in Sartre 
interprets its relationship with the world primarily in the 
light of its psychological modes. This position obviously 
stands in opposition to the views held by Newman, Champigny 
and Plantinga.
In the following chapter we shall demonstrate system­
atically the relationship of Sartre's pre-ontological work 
to L'être et le néant. It is anticipated that this critical 
exposition will clarify the relationship of Sartre's psycho­
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Les Mains Sales
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CHAPTER III
THE RELATION OF SARTRE'S PRE-ONTOLOGICAL 
WORK TO L'ËTRE ET LE NEANT
Unquestionably the climax of Sartre's popularity on one 
hand, and his contribution to the popularity of the existen­
tialism on the other, rest primarily on his work L'être et le 
néant and his defense of existentialism. This defense, which 
was later printed in a pamphlet entitled L 'existentialisme 
est un humanisme, represents the peak of Sartre's popularity.^ 
It is not our interest here to discuss the causes of Sartre's 
popularity nor the situations which probably have made him 
the most popular existential philosopher, but to point out 
that Sartre's acclaim is, to a great extent, attributable to 
his most popular works L'être et le néant and L 'existentialisme 
est un humanisme. This is particularly true if we consider 
Sartre's prestige as a philosopher and not as a playwright or 
as a literary figure, because before writing L'être et le 
néant Sartre had already established his literary reputation 
on the Parisian scene, not only as a writer but also as a
Ijean-Paul Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme 
(Paris: Editions Nagel, I963).
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director of his own plays, and as a literary and a political 
critic.2
If this is the case in relation to Sartre’s prestige in 
Europe, in the United States the case is slightly different. 
Because the name of Sartre has been associated more with 
Being and Nothingness in the United States than with La 
Nausée, The Wall, or The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre’s 
popularity in the United States has been more related to his 
atheistic existentialism than to his literary and political 
involvement. Not before the publication of Being and Nothing­
ness in the English language did the name of Sartre become 
well known to the literary elite, and then the literary circle 
became more interested in Sartre’s writing in general. The 
Transcendence of the Ego, which was written in 1936, did not 
become circulated in the English language until 1957;^
L ’imagination did not appear in English until 1962.^ And 
L ’imaginaire which was written in 1940 was first translated 
and published in 1948 by the Philosophical Library. This 
survey of Sartre’s translated work could support the notion 
that Sartre’s popularity as a philosophical figure in the
2por a detailed description of Sartre's development, 
see Francis Jeanson's book Sartre par lui-meme (Paris: 
Ecrivains de Toujours, 1965), in which we find a vivid and an 
objective description of Sartre’s activities in general.
3sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego.
^Jean-Paul Sartre, Imagination, trans, Forrest Williams 
(Ann Arbor, Michigân: The University of Michigan Press,
1962).
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United States began when Being and Nothingness became avail­
able in the English language, thanks to Hazel Barnes' effort 
in translating this work, after which the American readers 
and publishers became more interested in Sartre's writing in 
general.
This representation does not express any philosophical 
judgment in itself, and we do not intend to make it so. The 
purpose of this illustration is simply to show that the cur­
ious impulse of those who express an interest in Sartre is 
usually directed toward Sartre's conception of nothingness, 
freedom, and anguish; and these, as we know, constitute an 
essential theme in his ontology. What appears to be most 
appealing and probably most interesting is Sartre's ontology. 
For this reason, presumably, his pre-ontological works not 
only appear neglected, but also disconnected from Sartre's 
ontological position.
In this chapter it is our intention to show the connec­
tion between Sartre's pre-ontological work, which is an ex­
ploration in the field of psychology of the imagination, to 
his phenomenological ontology. Our endeavor does not stop 
with showing this connection; we also want to show that the 
themes of Sartre's ontology are the continuation of the psy­
chological exploration which he attempted to pioneer in his 
work on imagination and the psychology of human emotion. It 
should be stressed, however, that we are not attempting to 
reduce Sartre's ontology to psychologism as Marvin Farber
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did to Husserl in his interpretation of Husserl in his recent 
work The Aim of Phenomenology.̂  What we are interested to 
show is that Sartre's ontological speculation cannot be di­
vorced from his psychological attitude. In the following we 
will attempt to show systematically the continuity between 
Sartre's pre-ontological works and Being and Nothingness, and 
in the fourth chapter we will show the impact of Sartre's 
psychological attitudes in conceiving the world and others.
The Discovery of Nothingness in 
The Transcendence of the Ego
To most commentators and to most people who are inter­
ested in Sartre, Being and Nothingness is undoubtedly Sartre's 
magnum opus. We are willing to accept this estimate, and we 
are also willing to go further in saying that without Being 
and Nothingness Sartre would never have had the philosophical 
importance which he is enjoying at the present. We cannot 
agree, however, with the claim of some writers that Being and 
Nothingness, as well as other writings of Sartre, grew and 
matured out of the cafe atmosphere.^
Our claim is that Being and Nothingness did not origi­
nate casually. Rather, the basic ontological themes which 
make Being and Nothingness what it is are themes which occu­
pied Sartre's attention for almost a decade before the
^Marvin Farber, The Aims of Phenomenology (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 4,5.
^We refer to Alfred Sterns introduction to his book, 
Sartre: His philosophy and Psychoanalysis, pp. 3-7.
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publication of Being and Nothingness. The second volume of 
Simone de Beauvoir's autobiography. The Prime of Life, gives 
an accurate account of Sartre's intellectual struggle in 
forming his ideas from an earlier time which goes back almost 
two decades before the publication of Being and Nothingness. 
Thus, while the climax of Being and Nothingness is known by 
most interpreters to be based on the discovery of the notion 
of nothingness in consciousness, and that freedom emerges out 
of this nothingness, we find almost no endeavor by commenta­
tors to trace the origin of nothingness in Sartre. We claim 
that this is as important in Sartre as the notion of freedom 
itself, because unless the notion of nothingness is established 
the nature of freedom cannot be fully understood. This is so 
because freedom in Sartre is the mere recognition of nothing­
ness in consciousness. If something is intrinsically con­
tained in consciousness, it cannot be considered as freedom, 
nor would it be possible to conceive of existence before es­
sence .
This self-determination of consciousness must not 
be conceived as a genesis, as a becoming, for that would 
force us to suppose that consciousness is prior to its 
own existence. Neither is it necessary to conceive of 
this self-creation as an act, for in that case conscious­
ness would be conscious (of) itself as an act, which it 
is not. Consciousness is a plenum of existence, and 
this determination of itself by itself is an essential 
characteristic. . . . The existence of consciousness 
comes from consciousness itself. By that we need not 
understand that consciousness "derives from nothing­
ness." There can not be "nothingness of consciousness" 
before consciousness. "Before" consciousness one can 
conceive only of a plenum of being of which no element
109
can refer to an absent consciousness.7
This exposition of consciousness did not generate sud­
denly in Being and Nothingness, and this becomes more clear 
if we consider the notion of nothingness in consciousness as 
it develops in The Transcendence of the Ego, and its implica­
tions for Being and Nothingness. The Transcendence of the 
Ego should be considered more than a brief prolegomenon for 
Sartre’s ontology of consciousness which is developed in 
Being and Nothingness, because in spite of its brief and 
sketchy analysis it contains the most fundamental elements 
of Sartre's conceptions of consciousness. Hazel Barnes rec­
ognized the importance of The Transcendence of the Ego to 
Being and Nothingness.
In an article called "La transcendence de L'ego" (1936) 
Sartre, while keeping within the general province of 
phenomenology, challenged Husserl's concept of the tran­
scendental Ego. The article does more than to suggest 
some of the principal ideas of Being and Nothingness.
It analyzes in detail certain fundamental positions 
which though basic in the later work are there hurriedly 
sketched in or even presupposed.°
Moreover, our emphasis on The Transcendence of the Ego
is based not only on its unique contribution to Being and
Nothingness and to the notion of freedom, but is also based
on our claim that The Transcendence of the Ego has more of ,
the pure Sartrean qualities than any of his other works,
namely, that it represents the most unique contribution of
^Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. Iv. 
^"Translator's Introduction" in Ibid., p. ix.
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Sartre to the theory of consciousness. In other words, if we 
were asked to make a judgment on what is the most original 
contribution of Sartre and which work of Sartre is more 
Sartrean than the others, our answer would be The Transcend­
ence of the Ego. This conclusion is made as a result of our 
study of the certain peculiarly existential themes which were 
developed and formulated before Sartre, but to which he has 
nevertheless contributed his share in expressing his thoughts 
about them. For example, if we review these themes and their 
origins we find that Sartre's criticism of the notion of a 
transcendental ego is not only new but also revolutionary.
For most philosophers the ego is an "inhabitant" 
of consciousness. Some affirm its formal presence at 
the heart of Srlebnisse, as an empty principle of uni­
fication. Others— psychologists for the most part-- 
claim to discover its material presence, as the center 
of desires and acts, in each moment of our psychic life. 
We should like to show here that the ego is neither 
formally nor materially consciousness: it is out­
side, in the world. It is a being of the world, like 
the ego of another.5
For this reason we are claiming that The Transcendence 
of the Ego can be considered the most Sartrean in origin, and 
it could be considered the most unique contribution of Sartre 
to the history of philosophy. We make this claim because if 
we study other themes or concepts which Sartre analyzes in 
his philosophical and literary works, we find that they do 
not really originate with Sartre but are rather interpreted 
by him in his particular way. For example, if we review
^Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 31.
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different themes, as anguish, being in the world, acting and 
doing, the absence of God, the for-itself, and the in-itself, 
and even the definition of consciousness, we find that these 
themes and others were discovered and analyzed before Sartre, 
This does not imply that Sartre accepts these notions as they 
were conceptualized or previously defined. What we mean to 
say is that the influence upon Sartre of those who developed 
these notions or themes cannot be totally ignored.
In order to make our generalization clear, we will 
briefly schematize the relationship of these different themes 
(e.g., anguish, being in the world . . .) to the philosophy 
of Sartre. In relation to anguish, Sartre points out, more 
than once, that it is the anguish of Kierkegaard which the 
for-itself or consciousness experiences when it is confronted 
with its responsibilities.Also we have shown in the pre­
ceding chapter how the ontological meaning of anguish was 
transformed from Kierkegaard's vertical and infinite reli­
gious experience to Sartre's horizontal and finite humanistic 
experience. The dialogue between consciousness and anguish 
is the same in Kierkegaard and in Sartre except for the fact 
that anguish or despair in Kierkegaard stems from the lack 
of infinitude;!! whereas in Sartre it originates from the 
lack of being, namely from its nothingness in consciousness.!^
lOgartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 19. See 
also Being and Nothingness, p. 29.
ÜKierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. l62.
l^Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 35-
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If the ontological meaning of anguish is derived from
Kierkegaard] the ontological structure of being in the world
unquestionably is inspired by Heidegger. Sartre makes this
clear in more than one instance in Being and Nothingness as
well as in other works. In his early work on the psychology
of emotion^Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions,̂ 3 Sartre
adopts Heidegger's view of being in the world.
Or 1'homme est une être du même type que le monde, il 
est même possible, comme le croit HEIDEGGER, que les 
notions de monde et de "réalité-humaine" (Dasein) soient 
inséparables. Précisément pour cela la psychologie doit 
se résigner à manquer la réalité-humaine, si du moins 
cette réalité-humaine existe.
In Esquisse d'une th'eorie des émotions Sartre repeatedly en­
dorses Heidegger's position. Sartre describes man as an 
emotional being in the world who should be viewed as such, 
and not in separation from, or in duality with, the w o r l d . ^5 
And the strongest endorsement of Heidegger's theory comes in 
L'existentialisme est un humanisme, when Sartre needs to 
strengthen his position in regard to man as being determined 
to be free. Thus in order to place man in the world free 
from the laws of causality, he accepts Heidegger's notion of 
man's throwness into the world.
"C'est ce que j'exprimerai en disant que l'homme est





condamné à être libre. Condamné, parce qu'il ne s'est pas 
créé lui-même, et par ailleurs cependant libre, parce qu'une 
fois jeté dans le monde, il est responsable de tout ce qu'il 
fait."^^ Moreover, Sartre again utilizes Heidegger's notion 
of being in the world when he defends his atheistic exist­
entialist position.
L'existentialisme athée, que je représente, est 
plus cohérent. Il déclare que si Dieu n'existe pas, il 
y a au moins un être chez qui l'existence précède 
l'essence, un être qui existe avant de pouvoir être 
défini par aucun concept et que cet être c'est l'homme 
ou, comme dit Heidegger, la réalité humaine.
Thus far vje have seen how Sartre synthesizes Kierke­
gaard's subjective religious view of man's situation, on one 
hand, with Heidegger's notion of man as being in the world, 
on the other. From Kierkegaard Sartre accepts the ontologi­
cal situation of man in relation to himself and in relation 
to what he lacks; namely his being, or the synthesis between 
the temporal and the eternal in order to become a self. It 
should be clear that despair for Kierkegaard is the outcome 
of man's ontological situation. The feeling of despair burst 
into man's situation when man realized his alienation from 
his total self and God. Thus, the self remains suspended 
between two worlds: the temporal and the eternal. It should
be noted that it is the same in Sartre; the self, conscious­
ness, or the for-itself never ceases its struggle to nihilate
l^Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme, p. 37. 
Ibid. , p . 21.
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the In-itselfj nor does the synthesis between the for-itself 
and the in-itself ever take place. For this reason conscious­
ness remains threatened by anguish, which is the same in 
Kierkegaard's self. The difference between the two is that 
for Sartre the struggle takes place within the spatio- 
temporal, whereas for Kierkegaard the struggle takes place 
between the temporal and the eternal.
In the light of this brief contrast between Sartre and 
Kierkegaard, on one hand, and between Sartre and Heidegger, 
on the other, we can conclude that while Kierkegaard furnishes 
Sartre with the inward subjective ontological image of the 
self, Heidegger has helped Sartre to construct the outward 
ontological relation of the self to the world. In spite of 
this influence, which is acknowledged by Sartre on various 
occasions, we find Sartre shifting his ontological position 
from that of Heidegger, just as he shifted from Kierkegaard. 
(We discussed the ontological transformation from Kierkegaard 
to Sartre in the preceding chapter.)
For Heidegger the encounter of Dasein is with the 
world; for Sartre the immediate encounter of consciousness 
is with the human situation. Hence, while the ultimate con­
cern of consciousness for Sartre is directed to human real­
ity, to Heidegger this concern is directed to the whole world 
by which human reality is conditioned. Chapter Three in 
Being and Time, "The Wordhood of the World," exemplifies this 
notion, which can be epitomized in the following:
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Our method has already been assigned (Anwelsung).
The theme of our analytic is to be Being-in-the-world, 
and accordingly the very world itself; and these are 
to be considered within the horizon of average every­
dayness— the kind of being which is closest to Dasein.
We must make a study of everyday Being-in-the-world; 
with the phenomenal support which this gives us, some­
thing like the world must come into view.!"
Sartre also speaks of being-in-the-world, but the world 
to Sartre is focused upon through the human situation.
Nous demeurons d'accord que la psychologie ne met pas 
l’homme en question ni le monde entre parentheses. Elle 
prend l'homme dans le monde, tel qu’il se présente à 
travers une multitude de situations; au café, en famille, 
à la guerre. D ’une façon générale ce qui l ’intéresse 
c’est 1’homme en situations.
Man’s ultimate concern, therefore, shifts from the 
world as a whole to his concern with others. This claim is 
verified in the way Sartre pursues his ontological analysis 
of the other in Being and Nothingness, in which the for- 
itself appears to be viewing the world; or, to put it dif­
ferently, man appears to be viewing the world from his human
situation.20
In spite of some transformation in relation to the on­
tological relation of man and the world, Sartre’s ontological 
view of man is quite developed out of Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger. As we mentioned earlier, from Kierkegaard Sartre 
has developed the notion of the inwardness of man’s subjec­
tivity in viewing himself as related to himself; whereas from
l^Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper
and Row, 1962), p. 44.
l^Sartre, Esquisse d ’une théorie des émotions, p. 17-
20sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 48l.
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Heidegger he has developed the outwardness of man in his proj­
ection upon the world. This brief analysis should be suffic­
ient to cast doubt upon the thesis of the dividing lines in 
existentialism, the religious line which is supposed to have 
been developed from Kierkegaard, and the atheistic line which 
is supposed to have grown out of Nietzsche. What we are sug­
gesting is that such a division is at least questionable, be­
cause if we view Sartre as he considers himself, representing 
athetistic existentialism, we find that his ontological image 
of man substantially grew out of Kierkegaard's theism.
What is left to be related to Nietzsche's influence 
upon existentialism in general and upon Sartre in particular, 
is not ontological or metaphysical, but something of an ethi­
cal significance. We are not including the theme of the death 
of God, simply because if this is truly the most influential 
theme upon atheistic existentialism, then why not consider 
other philosophers who proclaim similar notions. The theme 
of the death of God in Nietzsche is different from the prop­
osition that God does not exist in Sartre. If we assert 
that God is dead, we assume that once God existed. If this 
is the case, then when God existed he could have had some­
thing to do with the essence of man. This certainly violates 
the notion of nothingness in Sartre as well as his radical 
notion of freedom. What we are suggesting at this point is 
that the usual acceptance of the notion that Sartre's atheism 
is the continuation of Nietzsche's discovery of the death of
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God is questionable. This appears even more clearly if we 
view the idea symbolically in its ontological meaning and 
not factually in the form of a personal death.
Why atheism today? The "father" in God is thor­
oughly refuted, likewise the "judge" and the "rewarder." 
Also his "free will"— he does not hear us, and even if 
he heard us he could not help. The worst of it is that 
he seems to be incapable of communicating clearly. Is 
he unclear?— this is what I have found out from many 
questions and conversations as to the cause of the de­
cline of European theism. It seems to me that the re­
ligious instinct is growing powerfully but is rejecting 
theistic gratification with deep distrust.^1
This quotation really does not help us decide the 
nature of the death of God, but at least it represents the 
symbolic nature of Nietzsche's writing, from which it will be 
difficult to make an affirmative statement as to whether 
God's death is an ontological death, which symbolizes the 
death of values and the meaning of existence, or a personal 
death in the factual sense of the terra. Neither interpreta­
tion really changes the course of our investigation because 
we cannot see any acceptable construction which justifies an 
ontological connection to Sartre.
On the contrary, we can see in Nietzsche's theory more 
of an ethical directive force which moves the human will to 
assert itself in existence. Nietzsche brings out the thrust 
of the will in acting and doing in the here and now. Man in 
Nietzsche appears with a gigantic will with nothing to negate
21priederich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (Chicago: 
Henry Regney, 1955), p. 60.
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its activity from asserting itself. Certainly Sartre glori­
fied this energy which would help make possible whatever man 
may project out of himself. "Not only is man what he con­
ceives himself to be, but he is also what he wills himself 
to be after this thrust toward existence."^2 The decisions 
in acting and doing, the emphasis on the here and now in 
self-assertion and self-direction might very well be in­
spired, if not by Nietzsche's symbolic writing, by his life 
itself. In short, what we are claiming in regard to the in­
fluence of Nietzsche upon Sartre is that this influence is 
more ethical than ontological. We shall not pursue this 
exposition any further because it is not basically connected 
with the theme of this chapter. However, since we could not 
analyze the ontological background of Sartre without bring­
ing up Nietzsche, we confined our analysis to the most direct 
issues. For the same reason we shall bring up Hegel's notion 
of consciousness.
If we analyze the ontological development of conscious­
ness and the modes of its activities, we find that Hegel's 
influence can be recognized in his notions of consciousness 
and its relation to the other. It is ironical that while 
most existentialists reject Hegel's objectivity, at the same 
time they are found caught in the "pliers" of his dialectic. 
This appears to be true in the systematic as well as in the 
descriptive relation of being and reality (the world).
22gartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, p. 15 -
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Thus, the influence of Hegel upon Sartre appears not only in 
the dialectical structure of relating consciousness to the 
world, but also in the borrowed Hegelian terminology which 
names this relationship. The Pour-Soi, which is defined as 
consciousness, or as the knowing subject, and the En-Soi, 
which exists independent of consciousness, but as a possi­
bility for consciousness to be known, are the Sartrean 
equivalents of Hegel's an sich and fur s i c h . 2 3  The basic 
difference between Hegel's an sich and Sartre's En-Soi is 
that while Hegel considers an sich a possibility for the 
other, it is also a form of consciousness i t s e l f . S a r t r e  
accepts the fact that the En-Soi is a possibility for the 
other, but it is void of c o n s c i o u s n e s s .^5 Further, as far 
as we can see, the Pour-Soi in Sartre and the fur sich in 
Hegel can hardly be distinguished except for the fact that 
while the fur sich in Hegel possesses an intrinsic quality 
of being,2G the Pour-Soi in Sartre possesses nothing. It is 
simply a consciousness of something, namely of the in- 
itself.27
Ontologically or even phenomenologically, Hegel as well 
as Husserl and Heidegger should be credited for his influence
23Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (New York: Macmillan
and Co., I96I), pp. 218-223.
Z^Ibid., p. 218.
25Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 1 7 7 .
Z^Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 223.
27Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 173.
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upon Sartre. This appears more so If we compare the descrip­
tions of the ego as they occur in Hegel and Sartre. It is 
doubtful that the similarity can be simply coincidental.
Hegel wrote: "Ego is the content of the relation, and itself
the process of relating. It is Ego itself which is opposed 
to another and, at the same time, reaches out beyond this 
other, which other is all the same taken to be only i t s e l f . "^8 
In spite of some awkwardness in the translation, this passage 
clearly explains that the ego is the content of something 
other than itself; namely, it is the content of the relation­
ship between the an sich and the fur sich, or between con­
sciousness and the world. This corresponds to Sartre's argu­
ment in The Transcendence of the Ego that the notion of a 
transcendental ego is false. "We should like to show here 
that the ego is neither formally nor materially in conscious­
ness: it is outside in the world. It is a being of the
world, like the ego of another."^9 Moreover, the ego in 
Hegel appears to be an actualization arising from the dialec­
tical relation between the an sich and the fur sich, which 
is the same in Sartre.
The basic difference is that consciousness in Hegel 
implies being or an intrinsic content which is manifested as 
a potentiality, whereas to Sartre consciousness implies no­
thingness. There is only consciousness with no-thing in it. 
There is only the intentionality of consciousness which
28Hegel, p. 219.
29sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 31.
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appears to be like an attribute of consciousness— indeed, 
like its essence.
Sartre’s basic departure from Hegel, Heidegger, Kierke­
gaard and Husserl is related to the notion of nothingness in 
consciousness, which is, in our view, the foundation of 
Sartre's radical position on freedom. As we suggested ear­
lier, The Transcendence of the Ego is more Sartrean than any 
of his other works because the primary notion of the work, 
namely, that of nothingness, cannot be traced to any western 
source as far as we can see. This conclusion does not include 
the eastern trend of thought, because the notion of nothing­
ness is a characteristic of Buddhism, Brahminism, and the 
Vedic traditions. In this work we will not be concerned with 
comparing Sartre's notions and the eastern trends of thought, 
because it is neither essential nor relevant to this par­
ticular problem. Hence, we shall accept the conclusion that 
Sartre should be credited with the discovery of nothingness 
in consciousness and with the methodology implied in analyz­
ing consciousness from this perspective.
It is in this sense that we are interested in viewing 
the relationship between The Transcendence of the Ego and 
Being and Nothingness. The former, in our estimation, should 
not be viewed as only a prolegomenon to the latter, but also 
as its foundation. This claim can be supported by consider­
ing the notion of consciousness in the two works. In The 
Transcendence of the Ego Sartre conceptualizes the nature of
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consciousness, and in Being and Nothingness he applies it. 
There is nothing discovered about consciousness in Being and 
Nothingness which was not stated in The Transcendence of the 
Ego. The difference between the two works is analogous to 
setting the rules or axioms of a problem and then attempting 
to solve this particular problem according to these rules.
If The Transcendence of the Ego represents the rules of the 
problem of consciousness. Being and Nothingness represents 
the operations of these rules in problem-solving.
In order to clarify the issue and to substantiate our 
thesis, we shall make a brief survey of the problem. In The 
Transcendence of the Ego Sartre acknowledges his debt to 
Husserl in regard to the function of consciousness; namely, 
all consciousness is consciousness of something.30 Thus, 
all consciousness is "positional” in relation to itself, 
which fact implies that it transcends itself in order to 
nihilate an object. Without object, consciousness cannot 
pursue its activities, nor can it become aware of itself as 
an ego, because the ego is outside in the world.31 it is, in 
fact, whatever consciousness is able to nihilate out of the 
world.
This position is adopted and developed in the introduc­
tion of Being and Nothingness. Sartre states the following:
3°lbid., p. 44.
31-'Ibid. , p . 31
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All consciousness, as Husserl has shown,is con­
sciousness of something. This means that there is no 
consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent 
object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no 
"content." We must renounce those neutral "givens" 
which, according to the system of reference chosen, find 
their place either "in the world" or "in the p s y c h e ."32
It is clear that Sartre is in total agreement with Husserl at 
this point, and also that he is applying his own fundamental 
notions, which are explained in the "Transcendental Ego," in 
Being and Nothingness. Paradoxically, what he appears to 
reject in Husserl is not the phenomenal activities of con­
sciousness, but its nature in relation to its transcendental 
ego. For Sartre, as we pointed out earlier, the ego is not 
constitutive of consciousness in any intrinsic fashion; 
rather, consciousness itself constructs its ego out of its 
relation to external objects. To Husserl the "1," or ego, is 
transcendental. Sartre states Husserl's position in the fol­
lowing: "This I would be, so to speak, behind each con­
sciousness, a necessary structure of consciousness, whose 
rays (Ichstrahlen) would light upon each phenomenon present­
ing itself in the field of attention."33
The basic difference, then, between Husserl and Sartre 
is related to the nature of the ego, which affects the notion 
of freedom itself. The reason for this is that if the ego is 
transcendental or intrinsically constitutive in consciousness, 
consciousness itself simultaneously would have to be directed
32sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. li.
33gartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 37.
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according to the will of the transcendental ego. This will
have an effect on the whole notion of freedom, simply because
freedom must be affected by any reduction of the ego to an
ontological or a psychological state.
The ego is nothing outside of the concrete totality 
of states and actions it supports. Undoubtedly it 
is transcendent to all the states which it unifies, 
but not as an abstract X whose mission is only to 
unify; rather, it is the infinite totality of states 
and of actions which is never reducible to an action 
or to a state.34
Undoubtedly this has a bearing on the notion of freedom 
and a bearing on the way we conceive the individual ego, 
namely as a subject or as an object. Further, if the ego is 
reducible to aiy particular state, then it can be reduced to 
an object determined by its particular state. This is in 
fact deterministic behaviorism, the psychology which treats 
man in terms of his states of need, out of which the ego ap­
pears as an object reduced to its needs. Sartre, seemingly, 
was well aware of the problem of the ego with respect to 
freedom and determinism. His undertaking in The Transcendence 
of the Ego shows not only the nothingness in consciousness, 
from which freedom ruptures, but also that the ego which 
comes into being out of consciousness is not an entity or 
subject which is reducible to any deterministic causality.
Hence, without the help of the Kantian noumenal nature, 
Sartre attempts to show that freedom is possible within causal
3^Ibid., p. 74.
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phenomena, and within the spatio-temporal world, in spite of 
the fact that consciousness is only a consciousness of these 
phenomena. Kant considers man to be free only noumenally, 
not free phenomenally, because he is subject to the law of 
causality; Sartre, on the contrary, tries to show that con­
sciousness can become aware of itself and of its freedom only 
phenomenally. This is so because there is nothing before con­
sciousness, nor anything in consciousness before it becomes 
conscious of the world. In fact, if consciousness is free 
only noumenally, it is not free at all, because man's choices 
and actions would in that case be determined by his noumenal 
essence. Any preconceived essence, before the act of con­
sciousness itself, is an unnecessary deterministic element of 
consciousness. Furthermore, while Kant views man as a uni­
fication or as a synthesis of a noumenal supersensible nature 
and of a phenomenal sensible nature, Sartre views man as con­
sciousness which makes its own unity possible. Whatever con­
sciousness is able to unify in its confrontation of the world 
will be considered the so-called ego. The ego, in other words, 
is the nexus of a unified complex united by consciousness.
The ego is a virtual locus of unity, and consciousness 
constitutes it in a direction contrary to that actually 
taken by the production: really, consciousnesses are
first; through these are constituted states- and then, 
through the latter, the ego is constituted.35
This is the major undertaking of The Transcendence of
35jbid., p. 81.
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the Ego, a theme which is pursued in terms of its implica­
tions in Being and Nothingness. In the former work Sartre 
attempts to define consciousness; in the latter work he tries 
to analyze the phenomenon of consciousness at work. The fol­
lowing illustration presents a picture of consciousness in 
its activities, which will also show the continuation of the 
notions discovered in The Transcendence of the Ego.
It would be in vain to imagine that consciousness can 
exist without a given; in that case it would be con­
sciousness (of) itself as consciousness of nothing—  
that is, absolute nothingness. But if consciousness 
exists in terms of the given, this does not mean that 
the given conditions consciousness; consciousness is 
a pure and simple negation of the given, and it exists 
as the disengagement from a certain existing given and 
as an engagement toward a certain not yet existing end. 
But in addition this internal negation can be only the 
fact of a being which is in perpetual withdrawal in 
relation to itself. If this being were not its own 
negation, it would be what it is— i.e., a pure and 
simple given. Due to this fact it would have no con­
nection with any other datum since the given is by nature 
only what it is.3°
This description of the activities of consciousness, 
which can be found in many other passages in Being and No­
thingness , expresses clearly the continuation of the rule 
which was affirmed in The Transcendence of the Ego; namely, 
consciousness is always a consciousness of something. How­
ever, it should be stated that the given is nothing more than 
whatever is revealed out of the in-itself to consciousness. 
The in-itself stands as possibilities to be interpreted and 
realized by consciousness. Thus, it is through consciousness
3&Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 478-^79*
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that the in-itself can be represented as a given, inasmuch as 
it is through the in-itself that consciousness can become 
aware of itself as consciousness. This is so because con­
sciousness is always a consciousness of s o m e t h i n g . 37
But if consciousness is always a consciousness of some­
thing, how is it possible for different consciousnesses to 
experience whatever may be revealed out of the in-itself in 
the form of individuality? Does the in-itself posit its 
meaning upon consciousness? Or does consciousness give mean­
ing to the in-itself? All these axiological questions—  
axiological because they involve a value question— are hypo­
thetically resolved in Sartre by his positing the notion of 
intentionality. Because of intentionality each individual 
consciousness experiences the in-itself on its own terms.
This appears to be like the Leibnizian monads, with a little 
difference. To Leibniz each monad contains its own essence 
which determines its individuality, whereas to Sartre con­
sciousness contains nothing. Its existence is an absolute 
in-itself, which is its own nothingness.38
Since consciousness contains no-thing, it is totally 
free and independent from any possible determination in con­
ceiving itself. For this reason Sartre claims that con­
sciousness has no raison d ’e t r e .39 Further, in spite of the
37sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 44 
38lbid., p. 4 4 .
39ibid., p. 4 0 .
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fact that consciousness contains no-thing, it is the unifying 
power which makes the unity of the personality of the "I" 
possible. In this respect Sartre is a devoted Cartesian, be­
cause the discovery of Cogito is as important as the discov­
ery of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T o  Descartes the Cogito unifies the 
I; to Sartre it is consciousness. The major difference in 
this respect consists in Sartre’s rejection of the imperson- 
alized Cogito, which lacks the personal motivations which 
make the unification of the ego p o s s i b l e . T h e  difference 
between Sartre and Descartes in this respect is based on the 
fact that the Cogito in Descartes expresses the mere spon­
taneity of consciousness, whereas to Sartre the ego emerges 
out of the intentionality of consciousness. Moreover, it is 
through intentionality that consciousness comes to be aware 
of itself as a personality. Intentionality represents the 
individuality of consciousness; through intentionality each 
individual consciousness experiences its own relation to the 
world in its own way.
Now, it is certain that phenomenology does not need to
appeal to any such unifying and individualizing I.
Indeed, consciousness is defined by intentionality.
By intentionality consciousness transcends itself. It
unifies itself by escaping from itself.
While the notion of intentionality plays a very important
40lbid., p. 40. 
4llbid., p. 40. 
42lbid., p. 38.
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role in Sartre's ontology, we find it difficult to under­
stand its ontological nature. Unfortunately, in The Tran­
scendence of the Ego, Sartre seems to be postulating the 
notion of intentionality as if it were an attribute of con­
sciousness without devoting much effort to describing its 
nature.
At this point there is no reason to raise the question
which we have raised earlier in the first chapter concerning
the nature of intentionality; but there are reasons to ques­
tion whether Sartre obeyed the continuity of logical reason­
ing in analyzing this notion. From our previous exposition 
it seems that Sartre arrived at his definition of intention­
ality by postulation, not by analysis. Nevertheless, if v;e
turn to The Transcendence of the Ego and to some extent to 
L* imaginaire, we find Sartre attempting to define intention­
ality; whereas in Being and Nothingness we find that inten­
tionality is applied throughout in interpreting the ontologi­
cal relation of Dasein and the world.
Intentionality appears as a projective force which di­
rects the modes of consciousness in a particular way or an­
other. There is no way to deny this, especially if we accept 
a personalized form of consciousness, as Sartre does. There 
seems to be no way to escape our definition of intentionality 
because the distinction of one conscious personality from 
another can only be possible through the intentionality of 
each individual consciousness.
130
We can conclude our Inquiry by saying that since no­
thingness is the original state of consciousness, it follows 
that we cannot predicate of intentionality any ontological or 
any teleological directive forces. It can, however, be de­
fined in terms of the psychological awareness of man's state 
in the world. This should not be interpreted as psychologism, 
because we are not attempting to reduce man's relation to the 
world to psychological determinism. What we mean is that the 
inward psychological awareness of man of himself is reflected 
upon the intentionality of consciousness in relating itself 
to the world. This appears consistent with the notion of 
freedom and also with the ontological analysis in Being and 
Nothingness. This we will postpone exploring to the following 
chapter.
L'imagination and Its Relation 
to Being and Nothingness
In the previous section we have shown that the notion of 
nothingness was not originally developed in Being and Nothing­
ness but in The Transcendence of the Ego. What we have seen 
of nothingness in Being and Nothingness is its implications 
for man's ontological situation and not its formulation.
Thus, Being and Nothingness should be considered as a contin­
uation of The Transcendence of the Ego as far as the notions 
of nothingness and of intentionality are concerned, and the 
same can be said of Sartre's pre-ontological work L 'imagination.^3
^3jean-Paul Sartre, L'Imagination (Paris: Presses
Universitaires De Prance, 1963)7
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In this work Sartre has attempted to accomplish two 
major goals. First, he attempts to evaluate different the­
ories of imagination which have been developed by various 
philosophers, as Hume, Bergson, Taine, and others. His dis­
satisfaction with these theories basically is related to 
their failure to draw distinctions between images and things 
and between imagining and perceiving. Second, Sartre attempts 
to formulate his own theory of imagination: a theory based
on a new approach to the psychology of imagination.
In the opening of L'imagination Sartre immediately be­
gins his analysis with the problem of perception of relation 
to objects. Unquestionably the clarification of this problem 
is pertinent to the problem of knowledge. For this reason 
(probably) Sartre has devoted a great deal of his time and 
effort to rescuing this problem from its ambiguities and in­
consistencies. We feel that this work in some respects is a 
continuation of his essay The Transcendence of the Ego, since 
in the latter work Sartre appears to be postulating the no­
tion of nothingness in consciousness; whereas in L'imagination 
he attempts to define its nature and analyze its phenomena 
through experience. Thus, the notion of nothingness which 
was extrapolated from The Transcendence of the Ego and ap­
plied in Being and Nothingness is actually defined experi­
mentally in L'imagination. Moreover, in L 'imagination for 
the first time Sartre introduces the Hegelian an sich and 
fur sich^^ with his own meaning of these terms as consciousness
44ibid., p. 1.
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and as object for consciousness.
Being and Nothingness then is indebted to L 'imagination 
in two ways: first, in defining the notion of nothingness,
and second, in introducing and explaining the actions of the 
for-itself and the in-itself. The following should justify 
this claim:
Je regarde cette feuille blanche, posée sur ma 
table; je perçois sa forme, sa couleur, sa position.
Ces différentes qualités ont des caractéristiques com­
munes: d'abord elles se donnent à mon regard comme
des existences que je puis seulement constater et 
dont l'être ne dépend aucunement de mon caprice. Elles 
sont pour moi, elles ne sont pas moi. Mais elles ne 
sont pas non plus audrui, c'est-à-dire qu'elles ne 
dependent d'aucune spontanéité, ni de la mienne, ni 
de celle d'une autre conscience. Elles sont pré­
sentes et inertes a la fois. Getter inertie du con­
tenu sensible, qu'on a souvent décrite, c'est l'ex­
istence en soi. Il ne sert à rien de discuter si 
cette feuille se réduit à un ensemble de représenta­
tions ou si elle est et doit être davantage. Ce qui 
est certain, c'est que le blanc que je constate, ce 
n'est certes pas ma spontanéité qui peut le produire. 
Cette forme inerte, qui est en deca de toutes les spon­
tanéités conscientes, que l'on doit observer, apprendre 
peu à peu, c'est ce qu'on appelle une chose. En aucun 
cas, ma conscience ne saurait entre une chose, parce 
que sa façon d'etre en soi est précisément un être pour 
soi. Exister, pour elle, c'est avoir conscience de son 
existence. Elle apparait comme une pure spontanéité
en face du monde des choses qui est pure inertie.
Nous pouvons donc poser des l'origine deux types 
d'existence: c'est en effet, en tant qu'elles sont
inertes que les choses échappent a la domination de 
la conscience; c'est leur inertie qui les sauvegarde 
et qui conserve leur autonomie.
The above constitutes the core of Sartre's view of the 
dialectical relations between the for-itself and the in-itself, 
and also the fundamental ground for his phenomenological
^^sartre, L'imagination, pp. 1-2.
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analysis of consciousness and for his notion of freedom. We 
mentioned earlier that in spite of his utilization of Hegel's 
terminology in describing the dialectical relations of con­
sciousness and nature, Sartre gives these terms a new mean­
ing. While in Hegel we find a consciousness which transcends 
both the for-itself and the in-itself, in Sartre we find only 
one consciousness which appears to be only conscious of it­
self and of the in-itself. While the in-itself appears as 
the content of perception, and also as the object of con­
sciousness, it yet lacks the power of perception and the 
awareness of itself as consciousness. It is the for-itself 
which perceives and conceives the in-itself according to its 
own intentionality.
We suggest that Sartre is not a "substance philosopher" 
because he rejects any external possibility in directing the 
for-itself in perceiving the in-itself. There is no Hegelian 
absolute or Lockean substratum or any other substantial real­
ity which stands between the for-itself and the in-itself.
To Sartre there is nothing between the for-itself and the in- 
itself which determines the relation of the one to the other. 
Sartre's notion of consciousness stems directly from this 
conclusion. Since, on the one hand, the for-itself is de­
fined in terms of consciousness, and consciousness is always 
conscious of itself or something other than itself, and 
since, on the other hand, the in-itself is inert and only an 
object for consciousness, it follows that there is no causal
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relationship between the in-itself and the for-itself in the 
way of determining the direction of consciousness. The in- 
itself on this level appears as mere passive possibilities. 
As possibilities the in-itself can be present, if and only 
if, the for-itself becomes consciously aware of these possi­
bilities. Hence, consciousness is free because there is no­
thing intrinsically contained in it to direct its awareness, 
nor is there any power within the in-itself which might 
affect the for-itself. Between the two there is a complete 
separation. The in-itself cannot become the for-itself, and 
also it cannot exert force in directing the awareness of the 
for-itself; nor can the for-itself become the in-itself or a 
"thing," simply because the nature of the for-itself is con­
sciousness. It cannot be at the same time a thing and a 
consciousness. For this reason, Sartre rejects the notion 
of the unconscious. Forrest Williams summarizes this re­
lation clearly in the following:
There are realities which exist in themselves ; i.e., 
in their being they are "wholly at one with them­
selves." Such is everything except consciousness, 
whose being is always and necessarily "for itself," 
a spectator of itself, so to speak, and thus "outside" 
itself rather than "in itself." Sartre's rejection 
of the notion of unconscious mind is based on the im­
possibility of anything being at once "in itself" and 
"for itself," at once a thing and a mental a c t .4°
According to this account, consciousness is autonomous 
and independent of the world, at least in terms of its
46Sartre, Imagination, pp. l47-l48.
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functional nature. Freedom originates with the independence 
of consciousness of the world. What is worth pointing out 
in this respect is that the roots of freedom in Sartre are 
discovered in his psychology and not in his ontology. One 
might object that Sartre's work on imagination should not be 
considered a psychological treatise but a phenomenological 
analysis of the psychology of imagination.^? To this we 
would reply that we are not concerned with the methodological
approach to the problem but with the nature of the problem
itself.
The problem involved in this argument seems to turn on 
the claims of phenomenology; (a) is it a science which 
claims priority over all the various fields of scientific
inquiry? or (b) is it a methodological form of inquiry in
arriving at the truth of the question involved? We object 
to the former definition, but we are willing to accept the 
latter. Our objection to the former definition is that it 
would be unfair to make an issue of a particular area, analyze 
it phenomenologically, then claim that this area is within 
the domain of phenomenology. This particular confusion is 
most likely to happen in the area of the social sciences, as 
psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, and political 
science. Our acceptance of the latter definition of
^?Ibid. While the sub-title of the English translation 
by Forrest Williams is A Psychological Critique, in the in­
troduction the translator states that "a psychology of im­
agination must first of all be phenomenology" (p. vii).
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phenomenology is based on the ground that a given empirical 
fact about a certain case does not exhaust the problematic 
nature of the case. Thus, phenomenology, as a method of in­
quiry about the essence of things, may be helpful in finding 
the truth about that particular case. Further, while phe­
nomenology depends on intuition in compounding the empirical 
data and judging their relations as objectively as possible, 
we do not claim that intuitive judgment is a priori or 
f i n a l . G i v e n  this definition, phenomenology can be con­
sidered a methodological inquiry which helps the investigator 
to get closer to the truth and to grasp better the problem 
involved than to depend on mere disconnected empirical data.
48pigrre Thevenas, What is Phenomenology? trans. James 
M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Book Inc., 1962), p. 37.
Thevenas describes the definitive problem in relation to the 
nature of phenomenology in the chapter "What is Phenomenol­
ogy?" "This question is as irritating for the layman, who 
hearing the word would like to know at least roughly what it 
means, as it is for the historian of philosophy or the phil­
osophical specialist who has the feeling of pursuing an elu­
sive doctrine, never clearly defined during the fifty years 
of its rich evolution, which from Husserl leads through 
Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, and many others up to Merleau- 
Ponty. Phenomenology seems to be a Proteus which appears 
now as an objective inquiry into the logic of essences and 
meanings, now as a theory of abstraction, now as a deep psy­
chological description or analysis of consciousness, now as 
speculation in 'the transcendental Ego,' now as a method for 
approaching concretely lived existence, and finally, as in 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, seems to blend purely and simply 
with existentialism."
^^Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Phi­
losophy, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper and Row,
1965), p. 48. Husserl defined phenomenology in a more radi­
cal way as the science of essences. The following throws 
light on his position. "The psychologists think that they 
owe all their psychological knowledge to experience, thus to
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Phenomenology, then, can be utilized In psychology, 
sociology, and even in some medical cases. As such, we be­
lieve Sartre utilized it before he developed his ontology. 
While L ’imagination deals with the psychology of imagination, 
Sartre has utilized a phenomenological method in approach­
ing the problem. For this reason we claim that the discovery 
of nothingness in consciousness, the development of dialecti­
cal relations between the for-itself and the in-itself, and 
also the notion of freedom are all basically psychological 
in origin, but phenomenologically analyzed. This does not 
imply that they are psychological in the behavioristic or 
determinist sense, but that they are only as a mode of ori­
entation to the world and others,
Sartre's philosophical development is like that of 
other philosophers who have made their philosophical depar­
ture from a neighboring field of inquiry, as Descartes, 
whose knowledge in geometry helped him to establish his meta­
physics; Kant, whose dissatisfaction with physics led him 
also to metaphysics; and Husserl, whose knowledge in
those naive recollections or to emphatic penetration into 
recollections, which by virtue of the methodical art of ex­
periment are to become foundations for empirical conclusions. 
Nevertheless the description of the naive empirical data, 
along with the immanent analysis and conceptual grasp that 
go hand in hand with this description, is affected by virtue 
of a fund of concepts whose scientific value is decisive for 
all further methodical steps. And here is the place for 
phenomenological analysis of essence, which, however strange 
and unsympathetic it may sound to the naturalistic psycholo­
gist, can in no way be an empirical analysis."
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mathematics helped him to combat psychologism and to es­
tablish his phenomenology. Parallel to these philosophers 
we can see Sartre's departure taking place from a specu­
lative view Into psychology, which leads him Into pheno­
menology, and then to ontology. Simone de Beauvoir notes 
In the second volume of her autobiography, that during the 
period Sartre was Involved In writing L 'Imagination he be­
came Interested In analyzing dreams, and In the light of 
dreams he Induced Imagery (with drugs) and the phenomena of 
perceptions. During this period, Sartre decided to conduct 
his experiments on himself. De Beauvoir describes the situ­
ation In the following:
Sartre had completed the critical chapters of the 
book on L 'Imagination that Professor Delacroix had com­
missioned from him for the Alcan series, and was now 
embarked upon a second and far more original section.
In this he followed the problem of the Image back to Its 
basic origins, utilizing for the purpose phenomenologi­
cal concepts such as purposiveness [Intentionallté] and 
hyllsm. It was now that he crystallized the first key 
concepts of his philosophy: the conscious mind as
tabula rasa, and Its capacity for annihilation [néanti­
sation]! This line of research where he had to formulate 
both method and content, drawing on personal experience 
for all his material, required considerable concentra­
tion. Since there were no formal considerations to hold 
him up, he wrote with Incredible speed, breathlessly 
driving his pen In pursuit of his thoughts. This hasty 
yet sustained creative effort. In contrast to his more 
literary labors, drained him of energy. He took a 
marked Interest In dreams, dream-deduced Imagery, and 
anomalies of perception. In February, one of his former 
fellow students. Dr. Lagache (who had passed his state 
examinations the year Sartre failed, qualified as a 
medical practitioner, and specialized In psychiatry) 
suggested that he should come to Salnte-Anne's Hospital 
and undergo a mescaline Injection. This drug Induced 
hallucinations, and Sartre would be able to observe the 
phenomenon In himself. Lagache warned him that It would
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be a mildly disagreeable experience, although not in 
the least dangerous. The worst that could happen was 
that Sartre might "behave rather oddly" for a few hours 
afterwards.50
The result of this experiment turned into a serious 
psychological disorder in which Sartre experienced halluci­
nations in the most frightening manner. At times he be­
lieved that he was a victim of a chronic hallucinatory 
psychosis, an illness which in a period of ten years would 
inevitably produce total i n s a n i t y .51 Mile, de Beauvoir's 
observation clearly describes Sartre's involvement in psy­
chological inquiry with an attempt to arrive at certain 
factual observations of mental phenomena. These observations, 
we believe, corroborate our thesis of his departure from 
psychology into phenomenology, and then ontology. Moreover, 
if we study certain specific problems in his ontology, we 
find that the personal psychological impact is to a great 
degree dictating the ontological categories by which he de­
scribes his relationship to the other and to the world. It 
will be our attempt to show this in the following chapter.
At present, however, we will continue with our study of his 
pre-ontological works, with the aim of discovering the sig­
nificance of certain themes which were developed in his pre- 
ontological works and carried over into his ontology.
5^De Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, pp. I68-I69.
5 ^ I b i d . , p. 170.
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L'Imaginaire and its Relation to 
Being and Nothingness
At first it may appear that L 'imaginaire is an inde­
pendent work but actually it is not. According to Mile, de 
Beauvoir, L'imaginaire was supposed to have been a second 
section of L 'imagination, but because of publication prob­
lems it was postponed for a few years.
Now at the age of thirty he was setting out upon 
a fore ordained road, and his only adventures would 
consist of the books he wrote. The first had been 
turned down; the second still needed work done on it.
As for his book L'image, Alcan had kept only the first 
part, which was published as L 'imagination ; and he 
foresaw that the second section, which interested him 
much more, would not be published for a very long 
time.52
In fact it did actually take four years for the second 
section to be published under the title L'imaginaire. What 
is of some importance here is Mile, de Beauvoir's description 
of L'imagination. She points out clearly that it is a work 
on "the psychology of imagination." This description should 
include both sections, namely the works published as L'im­
agination in 1936, and as L'imaginaire, published in 1940.
But when L'imaginaire was published it was sub-titled "Psy­
chologie phénoménologique de l'imagination." This compari­
son is not intended merely to supply biographical or biblio­
graphical data, but to show that while the second section 
of L'imagination was specifically labeled as a "psychologie 
phénoménologique de l'imagination," the first section was
52p)e Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, p. 171.
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not specified in any manner. We can presume, then, that it 
was simply a work on the ’’psychology of imagination.” This 
transformation supports our claim that Sartre’s philosophical 
development began with psychology, proceeded to phenomen­
ology, and ended in ontology. The last statement of the first 
section of L 'imagination confirms this transformation.
Elle ne peut entrer dans le courant de la conscience 
que si elle est elle-même synthèse et non élément.
Il n ’y a pas, il ne saurait y avoir d'images dans la 
conscience. Mais l'image est un certain type de con­
science . L'image est un acte et non une chose. L'image 
est conscience ^  quelque chose.
Nos recherches critiques ne sauraient nous conduire 
plus loin. Il faudrait à présent aborder la description 
phénoménologique de la structure ’’image”. C'est ce que 
nous tenterons dans un autre o u v r a g e . ^3
This autre ouvrage (another work) was in fact L 'imag­
inaire . The introduction of this work sounds like a con­
tinuation of the previous one; in fact, in L ’imaginaire 
Sartre begins exactly where he left off in L 'imagination.
Now if we consider how Mile, de Beauvoir describes the 
nature of this work in general, we find that her description 
is somehow divided between two forms. In the first, she 
declares that Sartre attempts to establish his concept of 
the conscious mind as "tabula rasa,” and in the second he
53sartre, L ’imagination, p. l62.
3^He concluded L 'imagination by saying that there are 
not and never could be images in consciousness, because an 
image is a certain type of consciousness, an act, not some­
thing. An image is a consciousness of some thing. In the 
introduction of L'imaginaire he explicates again what he 
has already defined in L'imagination.
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tries to explain the activity of the conscious mind in the 
light of its "intentionality" and its capacity for nihila- 
tion.^5 This is exactly what takes place between the two 
sections of L'imagination. In the first section, or in 
L'imagination, Sartre establishes the notion of nothingness 
in consciousness (this we have shown earlier); and in the 
second section, or in L'imaginaire, Sartre develops the no­
tion of intentionality and of judgment. (This we will ex­
plore in the following.) By this we mean that he attempts 
to analyze through a form of applied psychology the phenom­
enon of consciousness in constructing its Images. In pre­
vious works Sartre explained his views only theoretically; 
in L'imaginaire he utilized experimental cases as well.
We believe that L'imaginaire is the most technical work 
of Sartre. This claim can be verified in the chapter "From 
Sign to Images," in which Sartre rejects Husserl's notion of 
the image. To Husserl the image is a replacement of its ob­
ject, whereas to Sartre the image is a unified representation 
of the given grasped by intuition.
L'image, dit Husserl, est un "remplissement" 
(Erfullüng) de la signification. L'étude de l'imita­
tion nous a plutôt donné à croire que l'image est une 
signification dégradée, descendue sur le plan de l'in­
tuition. Il n'y a pas remplissement: il y a change­
ment de nature. L'étude des consciences de dessins 
schématiques va nous confirmer dans cette opinion.
Dans ceux-ci, en effet, l'élément intuitif est considér­
ablement réduit, et le rôle de l'activité consciente 
croit en importance: ce qui constitue l'image et sup­
plée à toutes les défaillances de la perception, c'est 
1'intention.5°
55simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, p. l68. 
5^Sartre, L'imaginaire, p. 46.
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In the following pages Sartre continues his illustra­
tion of how objects become reduced to the intentionality of 
perception. "L'intention de perceptive devient imagee"^? 
Sartre concludes this from his brief experiment on perception 
and images, and in the experiment he clarifies the difference 
between images and the objects themselves.
At this point, in our opinion, Sartre is able to clar­
ify his position in relation to Husserl, and is also able to 
see the discrepancies among the philosophers who express con­
cern for the problem. The major difference from Husserl 
could be roughly stated as follows; Husserl's phenomenologi­
cal analysis of perceptions and images seems to be based on 
a priori intuitive propositions, while Sartre's phenomeno­
logical analysis of perceptions and images seems to be based 
on verified empirical data. Hence, the difference between 
the teacher and the student is reminiscent of Plato and 
Aristotle, a difference in the approach to knowing the es­
sence of things. To Husserl, things do have essences, and 
the major task for the phenomenologist is to grasp these 
essences; whereas to Sartre things are what they are, with 
no essences behind them or between them and the mind. There 
is only the intentional power of the mind which can reproduce 
as images whatever is given through perception. When Sartre
5?lbid., p. 47. Also we refer the reader to pp. 46-52 
in order to see Sartre's illustrations, which resemble those 
of a professional psychologist more than those of a phenomen­
ologist .
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accepts the fact that consciousness Is always a consciousness 
of something, he also means to say that whatever conscious­
ness Is conscious of. Is heterogeneous and extrinsic In Its 
relation to consciousness. That Is to say, whatever con­
sciousness Is conscious of. It Is conscious of something out­
side of Itself and In the world.
L ’Image est une conscience sul generis qui ne peut en 
aucune façon faire partie d'une conscience plus vaste.
Il n'y a pas d'image dans une conscience qui renfermerait, 
outre la pensee, des signes, des sentiments, des sensa­
tions. Mais la conscience d'image est une forme syn­
thétique qui apparaît comme un certain moment d'une 
synthèse temporelle et s'organise avec d'autres formes 
de conscience, qui la precedent et la suivent, pour 
former une unlt^ mélodique. Il est aussi absurde de 
dire qu'un objet est donne" a la fols en Image et en con­
cept que de parler d'une corps qui serait a la fols 
solide et gazeux.5°
This discovery was kept In mind throughout in Being and 
Nothingness. In fact. It was the very foundation of the on­
tological negation pursued by the for-ltself In Its attempt 
to nlhllate the in-ltself. The following should place this 
claim beyond any doubt:
All consciousness, as Husserl has shown. Is con­
sciousness of something. This means that there is no 
consciousness which Is not a positing of a transcendent 
object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no 
"content." We must renounce those neutral "givens" 
which, according to the system of reference chosen, 
find their place either "In the world" or "In the 
psyche." A table Is not consciousness— not even In
the capacity of a representation. A table Is 
space, beside the window, etc. The existence of the 
table In fact Is a center of opacity for consciousness;
58Ibid., p . 27.
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it would require an infinite process to inventory the 
total contents of a thing.59
It should be noted that the only difference in describ­
ing the relationship between consciousness and things in 
L* imaginaire and Being and Nothingness is one of approach and 
not of principle. In L'imaginaire the approach is more or 
less technically psychological, whereas in Being and Nothing­
ness it is ontological. But in spite of this difference in 
technicalities, it is clear that the same principles are 
applied in both. However, if we view L'imaginaire in the 
light of Being and Nothingness we find that, in the former 
work, consciousness is conceived as a synthesizing power 
which unifies its perceptive awareness in images. Thus, the 
image, which is taken as a representation of the object in 
consciousness, is in fact a unified synthesis accomplished 
by consciousness itself. On this ground consciousness cannot 
be actually a consciousness without being conscious of some­
thing. Images in this respect are considered to be the syn­
thetic representation of consciousness.
Diçons-nous que l’image, c’est l'organisation syn­
thétique totale, la conscience? ^Mais cette conscience 
est une nature actuelle et concrete, qui existe en soi, 
pour soi et pourra toujours se donner sans intermé­
diaire a la reflexion. Le mot d ’image ne^saurait donc 
designer que le rapport de la conscience a l’objet; 
autrement dit, c’est une certaine façon qu’a l ’objet
de paraître a la conscience, ou, si l ’on préféré, une 
certaine façon qu’a la conscience de se donner un objet. 60
59sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. li
GOsartre, L ’imaginaire, p. 17.
146
The possibility of synthesizing the experience of con­
sciousness, which exists in L ’imaginaire, seems to have been 
postponed in Being and Nothingness. The for-itself appears 
always to be in contradiction with the in-itself, and a feel­
ing of threat or a feeling of carefulness dominates the on­
tological modes of the for-itself. This feeling seems to 
prevent the for-itself from emerging into the in-itself.
While consciousness in L'imaginaire tends to unify and to 
synthesize its experience of the world in images, in Being 
and Nothingness the only desire which seems to animate the 
for-itself is to nihilate the in-itself. This attitude 
of the for-itself is, in our estimation, essential in devel­
oping the conception of freedom. We feel that this attitude 
of the for-itself in creating a dichotomy in its relation­
ship with the in-itself is partially responsible for gener­
ating the problematic situation between the individual in­
volved and the other.
Since we will be devoting the following chapter to a 
discussion of this problem, at the moment we will not go into 
any detailed analysis of it. But we would like to suggest 
that the conception of freedom to a great extent expresses 
our attitudes toward the world and the other. Thus our at­
titude fundamentally influences our conception of freedom 
and a consideration of its nature. The attempt to be free 
from, or free with, the other is naturally related to our 
attitude toward the other, namely, whether the other is
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considered as a threat or as possibilities to participate in 
the values of freedom. Unquestionably, Sartre conceives the 
other as a threat, and this we feel is not related to the 
intrinsic nature of the other, but to Sartre’s psychological 
attitude toward the other.
Before we go further, it might be worth pointing out 
that L*imaginaire expresses clearly some fundamental psycho­
logical notions which are directly related to the origin of 
the concept of freedom. This can be deduced after an under­
standing of the psychological function of consciousness in 
relation to its intentionality. Freedom and determinism as 
an issue is as old as the history of philosophy itself. How­
ever, it is not our concern in this work to attack the prob­
lem of freedom and determinism from its traditional perspec­
tive. The reason for this is fundamentally related to the 
traditional concept of man, in which man generally appears 
to possess certain qualities or essences which are not his 
own making, but are already made for him. As a result of 
this inherited, pre-formed nature, it is hardly possible for 
man to escape some form of determinism. This should include 
spiritualism, materialism, rationalism, idealism, and even 
empiricism. All these views affirm explicitly or implicitly, 
a certain notion of substance which has something to do with 
the human personality. In clear opposition to this view, 
Sartre declares that "existence precedes essence." Man, 
consequently, appears naked and free from any element which
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might determine his personality. Since man does rot inherit 
any essence, he is free, and his freedom can be realized in 
consciousness. Consciousness is, indeed, the road to freedom.
In the previous sections of this chapter we have shown 
that in consciousness there is no-thing which determines its 
activities or directions, except itself. Consciousness is 
an absolute freedom, simply because its existence is absolute. 
If consciousness is free in its pure spontaneity, we shall 
attempt to find out how this freedom is carried out in its 
activities and in its confrontations with the external world.
While consciousness is empty of any pre-formed being, 
it appears also independent in its activities from all other 
beings, which implies that consciousness is ultimately re­
duced to the I, and to the I alone. Thus when consciousness 
becomes aware of itself, it becomes aware of its own in­
dividuality as totally independent from all other individual­
ities. In this way, consciousness comes to be aware of its 
relations to the world. In this respect Sartre definitely 
objects to George Herbert Mead's social self, which develops 
out of an organic social whole.
A self can arise only where there is a social 
process within which this self has had its initiation.
It arises within that process. For that process the 
communication and participation to which I have re­
ferred is essential. That is the way in which selves 
have arisen. That is where the individual is in a 
social process in which he is part, where he does 
influence himself as he does others.
^^George Herbert Mead, On Social Psychology (Rev. ed., 
Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1964), p. W .
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To Sartre, it is true that man is always in a "human 
situation" with the other in the world. But the other, or 
the "human situation," does not help the self to become con­
scious of itself because it is considered a temptation for 
the self to become objectified, and thus to conceive itself 
as an object or a thing and not as a subject.
The Other, on the contrary, is presented in a certain 
sense as the radical negation of my experience, since 
he is the one for whom I am not subject but object. 
Therefore as the subject who denies my character,as 
subject and who himself determines me as object.
Therefore, to Sartre the other is not as much help for 
the becoming of the self, as Mead suggests, nor can the other 
bring consciousness into its reflective state wherein it can 
become conscious of itself. Consciousness in Sartre, then, 
appears more autonomous over its individuality, and this 
radical individuality is rooted in the intentionality of 
consciousness. Further, while consciousness is always a 
consciousness of something, each individual consciousness 
projects itself toward what it is conscious of in its own 
manner. "Toute conscience pose son objet, mais chacune a sa 
manière."^3 The difference in the manner of interpreting 
the confronted object is a difference which is rooted in the 
intentionality which directs the prehensive act of conscious­
ness in this way or that way. Moreover, while intentionality
^^Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 228.
G^sartre, L* imaginaire, p. 24.
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according to Sartre is in the jcenter of consciousness, it has 
also to be considered the primordial instance of individu­
ality, and also as the condition for freedom.
Sans abandonner le domaine de la description pure, 
on peut tenter d'expliquer cette propriété caractér­
istique de l'image. Dans l'image, en effet, une cer­
taine conscience se donne un certain objet. L'objet 
est donc corrélatif d'un certain acte synthétique, qui 
comprend, parmi ses structures, un certain savoir et 
une certaine "intention". L'intention est au centre 
de la conscience: c'est elle qui vise l'objet, c'est-
a-dire qui le constitue pour ce qu'il est. Le^savoir, 
qui est indissolublement lie a l'intention, precise 
que l'objet est tel ou tel, ajoute synthétiquement des 
déterminations.°
Accordingly, we believe that intentionality should not 
only be viewed as a psychological or an epistemological frame 
of reference for consciousness, but also as an ontological 
demarcation of the human personality. Without intention­
ality, consciousness would have remained passive, or pure 
spontaneity. This is not the case with intentionality, be­
cause in this situation consciousness appears as active and 
directive in reflecting upon its concern. In short, in­
tentionality must be considered as an ontological attribute, 
since without it consciousness would not have any ontologi­
cal significance. '
In the light of these considerations we conclude that 
intentionality is a condition for freedom, because without 
intentionality consciousness would have remained pure spon­
taneity. Through intentionality, then consciousness
G^Ibid., p. 22,
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exercises Its individuality and actualizes its identity. 
("Toute conscience pose son objet, mais chacune a sa 
maniéré."^5) Since without intentionality, identity is not 
possible, and since freedom without identity is meaningless, 
freedom is conditioned upon intentionality. We conclude, 
therefore, that while consciousness stands as a potentiality 
for individuality, it is only through intentionality that 
individuality is actualized.
It may be useful and instructive to call attention to 
some historical parallels to Sartre's views on these matters, 
If intentionality possesses any pre-established essence, it 
is equivalent in character to the Leibnitzian monads. How­
ever, if a comparison is to be suggested, we feel that a 
case can be made for relating Sartre's psychology of imag­
ination not to Descartes only but also to Locke. From Locke 
Sartre accepts the notion of the tabula rasa,^^ but he re­
jects its passivity, on the one hand, and the notion of the 
material substance (substratum), on the other. Against 
Descartes, he rejects the notion of innate ideas and of sub­
stances, and accepts the activity of the mind and its re­
flective ability in discovering the cogito. However, we do 
not mean to say that Sartre's effort is a mere synthesis, 
because undoubtedly his contributions and creativity repre­
sent something more than his ability to synthesize the
GSibid., p. 24.
G^De Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, p. l68.
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negative with the positive. At this point we can say about 
Sartre something similar to what Frederick Copleston said 
about Kant; namely, that he submits to critical evaluation 
both rationalism and empiricism and works out his own phil­
osophy, not as a synthesis of these two movements, but as a 
triumph over them.^7 This we apply to Sartre also, although 
we must make one comment. Kant postulates the noumena as 
the guarantee for freedom: Sartre posits intentionality in
the center of consciousness in order to explain its activ­
ities. Kant humbly enough acknowledges the limitations of 
human reasoning in explaining the nature, or the whatness, 
of the noumena.
Although we are closing our discussion of this problem 
in Sartre we still do not have a precise account of the 
nature of intentionality. The following characterization is 
not by any means an exact definition, but it will serve to 
sum up what we have learned about Sartrean intentionality: 
the unified expression of the I in consciousness without 
which the upsurge of consciousness into the world would be 
impossible.
L ’esquisse d'une théorie des emotions in Relation 
to Being and Nothingness
In Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions, Sartre sets 
himself two projects. First, he elaborates his objections
^Tprederick Copleston, S.J., History of Philosophy 
(Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1961), VI, ÏÏ28
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to the traditional psychological view of human emotions. 
Second, he clarifies his position in relation to Husserl and 
Heidegger.
His major objection to the traditional psychological 
treatment of emotion is similar to Husserl's objection to 
psychologism. Sartre's dissatisfaction with traditional 
psychology is related to the reductionist approach which is 
commonly used in interpreting human emotion. To take the 
empirical experimental method as the only approach to under­
stand man's emotional state, Sartre feels, is to reduce man's 
total situation to something less than human. Thus, we assume 
that "une mere a triste parce qu'elle p l e u r e . This con­
clusion in regard to the emotional state of a mother is based 
on the outward act which can be observed empirically, but 
this does not satisfy Sartre because the outward empirical 
appearance of a person does not exhaust his inward psycholog­
ical and emotional state. For this reason Sartre objects to 
behavioristic psychology.^5 order to establish a compre­
hensive psychological view of man, Sartre argues, we should 
attempt to combine the outward empirical situation of man as 
a spatio-temporal being with his inward conscious state as 
well. The one is complementary to the other.7^
While Sartre may appear to sound like a traditional
68sartre, Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions, p. 11.
G9lbid., pp. 33-38.
7 Q l b i d . , p .  7 .
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Husserlian, In the following pages of his work he attempts 
to clarify his position in relation to those of Husserl and 
Heidegger. It turns out that Sartre is more allied with 
Heidegger than with Husserl. In fact, it is in this work 
that Sartre declares his endorsement of Dasein as a being in 
the world.71 Moreover, it is in this work that Sartre ac­
cepts Heidegger's interpretations of the relationship of 
Dasein and the world; it is here that Sartre announces that 
reality is essentially human reality, and that there is no 
division between Dasein and the world.
A cela il faut repondre que les sciences de la nature 
ne visent pas a connaître le monde mais les conditions 
de possibilité de certains phénomènes généraux. Il 
y a beau temps que cette notion de monde s'est evanouie 
sous la critique des methodologistes et cela précisément 
parce qu'on ne saurait à la fois appliquer les méthodes 
des sciences positives et espérer qu'elles conduiront 
un jour a découvrir le sens de cette totalité synthétique 
qu'on appelle monde. Or 1'homme est un être du même 
type que le monde, il est même possible, comme le croit 
HEIDEGGER, que les notions de monde et de 'Réalité- 
humaine" (Dasein) soient inséparables. Précisément pour 
cela la psychologie doit se résigner à manquer la 
réalité-humaine, si du moins cette réalité-humaine 
existe.72
This position reflects some change from The Transcend­
ence of the Ego and L'imaginaire, in which consciousness 
does not appear to be identified with the world, but stands 
as an independent entity from the world. In L'imaginaire it 
is clear that consciousness synthesizes its experience of 
the world in constructing images; these images are considered
7^Ibid. , p. 10.
72ibid,
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to represent the unity of consciousness, on the one hand, 
and the world, on the other.
It should be mentioned, however, that the notion of 
consciousness itself remains the same: nothingness remains
as the ontological status of consciousness. However, while 
in L 'imaginaire consciousness conceptualizes its experience 
of the world through the actualized intentionality, in 
Esquisse d'une theorie des elnotions consciousness depends on 
emotions in apprehending the world. "L’elnotion se presentura 
comme une nouveauté irréductible par rapport aux phenomenes 
d'attention, de mémoire, de perception, etc."73 Then Sartre 
goes on to say that "L'émotion est une certaine manière 
d'appréhender le monde."7^ Hence, emotion is not only a 
state of one's being in the world, as love, hate, anger, 
happiness, but also as a mode in which one may apprehend his 
relationship to the world. For this reason Sartre has stated 
that "La conscience émotionnelle est d'abord conscience ^  
monde."75 Considering man as a being in the world, we can 
describe him as a being who feels, conceives, and perceives 
his relationship to the world. Consciousness, therefore, 
cannot be posited independently of this relation, but as a 





notion of consciousness in Husserl, because Husserl appears 
to posit its cognizance of the world independently of it, 
whence it follows that man appears in isolation, or in sep­
aration from the world.
Si nous voulons fonder une psychologie il faudra 
remonter plus haut que le psychique, plus haut que 
la situation de l ’homme dans le monde, jusqu’à la 
source de l ’homme, du monde et du psychique: la
conscience transcendentale et constitutive que nous 
atteignons par la "reduction phénoménologique’’ ou 
"mise du monde entre parenthèses". C ’est cette 
conscience qu’il faut interroger et ce qui donne 
du prix a ses réponses c ’est qu’elle est précisément 
mijenne. Ainsi HUSSERL sait tirer parti de cette prox- 
imité absolue de la conscience par rapport à elle- 
meme, dont le psychologue n ’avait pas voula profiter.7°
This not only distorts consciousness, but also makes 
it impossible for the psychoanalyst to understand in isola­
tion from his situation. Sartre is more inclined to align 
with Heidegger than with Husserl on this issue, because in 
the former the revelation of man as consciousness takes 
place as a result of man’s encounter: the world— the human
reality.
Joseph P. Pell summarizes the difference between 
Husserl and Sartre in the following:
In Being and Nothingness Sartre seeks to bring 
phenomenology back to the "world" from which it is 
divorced by Husserl; hence the subtitle. An Essay 
on Phenomenological Ontology. Clearly Husserl’s and 
Sartre’s purposes are very different. While Husserl’s 
and Husserl’s program is a carefully delimited one, 
elucidation of the a priori constitutive structures 
of human consciousness, Sartre’s "phenomenological 
ontology" is an attempt to develop a general theory
76Ibid., p . 13.
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of human experience. Hence Sartre must study con­
sciousness not in isolation, but in situations.
The point which we are stressing is that the integra­
tion of man and the world takes place in Sartre's thought
/before Being and Nothingness; Esquisse d'une theorie des 
emotions asserts this claim. In fact, one may complain that 
Sartre in L'emotion went a little too far in the process of 
integration. He was more a German Heideggerian than a French 
Cartesian. This is clear when he declares that: "Or 1 'homme
est un être du même type que le monde, il est même possible, 
comme le croit HEIDEGGER, que les notions de monde et de 
ré^alitê-humaine (Dasein) soient i n s e p a r a b l e s . On the con­
trary, in Being and Nothingness Sartre's position is more 
Cartesian than Heideggerian. While man is a being in the 
world, at the same time he is not identified with it. The
for-itself is what it is, and the in-itself is what it is.
A synthesis does not take place in Being and Nothingness. 
Sartre closes the curtain while the struggle to nihilate the 
in-itself still goes on. This does not mean that man es­
capes from the world or isolates himself from it, but sim­
ply that man realizes his encounter, the world, and that 
through self-realization man attempts to affirm his being: 
a being whose freedom is in question.
In this chapter we have shown the relationship of
77joseph P. Fell, Emotions in the Thought of Sartre 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 52-53•
78sartre, Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions, p. 10.
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Sartre's pre-ontologlcal works to his ontology (L'etre et le 
néant), and we have also indicated the correlation between 
the former and the latter: the former contributed to the
latter's ontological stage. In the course of our analysis 
we have pointed out at various times the psychological nature 
of Sartre's pre-ontological works, which we believe have a 
strong influence on Sartre's ontological perspective, e.g., 
the notions of intentionality, images, individuality, and 
freedom.
In the following chapter we will interpret the onto­
logical ethos through which Sartre conceives his relation­
ship to the world and the other. We intend to trace the 
psychological attitudes and involvements which Sartre's writ­
ing manifests in relating man to the other. This will 
strengthen or confirm our contention that Sartre's psycho­
logical attitude permeates and directs his ontology, which 
we also maintained in previous chapters.
CHAPTER IV
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF FREEDOM AND 
SUBJECTIVITY AS IT APPEARS REFLECTED 
IN SARTRE'S RELATION TO THE 
WORLD AND THE OTHER
In the previous chapter we discussed the relationship 
of Sartre's pre-ontoIogical work to his phenomenological 
ontology. This undertaking was motivated by the notion that 
an understanding of Sartre's ontology could not be achieved 
without an understanding of his psychology. However, it 
should be understood that we are not reducing his ontology 
to his psychology; we are merely pointing out that his on­
tology cannot be divorced from his psychology, since there 
is a concrete continuity between his pre-ontoIogical works 
and his phenomenological ontology.
We have also demonstrated that the notion of freedom 
does not first appear in Being and Nothingness, but in such 
pre-ontological works as the Transcendence of the Ego and 
L'imaginaire. Our contention is that Sartre's radical con­
ception of freedom is fundamentally related to his notion 
of nothingness. While this notion is formulated in L 'imag­
inaire and the Transcendence of the Ego, we claim that in
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Being and Nothingness It Is applied. Our project In this 
chapter shall be devoted to Illustrating how the psychologi­
cal orientation of Sartre has a direct Influence on his on­
tological conception of freedom. We shall pursue this goal 
by evaluating his ontological analysis of the other.
Sartre's Objection to the Realist and the 
Idealist Notion of the Other
Sartre claims that the problem of the other Is entirely
neglected In the history of philosophy. In fact It did not
appear to be Important In spite of Its direct ontological
relationship to the "me" In which the other appears as an
Inescapable reality.
The other Is a thinking substance of the same essence 
as I am, a substance which will not disappear Into 
primary and secondary qualities, and whose essential 
structure I find In myself. Yet for all that realism 
attempts to account for knowledge by an action of the 
world upon the thinking substance. It has not been 
concerned with establishing an Immediate reciprocal 
action of thinking substances upon each other. It Is 
through the medlacy of the world that they communi­
cate . ̂
The other to Sartre appears to be more Important than 
reality Itself, because the other Is another for-ltself which 
stands against, or In relation to, "mine" as a possible 
nlhllatlon. Reality, or the In-ltself, on the contrary. Is 
In this respect passive; therefore. It does not represent 
any threat In nlhllatlng "me" or the other. For this reason 
Sartre emphasizes that "being In the world" Implies being
^Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 223
I6l
with others, and it is in this light that ontological rela­
tionship between the for-itself and the for-others should be 
analyzed. Sartre at this point raises two fundamental ques­
tions which he attempts to answer: "first that of the ex­
istence of the other, then that of the relation of my being 
to the being of the other.
Looking at these two questions from a historical frame­
work, Sartre concludes that while the latter question has 
been totally neglected in traditional philosophy, the former 
appears naively abstracted. As a result of this abstraction, 
the for-itself has also been conceived as being abstracted 
from the other. For this reason Sartre is dissatisfied with 
both the realist and the idealist approach to the other.
It is not the Other's body which is present to the 
realist intuition but a body, a body which doubtless 
has particular aspects and a particular f 5 >_5 but 
which belongs nevertheless to the great class of 
bodies. If it is true that for a spiritual realism, 
the soul is easier to know than the body, still the 
body will be easier to know than the Other's s o u l .3
Thus the realists not only negate the presence of the other's 
body as a possibility for perception, but they also claim the 
feasibility of comprehending the other within the spatio- 
temporal encounter. For this reason they tend to abstract 
from the other a supersensible entity, which can only be ap­
proached as an objective universality, and not as a concrete
2lbid.
3jbid. , p. 224
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individual. Hence the attempt to comprehend the other does 
not appear to rest upon a concrete empirical relationship, 
but upon analogy and mental abstraction.^ Sartre draws the 
following conclusion;
To tell the truth, the realist is not much con­
cerned with this problem; that is because he takes the 
existence of others as certain. This is why the real­
ist and positivistic psychology of the nineteenth 
century, taking for granted the existence of my fellow- 
man, occupied itself exclusively with establishing the 
ways by which I know this existence and read upon the 
body the nuances of a consciousness which is strange to 
me. 5
Sartre's dissatisfaction with the idealist's approach 
to the other seems to be similar to his dissatisfaction with 
the realist's. More specifically, the Kantian approach does 
not appear to be any better than the realist. Categorically, 
by minimizing the phenomenal encounter and emphasizing the 
noumenal structure of being, the other appears abstracted 
also. This abstraction takes place when the individual sub­
ject appears as only a part of a comprehensive whole and 
when the individual conceives himself in the light of the 
universal moral law rather than in his own subjectivity.
Actually it would be completely erroneous to put 
the problem of the Other and that of noumenal real­
ities on the same footing. . . . this noumenal exist­
ence can only be thought, not conceived. But when I 
aim at the Other in my daily experience, it is by no 
means a noumenal reality that I am aiming at; neither 
do I apprehend or aim at my intelligible reality when 




thoughts. The Other Is a phenomenon which refers to 
other phenomena— to a phenomenon-of-anger which the 
Other feels toward me, to a series of thoughts which 
appear to him as phenomena of his inner sense. What 
I aim at in the Other is nothing more than what I find 
in myself. But these phenomena are radically distinct 
from all other phenomena.°
Sartre’s major objection to Kant at this point is based 
on Sartre’s interpretation of the noumenon which seems to 
appear separated from the phenomenon as an independent and 
intelligible reality. In the light of this interpretation 
it is true that an abstraction and even some form of duality 
between the for-itself and the other occurs. Sartre's 
criticism of Kant is based on this ground, where conscious­
ness appears to abstract its relations with the other in­
dependently from empirical experience. Sartre states the 
following in relation to Kant:
Thus since a relation between consciousnesses is by 
nature unthinkable, the concept of the Other can not 
constitute our experience; it must be placed along 
with teleological concepts among the regulative con­
cepts. The Other therefore belongs to the category 
of "as if." The other is an a priori hypothesis with 
no justification save the unity which it permits to 
operate in our experience, an hypothesis which can 
not be thought without contradiction.'
We feel that Sartre’s interpretation of Kant needs 
some clarification. It is true that some form of abstraction 
takes place between the for-itself and the other. This ab­




that each individual should be treated as an end in himself, 
not as a means to an end. This does not completely save the 
individual from being abstracted as an entity which expresses 
the universal will, namely, the universal law. But at the 
same time we feel that the gap between the elements of man's 
being is exaggerated. Thus, while Kant speaks of man as free 
in his noumenal nature, he is nonetheless determined phenomen­
ally, because in this respect he is subject to the causal
D
law. The origin of freedom, according to Kant, is related 
to the spiritual part of man, or the noumena, and determinism 
to the empirical element of man or the phenomena. Accord­
ingly when Kant declares man to be noumenally free, it means 
that man as a rational being is free; thus man appears ca­
pable of freedom only when he utilizes his noumenal nature 
of his rational faculty (G'^eist) in making judgments. In 
this respect, man transcends the phenomenon only in so far 
as he transcends the immediate passivity of the senses into 
an intuitive act. Therefore man is noumenally free because 
he possesses a rational faculty which enables him to direct 
his senses or his phenomenal nature in the light of reason.
Accordingly, we feel that Sartre is right in accusing 
Kant of abstraction, but he is wrong in his exposition of 
Kant's notion of causality and its relationship to f r e e d o m . 5
^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman 
K. Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 196I), pp. 468- 
469.
^Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 226.
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The Kantian metaphysics is considered a metaphysics of free­
dom by some existentialists. Nicholas Berdyaev, for example, 
proclaims that it is Kant who makes existential metaphysics 
a possibility,10 for the obvious reason that Kant holds man 
to be, at his center, a rational being, and from this asser­
tion it is possible to assume that he is free to shape his 
own destiny. In this respect Berdyaev considers himself in- 
debted to Kant. "Kant was a metaphysician of freedom, even 
it may be, the only metaphysician of freedom, and in this 
respect my attempt to set forth my own metaphysics of free­
dom will be derived from Kant."11
Berdyaev, therefore, accepts most of Kant's metaphysics, 
and his distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal 
world, but he is not satisfied with the hypothesis that man 
can only explore the phenomenal world because the noumenal 
sphere lies beyond man's phenomenal capacities. Berdyaev's 
argument is that if the mind can transcend the world of ap­
pearance through reason, then the noumenal world, which rep­
resents the spiritual nature, must be cognized through spir­
itual experience. Thus Beryaev, at this point, rejects the 
Kantian notion of experience, which is based upon the senses, 
in which the world of appearance is the only ground for the 
given. This, according to Berdyaev, would isolate man from
lONicholas Berdyaev, The Beginning and the End, trans 
R. M. French (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), p. 5T
lljbid., p . 8.
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spiritual experience, the givens of which are noumenal. 
Berdyaev argues that since man Is part finite and part In­
finite, or phenomenon and neumenon. It would not be logical 
or natural to limit his experience to one world and Isolate 
him from the other.
Man Is a tragic being for the simple reason that 
he finds himself placed on the frontier between two 
worlds, a higher and a lower, and he Includes both worlds 
In himself. He cannot be entirely adapted to the lower 
world, a fact which Is plain from the revelation of 
human nature In history.^3
Ironically, while Sartre considers Kant a little too 
naive In positing a transcendental Identity of man from which 
freedom emerges, Berdyaev's objection to Kant Is related to 
the fact that Kant limits man's experience to one part of his 
nature and neglects the other. This difference of opinion Is 
related to the difference In conceptualizing the Image of man 
and the world. Berdyaev conceives the world and man from a 
Christian point of view. The double nature of man and of the 
world give rise to a dualism. Berdyaev Is also a traditional 
Christian In his conception of freedom. True freedom Is free­
dom of spirit; his dissatisfaction with Kant Is based on the 
fact that Kant does not give enough weight to man's "noumenal 
capacity" or spiritual capacity. In Beryaev's sense of the 
word. In experiencing the noumenal world. This for Berdyaev
IZfbld., pp. 14-17.
4-3Nlcholas Berdyaev, Truth and Revelation, (London: 
Geoffery Bles, 1957), p. l6.
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Is an arbitrary limitation of man’s freedom. Since true 
freedom is unlimited, and the unlimited element in man is 
his spirit, the only possibility for man to exercise his un­
limited freedom is through his spirit, in the spiritual 
world. This to Sartre is not freedom at all because the 
true meaning of freedom should be incarnated in the present, 
in the here and now in which consciousness can affirm itself 
and actualize itself within the spatio-temporal mode of its 
being. The only possible freedom is that of a finite con­
sciousness in a finite situation; any transcendental or spir­
itual conception of freedom is not only a negation of the 
only possible freedom, but also an escape from the real situ­
ation. For this reason Sartre concludes that a complete an­
alysis of freedom cannot be obtained from man’s relationship 
with the other. This leads us to the second question: 
namely, the "relation of my being to the being of the other.
Sartre’s Evaluation of Husserl, Hegel, and 
Heidegger’s Notion of the Other
From the previous analysis we can conclude that Sartre’s 
rejection of both the realist and the idealist is based on 
the fact that both conceive the relation with the other as 
an external relation in which the for-itself appears ab­
stracted from the other. For this reason Sartre contends 
that the realist and the idealist do not express any concern
l^Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 223
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for the other^5 simply because they cannot see the pertinence 
of the problem in a concrete situation. The problem of the 
other was first given importance by Hegel and then Husserl 
and Heidegger, whose theories have had a direct influence 
upon Sartre, and from which he has been able to construct his 
own.
Sartre’s dissatisfaction with Husserl's notion of the 
other is related primarily to the letter's unsuccessful at­
tempt to escape solipsism. According to Sartre, Husserl at­
tempts to refute solipsism by claiming that the ego intrinsi­
cally implies the existence of the other. Since the other, 
according to Husserl, is "the indispensable condition for 
the constitution of the w o r l d , t h e r e  is no way to doubt 
the existence of the other. "Hence my empirical ego and the 
ego of the other emerges in the world at the same moment."1? 
Sartre sets forth Husserl's position in the following: "For
Husserl the world as it is revealed to consciousness is in- 
termonadic. The Other is present in it not only as a particu­
lar concrete and empirical appearance but as a permanent con­
dition of its unity and of its r i c h n e s s . T h e r e f o r e  phënom- 
enologically self awareness is also an awareness of the other.
ISlbid.
iGlbid., p. 233.
l^Wilfrid Desan, The Tragic Finale (New York: Harper
and Row, I960), p. 62.
l^Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 233.
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"And since our psychophysical self Is contemporary with the 
world, forms a part of the world, and falls with the world 
under the Impact of the phenomenological reduction, the 
Other appears as necessary to the very constitution of the 
s e l f . "^5 Husserl's representation unquestionably helps 
Sartre to see the Inescapable and Intricate relationship be­
tween the for-ltself and the other, and what helps Sartre 
the most Is to become aware of the dividing line In Husserl's 
phenomenology which separates his Carteslanlsm from his 
Kantianism. At this point, undoubtedly, Husserl's notion of 
the ego Is more Kantian than Cartesian, Kantian because he 
emphasizes the transcendental subject which appears similar 
to that of K a n t . 20 Furthermore Sartre declares that Husserl's 
attempt to escape solipsism by accepting the other as the 
ground of knowledge was In vain.21 The failure to overcome 
solipsism Is related to the failure of the transcendental 
subject Itself to clarify the Identity of the for-ltself as 
It stands In relation to the other.
Hegel's observation of the problem of the other seems 
to be more concrete and also more explicit In Its analysis 
of the phenomenon of consciousness. Sartre Is Inclined to 
accept the psychological tension which Hegel Introduced In
19ibld.
20lbld., p. 234.
21lbld., p . 235■
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conceiving the Identity of consciousness in relation to the 
other. With this in mind the other is considered a dialecti­
cal necessity when the for-itself emerges in building up its 
identity.
I can only be I because there is an Other which is not 
I. There is thus an "internal negation" constituted 
as "conditio sine qua non" of the Ego. The Ego assumes 
its value through the other; it is to the heart of the
Ego t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  p e n e t r a t e s . ^ 2
Sartre is definitely more Hegelian than Cartesian on this 
point. The "I think therefore I am" reveals an exclusion of 
the cogito from the other; consciousness reveals itself to 
itself as distinct from the other. Sartre is indebted to 
Hegel here for pointing out that consciousness could not 
possibly be an object for itself, and thus it can become 
aware of itself as subject and as object only when it con­
fronts another consciousness.
Here Hegel takes his stand on the ground not of a 
univocal relation which goes from me (apprehended by 
the cogito) to the Other, but of the reciprocal rela­
tion which he defines as "the self-apprehension of the 
one in the other." In fact it is only in so far as 
each man is opposed to the Other that he is absolutely 
for himself. . . . Thus the cogito itself can not be a 
point of departure for philosophy; in fact it can be born 
only in consequence of my appearance for myself as an 
individual, and this appearance is conditioned by the 
recognition of the O t h e r . 2^
This brings us to the classical Hegelian example of 
the master-slave relationship. Each depends on the other
22Desan, Tragic Finale, p. 62.
23gartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 236
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for self-affirmation, and each is in need of the other for 
self-recognition. The master needs the slave for self- 
assertion as much as the slave needs the master for self­
negation. The one without the other would make self-realiza­
tion impossible. "Thus Hegel’s brilliant intuition is to 
make me depend on the other in my being. I am, he said, a 
being for-itself which is for-itself only through a n o t h e r .
Although Sartre accepts the dialectical relation of 
being and the other in Hegel, he rejects the foundation upon 
which this relation is structured. In regard to this point 
Hegel is like Husserl in emphasizing the knowing element.
"I know that another knows me as m e . "^5 This to Sartre is 
an exaggerated epistemological optimism which cannot be con­
sidered a factual ground for relation. "Between the Other- 
as object and Me-as subject there is no common measure, no 
more than between self-consciousness and consciousness of 
the o t h e r . A n o t h e r  type of optimism in Hegel is what 
Sartre calls an ontological optimism. This to some degree 
is related to the former, although the outcome is different. 
If on the epistomological level Hegel expresses confidence 
that the other knows me as I am and I know the other as he 
is, on the ontological level Hegel affirms that a unifica­
tion of all consciousness becomes an actuality as a universal
2%Ibid., p. 237.
25pesan, Tragic Finale, p. 63.
26sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 243.
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whole In which the "Individual consciousnesses are moments 
in the whole, moments which by themselves are unselbstandig, 
and the whole is a mediator between c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "^7 This 
for Sartre is an impossibility, because as long as conscious­
ness exists a final synthesis could not be p o s s i b l e . ^8
On the whole the fundamental mistake which is shared 
by Husserl and Hegel is that they conceive the relation of 
consciousness and the other in the light of knowing to know­
ing. Sartre proposes that if we intend to refute solipsism, 
this relation ought to be approached from being to b e i n g . ^9
Heidegger comes closest to solving the problem of being 
and the other. In fact he is the first to realize that the 
relation of being and the other should be a relation of be­
ing to being, and not a relation of knowledge. This approach 
to some degree helps Sartre to establish his own view on the 
problem, in spite of the fact that Sartre has some objections 
to the Heideggerian approach similar to those he makes 
against Hegel and Husserl. Sartre gives credit to Heidegger 
for his discovery that "the relation between human realities" 
must be a relation of being; this relation must cause "human 
realities" to depend on one another in their essential be­
i n g .  "30 This relation, in other words, is conceived ontolog- 
ically as "being with," not epistemologically as "being for." 
My being with others is an unquestionable certainty to
27ibid. 8 8 j b i d . , p. 244. ^9ibid. 30i b i d .
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Heidegger; it is as certain as the existence of the world.
Thus human reality designates "being-in-the-world."
Heidegger defines "being-in" as Befindlichkeit and Verstand; 
the world as that by which human reality makes known to it­
self what it is; and "being," or being-with, means Mit-Sein.31 
This Mit-Sein ontologically constitutes the modes of being; 
it is similar to a collectivity of beings which are the one 
and the many at the same time. In a sense it is a form of 
incarnation of the many in the one, and likewise the one in 
the many. Thus, being-without-the-other is impossible; 
being-with-other can only be ontologically conceived. By 
affirming the structure of being as being-with or Mit-Sein, 
Heidegger discloses the dialectical tension between being 
and other, on one hand, and disregards the possibility of 
solipsism, on the other. In this way the other is no more 
a problem for my being, simply because the recognition of the 
other is also a recognition of my own being.
Sartre summarizes Heidegger’s position on this point
in the following:
To be sure, Heidegger does not take his departure from 
the cogito in the Cartesian sense of the discovery of 
consciousness by itself; but the human-reality which 
is revealed to him and for which he seeks to fix the 
structures in concepts is his own. "Dasein ist je 
meines," he writes. It is by making explicit the pre- 
ontological comprehension which I have of myself that 
I apprehend being-with-others as an essential charact­
eristic of my being. In short I discover the
31lbid.
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transcendental relation to the Others as constituting 
my own being, just as I have discovered that being-in- 
the-world measures my human-reality. Henceforth the 
problem of the Other is a false p r o b l e m . 32
The problem of the other is a false problem because 
when consciousness emerges into self-realization it does not 
do so as an independent identity from the consciousness, but 
as an identity which grows out of the relationship to other 
consciousnesses. Thus, the I does not appear to be standing 
in a conflicting duality with other I's, but as a continua­
tion of emergence without which my 2 would not be possible. 
Furthermore, while Sartre accepts Heidegger's primary notion 
concerning the relation of being, he rejects the pre- 
ontological manifestation of being on the ground that it would 
be impossible for the I to become aware of itself as an I if 
we emphasized the collective emergence of consciousness. In 
that case my consciousness would be a consciousness of the WE 
instead of the I.
The empirical image which may best symbolize 
Heidegger's intuition is not that of a conflict but 
rather a crew. The original relation of the Other 
and my consciousness is not the you and it is the
we. Heidegger's being-with is not the clear and dis­
tinct position of an individual confronting another 
individual; it is not knowledge. It is the mute ex­
istence in common of one member of the crew with his 
fellows, that existence which the rhythm of the oars 
or the regular movements of the coxswain will render 
sensible to the rowers and which will be made mani­
fest to them by the common goal to be obtained, the 
boat or the yacht to be overtaken, and the entire
32ibid., p. 245.
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world (spectators, performance, etc.) which Is profiled
on the horizon.33
This rather dramatic illustration of Heidegger's posi­
tion conveys Sartre's objections. First, Sartre supposes 
that Heidegger's position inevitably lead to m o n i s m . 3^ Sec­
ond, when we understand by that I am the being for whom there 
is for me another human reality, this is a structured monism. 
Third, if we mean that I am the being by whom there are in 
general others, we fall back into s o l i p s i s m . 35 Fourth,
Sartre proclaims Heidegger's failure in his attempt to escape 
idealism, maintaining that Heidegger's "flight outside the 
self, as an a priori structure of his being, isolates him as 
surely as the Kantian reflection on the a priori conditions 
of our experience."3^
Thus far we have witnessed Sartre's evaluation of his 
predecessors in regard to the problem of the other. We have 
also seen what he accepts and what he rejects from their 
discoveries. It seems that Sartre is influenced by Hegel in 
accepting the necessity of a dialectical relation between 
being and the other, and this tension appears as a primary 
step for consciousness to become aware of itself as a self 
in relation to another. Sartre rejects Hegel's ontological 
and epistemological optimism, according to which the other 
appears to know me as 1 am and 1 to know the other as he is.
33ibid. , pp. 246-247. 3 4  ̂ p. 247.
35ibid., p. 248. 36ibid., p. 249.
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This to Sartre Is an impossibility because consciousness can­
not be conscious of itself and conscious of the other at the 
same time and in the same manner. Sartre accepts Heidegger's 
notion of transforming the relation with the other from know­
ing to being, and also his fundamental notion of being-in- 
the world. But at the same time he rejects Heidegger's pre- 
ontological structure of being, and also his collective form 
of self-awareness, which leads to some form of monism or 
altruism if it is taken seriously. Sartre also rejected 
Husserl's transcendental position which in his opinion fails 
to bring the other into a concrete relation. In the follow­
ing we shall attempt to investigate how Sartre attacks the 
problem.
Sartre and the Problem of the Other
From the previous discussion we can conclude that 
Sartre's major objection to the way the other is treated by 
certain other thinkers is directed mainly against the tendency 
to abstract the other in terms of knowing, on one hand, and 
against the tendency to solipsism, on the other. We can as­
sume, therefore, that Sartre's major concern in his treatment 
of the other is twofold: first, to avoid the mistakes of
his predecessors, and second, to reconstruct a theory which 
can meet the authentic existential phenomenon of being-and- 
the-other.
It is worth-while to point out here that Sartre ex­
presses a concern to refute solipsism as early as the
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Transcendence of the Ego. "He then believed that by making 
the Ego a part of the psychic and hence an object In the 
world, he could refute solipsism. But then later In Being 
and Nothingness he states that his earlier view had been too 
optimistic."37 If this Is the case, how could Sartre then 
refute solipsism, especially after his refusal of Heidegger’s 
notion of the pre-ontologlcal disposition of belng-ln-the- 
world. This notion, as we saw earlier, considers being on- 
tlcally, so to speak, rooted with other beings. Hence, 
belng-ln-the-world and belng-wlth-others simultaneously Im­
ply the same thing.
Sartre’s objection to this notion Is based on the fact 
that the cogito seems to be nlhllated before It realizes 
Itself. According to Sartre any relationship with the other 
has to have Its starting point with the cogito.33 Therefore 
Heidegger’s departure Is false.
Granting the notion that the cogito has to be the point 
of departure In formulating the relation with the other, one 
might Inquire Into the ground on which the cogito establishes 
Its relation. The Immediate answer ought to be that It Is on 
the concrete ground of being, and not on the abstract forms 
of knowledge. Fundamentally, Sartre agrees with Heidegger 
on this point, but he objects to Heidegger’s notion of being.
37Hazel Barnes, "Translator’s Introduction” to Being 
and Nothingness, p. XL.
33sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 251.
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Thus, we find Sartre willing to accept Heidegger's ontolog­
ical structure of being-in-the-world, but unwilling to give 
up the Cartesian cogito. The dichotomy which we feel arises 
at this point is one of attempted reconciliation between 
establishing an ontological relation with the other and the 
subjective individuality of the cogito. This problem becomes 
more abstruse when we consider the modification of the cogito 
in Sartre's terms.
To Descartes the essence of the cogito is thinking; 
therefore through thinking the cogito can establish its re­
lation with the other. But to Sartre the essence of the 
cogito is being, and it is through being to being that the 
cogito is expected to establish its relation with the other. 
For this reason the problem appears more difficult in Sartre. 
This difficulty arises as a result of Sartre's acceptance of 
the cogito as a point of departure for establishing the re­
lation, and also as a result of his rejection of knowing as 
the basis of this relation. It is also more difficult for 
Sartre than for Heidegger to establish an ontological rela­
tion with the other because in Heidegger being is pre- 
ontologically directed toward the other simply because the 
ontic structure of being is intrinsic to being-with-the- 
other; whereas' in Sartre the cogito reveals itself to itself 
through its own nakedness, without any ontic existentiality. 
Thus, in spite of its nakedness and absolute nothingness, 
Sartre expects his cogito to establish an ontological
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relation with the other. The crucial question at this point 
is, how can the cogito establish an ontological relation 
with the other without falling into solipsism, personalism, 
or even some minor form of psychologism? With this in mind 
we shall attempt to pursue our evaluation of Sartre and the 
problem of the other.
The Psychological Modes of the "Look" and the Other
If we attempt to answer the question raised above, we 
find it difficult to conceive any ground upon which the for- 
itself establishes its relation with the other, other than 
its own intentionality. By rejecting the "knowing" approach 
to the other and replacing it with being, Sartre puts his 
being in the position of facing the other with nothing except 
his own attitude toward the other. In all fairness we cannot 
see any other way or means which can help the for-itself to 
relate itself to the other except its own psychological 
states, from which the conception of the cykher is constructed, 
While Sartre attempts to formulate his phenomenological de­
scription of the other, these descriptions can only express 
Sartre’s own attitude toward the other. There might be some 
correspondence of description between one for-itself and 
another in characterizing the other, but this is not essen­
tially the rule. If it is true that each "consciousness has 
its own manner in relating itself to the world,"39 it should
39sartre, L ’imaginaire, p. 24.
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follow that- each consciousness has its own manner in relating 
itself to others.
But the fundamental problem which Sartre faces at this 
point is that when the for-itself confronts the in-itself, 
it does not face any challenge; whereas when the for-itself 
confronts the other it faces a challenge because the other 
is another for-itself. For some reason Sartre conceives 
this confrontation as a threat of nihilation and objectifi­
cation instead of a hope for affirmation and authentication. 
This threat is directly revealed in the look. For the look 
to Sartre is a magic power; it nihilates one’s being; it 
objectifies one’s personality; it penetrates one’s depth; 
and it shatters one’s ego; it brings shame; it alienates 
one’s self from himself; but it never expresses a feeling of 
affirmation, of appreciation, or of participation in one’s 
doing and being. Hence the other is a look inasmuch as I am 
a look. We are looking at each other with one single atti­
tude, to objectify each other, and to destroy each other’s 
being, because only by destroying the other’s being can my 
being be affirmed.
We shall cite here a few passages from Sartre’s literary 
works which confirm our description of the look.
In the Reprieve we find the following:
They see me— no, not even that: it sees me. He
was the object of looking. A look that searched him to 
the depths, pierced him like a knife-thrust, and was 
not his own look; an impenetrable look, the embodiment 
of night, awaiting him in his deepest self and
I8l
condemning him to be himself, coward, hypocrite, ped­
erast, for all eternity. Himself, quavering beneath 
that look, and defying it. That look! As if night was 
the look. I am seen. Transparent, transparent, trans­
fixed. But by whom? "I am not alone,” said Danielaloud.40
This passage exemplifies the effectiveness of the other’s 
look upon one's being. The other in this respect goads the 
for-itself to become conscious of itself and of its relation 
to the other. Furthermore, when the for-itself feels itself 
being pierced by the other’s look, it also becomes aware of 
its "transparency”; namely, that the for-itself is not closed 
in upon itself in its location in space, but that it is open 
and accessible for the other. Hence, as a result of feeling 
its accessibility to the other, the for-itself becomes aware 
of the privation of one’s freedom. Since the other is the 
cause of this privation, naturally it follows that the for- 
itself finds itself compelled to protect itself from being 
invaded by the other. Since this is not possible, because 
the for-itself is constantly in immediate confrontation with 
the other in space and time, there is no way to escape from 
the other.
Sartre describes this salient dialogue with the other 
in No Exit.
(Garcin) This bronze. (Strokes it thoughtfully.) 
Yes, now’s the moment; I’m looking at this thing on 
the mantelpiece, and I understand that I’m in hell.
40jean-Paul Sartre, The Reprieve, trans. Eric Sutton 
(New York: Alfred A Knopf, 19^7), pp. 135-136.
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I tell you everything's been thought out beforehand.
They knew I'd stand at the fireplace stroking this thing 
of bronze, with all those eyes Intent on me. Devouring 
me. (He swings round abruptly.) What? Only two of 
you? I thought there were more; many more. (Laughs)
So this Is hell. I'd never have believed It. You 
remember all we were told about the torture-chambers, 
the fire and brimstone, the burning marl. Old wives' 
tales! There's no need for red-hot pokers. Hell Is—  
other people!^!
In The Files Aeglsteus expresses his concern about the 
other's look as follows;
(Aeglstheus) Alike? a god likening himself to 
me— what freak of Irony Is this. Since I came to the 
throne, all I said, all my acts, have been aimed at 
building up an Image of myself. I wish each of my 
subjects to keep that Image In the foreground of his 
mind, and to feel, even when alone, that ray eyes are 
on him, severely judging his most private thoughts.
But I have been trapped In my own net. I have come to 
see myself only as they see me. I peer Into the dark 
pit of their souls, and there deep down, I see the Image 
that I have built up. I shudder, but I cannot take my 
eyes off It. Almighty Zeus, who am I? Am I anything 
more than the dread that others have of me?^^
As we stated earlier, an Interpretation of one's rela­
tion to the other Is essentially a reflection of the person­
ality Involved In Its confrontation with the other. Since 
we cannot see any objective methodology, other than the In- 
tentlonallty of consciousness. In describing this relation, 
we cannot avoid assuming that the observations made are 
strictly subjective and personal. This point may very well 
be criticized on the ground that Sartre Is not actually
^^Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New 
York: Vintage Book, 19^9), pp. Î6-47.
^2jean-Paul Sartre, "The Files," In No Exit, p. 103.
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recording his own Impressions of the other, but the data of 
his phenomenological ontology. Our answer is that phenomen­
ological ontology is an undertaking which cannot be accom­
plished independently of the participation of consciousness 
itself. In fact it is through the activities of conscious­
ness t h a t  t h e  m e t h o d  of "reduction" can be applied, and with­
out consciousness the intuitive grasp of the phenomenon ob­
served cannot be apprehended. For this reason subjectivity 
and some form of arbitrariness in describing the other ap­
pears to be an inescapable fact. It follows that when Sartre 
describes his observations of the other, these observations 
do not have to be considered a universal truth about the 
inner being of all others, nor is it necessarily implied 
that all consciousnesses experience the other in the fashion 
that Sartre describes.
The following lengthy description of the other's look 
expresses not only the personal and subjective element, but 
also some form of paranoia in relation to the other.
You must have experienced, in a subway, in the 
foyer of a theater, or in a train the sudden and irk­
some sense that you were being looked at from behind.
You turn around, but the observer has buried his nose 
in a book; you can't discover who was looking at you, 
there's a faint tingling all over your back, like a 
sudden twitch of all your tissues. Well, that is what 
I felt for the first time, on September 26, at three 
o'clock in the afternoon, in the hotel garden. No 
one was there, you understand, Mathieu, no one at all.
But the look was there. Understand me well; I did not 
see it, as one sees a passing profile, a forehead, or a 
pair of eyes; for its essential character is to be be­
yond perception. But I became more compact and con­
centrated, I was both transparent and opaque, I existed
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In the presence of a look. Since then I have been con­
tinually under observation, even in my solitary room; 
sometimes, the consciousness of transfixion by that 
sword-blade, of that eye upon me while asleep, awoke 
me with a start. I have, in fact, almost entirely lost 
the capacity for sleep. Ah, Mathieu, what a discovery!
I was seen, I struggled to know myself, I seemed to be 
slipping out of my extremities, I claimed your kindly 
intercession, and all the time I was seen, the inexor­
able look, an invisible steel blade, was on me. And 
you too, skeptic and scoffer as you are, you are seen.
But you don't know it. I can easily describe that look: 
it is nothing; it is a purely negative entity: imagine
a pitch-dark night. It's the night that looks at you, 
but it's a dazzling night, in fullest splendor; the night
behind the day. I am flooded with black light; it is
all over my hands and eyes and heart, and I can't see 
it. Believe me, I first loathed this incessant viola­
tion of myself; as you know, I used to long to become 
invisible, to go and leave no trace, on earth or in 
men's hearts. What anguish to discover that look as a 
universal medium from which I can't escape! But what a re-
■ lief as well! I know at last that I am. I adapt for
my own use, and to your disgust, your prophet's foolish 
wicked words: "I think, therefore I am." I need no
longer bear the responsibility of my turbid and dis­
integrating self: he who sees me causes me to be: 1
am as he sees me. I turn my eternal, shadowed face to­
wards the night, I stand up like a challenge, and I say 
to God: Here I am. Here am I as you see me, as I am.
What can I do now!— you know me, and I do not know my­
self. What can I do except support myself. And you, 
whose look eternally creates me— do support me. Mathieu, 
what joy, what torment! At last I am transmuted into 
myself. Hated, despised, sustained, a presence supports 
me to continue thus forever. I am infinite and in­
finitely guilty. But I am, Mathieu, I am. Before God
and before men, I am. Ecce h o m o . ^3
It is almost pathological for Mathieu to conceive of himself
as an object for the other, continuously watched, observed,
and objectified. It is tiring for one to be so self-con­
scious, as if the other is no longer another, but a shadow 
of the for-itself. For Sartre it is a natural state in
^3sartre, The Reprieve, pp. 406-407.
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which the for-itself finds itself continuously confronting 
itself, the in-itself and the other. It is in fact the para­
dox of the human situation. It is a paradox because on the 
one hand, without the other the for-itself does not become 
aware of itself as reflective consciousness and as freedom 
and because, on the other hand, the other is the constant 
threat to the freedom and subjectivity of the for-itself. 
While the for-itself as subject faces another for-itself as 
another subject, a battle to objectify the other takes place. 
Thus, while the other attempts to assert his subjectivity by 
objectifying me and robbing me of my freedom, I tend to do 
the same thing. The conflict between the for-itself and the 
other is an essential conflict, because without the other 
there would be no challenge for the for-itself to assert it­
self, and to exercise its freedom.
It is in and through the revelation of my being-as- 
object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend 
the presence of his being-as-subject. For just as 
the Other is probable object for me-as-subject, so I 
can discover myself in the process of becoming a 
probable object for only a certain subject.
The most probable relation is therefore the relation 
of a subject to an object. Sartre in this respect does not 
see any possibility for intersubjective relations in which 
the for-itself as a subject relates itself to the other as 
another subject, like the I-Thou relationship in Buber. It 
is also impossible to establish an objective relation, in a
44Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 256-257*
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Spinozlstic sense, in which the individual person establishes 
his relation with another person, preserving the willingness 
to respect and to accept with openness the personality of the 
other according to its own identity. This type of relation 
would probably be considered by Sartre to be too intellectual- 
istic, the association being based too much on thought qua 
thought, and not on being or on awareness qua awareness.
We cannot help questioning Sartre's conception of the 
other, which is represented as a threat to one's freedom and 
subjectivity, whether it is structured according to his own 
subjective attitude toward the other or in the light of his 
phenomenological discovery. In either way it appears to us 
that personal experience cannot be totally eliminated in 
conceiving the threat which the other represents. This seems 
to be very possible in Sartre's situation. In his auto­
biography, The Words, he describes his childhood experience 
which reveals the psychological tension inflicted by the other 
upon him. In writing about his father and mother, he notes 
that
The death of Jean Baptiste was the big event of 
my life: it sent my mother back to her chains and
gave me freedom.
There is no good father, that's the rule. Don't 
lay the blame on me but on the bond of paternity, 
which is rotten. To beget children, nothing better; to 
have them, what iniquity! Had my father lived, he would 
have lain on me at full length and would have crushed 
me. As luck had it, he died y o u n g .^5
^^Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Prechtman (New 
York: George Braziller, 1964), pp. 18-19.
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Our penetrating the veil of the past and using illus­
trations from his childhood does not imply that we intend to 
psychoanalyze Sartre's personality in view of his experience 
with the other. It should be clear that this is not our 
goal, nor do we intend to reduce his phenomenological de­
scription of the other to mere psychological data. But what 
we would like to point out is that Sartre's life itself re­
veals a silent struggle against the other. As the only child 
of a typical French bourgeois family, Sartre was the main 
object of the family's interest. Each member of the family 
is described in The Words as having something to do with 
Sartre, the child, the object of interest for all the famâly. 
Sartre at moments evinces a feeling of being almost suffo­
cated by the other; yet even so, Sartre never brought his 
inner tension, which is produced by the other, into the open. 
He never acts rudely or violently, he is not rebellious or 
malicious, but he impresses the reader as a shy lonely child 
who is encountered by an authoritarian other, expected to be 
what the other is hoping for him. Facing these situations, 
Sartre, the perceptive and highly intelligent child, instead 
of revolting and expressing his own views about himself 
vis-a-vis the other, escapes into his own inwardness. Thus 
outwardly Sartre gives in to the other, while inwardly he 
lives his own life.
I led two lives, both of them untrue. Publicly 
I was an imposter: the famous grandson of the cele­
brated Charles Schweitzer; alone, I sank into imaginary
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moping. I corrected my false glory by a false incog­
nito. I had no trouble shifting from one role to the 
other; just as I was about to make my secret thrust, 
the key would turn in the lock, my mother’s hands would 
suddenly be paralyzed and rest motionless on the piano,
I would put the ruler ba^k into the study and rush into 
my grandfather’s arms.^°
In another instance Sartre states that he used to defend him­
self with his imagination,but the following passage re­
flects clearly the inner psychological struggle which Sartre 
experienced in his childhood.
It was a pure object, doomed par excellence to 
masochism if only 1 could have believed in the family 
play acting. But no. It perturbed me only on the 
surface, and the depth remained cold, unjustified.
The system horrified me. 1 developed a hatred of happy 
swoons of abandonment, of that caressed and coddled 
body, 1 found myself by opposing myself.
During his childhood, and to some extent in his matur­
ity, Sartre’s experience of the other is most negative and 
non-appreciative. The other, as it appears manifested at 
times as his immediate family, is for Sartre, the threat to 
his freedom, the power which objectifies him, the external 
tension which forces him to be what he is not. Simone de 
Beauvoir also alludes to the pressure that Sartre faced from 
his mother and friends through his late twenties, whenever 
he faced a situation where decision was n e e d e d . The
46ibld., p. 133. 47pbld., p. 113. ^^Ibld. , p. 113.
^^De Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, p. 210. Mile, de 
Beauvoir describes the following situation: "Sartre was due
to leave Le Havre the following year. For some reason 1 can­
not now remember - doubtless a matter of doubling up two 
appointments - a new philosophy Instructor was being brought 
In. In exchange Sartre was offered a job In Lyon, preparing 
pupils for the Ecole Normale entrance. Both his parents and 
Madame Lemalre put strong pressure on him to accept."
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pressure from the other, which evolves into objectifying 
forces, is thematic in Sartre's life. For this reason the 
other appears as a threat to his freedom: to be at once an
object and to be free is contradictory. Thus since it is the 
other who threatens my subjectivity and my freedom by re­
ducing me into an object, it is my responsibility to save my­
self from the other.
Sartre concludes The Words with the following:
What I like about my madness is that it has pro­
tected me from the very beginning against the charms 
of the "elite": never have I thought that I was the
happy possessor of a "talent"; my sole concern has been 
to save myself - nothing in my hands, nothing up my 
sleeve - by work and faith. As a result, my pure 
choice did not raise me above any one. Without equip­
ment, without tools, I set all of me to work in order 
to save all of ne. If I relegate impossible salvation 
to the proproom, what remains? A whole man, composed 
of all men and as good as all of them and no better
than any.50
Ironically enough, Sartre ends his autobiography on a 
humble tone which makes the reader nostalgically recall the 
conclusion of Spinoza's Ethics.51 Both of them are concerned 
with salvation, and also they express an ultimate commitment 
and devotion to labor for the cause of salvation. But un­
questionably salvation means different things for Sartre and 
Spinoza. As far as Sartre is concerned we suggest that sal­
vation is authenticity— the authenticity of the for-itself
5*^Sartre, The Words, p. 255»
^^Benedict Spinoza, Selections, ed. John Wild (New York 
Scribner and Sons, 1930), p"i 400.
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In relation to itself, to the other, and to the world. The 
authenticity of the for-itself in relation to itself is in­
definitely hindered by the other; and since the for-itself 
is constantly in encounter with the other, the for-itself 
can never overcome the hindrance exerted by the other; and 
thus it remains alienated from itself as subject, and from 
its authenticity. For Spinoza, on the other hand, salvation 
is achieved through knowledge, a knowledge of man's passion 
and emotion, a knowledge of the external causes which enslave 
the human intellect and prevent it from exercising its free­
dom, and a knowledge of the world which allows human intel­
lect to rise above the immediacy of the senses to emerge into 
the intellectual love of God.
It is interesting to note the difference between Sartre 
and Spinoza on how man relates himself to the other and to 
the world. While Sartre holds that the relationship with the 
other should be a relationship of being to being, Spinoza 
affirms that this relationship should be of understanding to 
understanding. The difficulties encountered in Sartre’s ap­
proach are related to the fact that while he emphasizes the 
ontological relationship with the other, he does little to 
clarify the nature of this relation. Granting the fact that 
ontology deals with describing the existential relationship 
of beings, we have no guarantee that the individual involved 
in describing this relation is not inserting his own atti­
tudes. This in fact appears to be the case with Sartre.
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The quotations in the preceding discussion illustrate the 
strong impact of the other on Sartre. Certainly he is ob­
jectified and robbed of his subjectivity and possibly of his 
freedom; but if this is the unfortunate case with Sartre, it 
may not be the same universally. Sartre’s description of 
the other cannot be considered universally valid, because 
experience shows that while some feel themselves objectified, 
and feel that their freedom is threatened by the other's 
look, others can absorb the other's look without any such 
shattering effect upon the orientation of their being. For 
this reason, we believe that the psychological attitudes de­
veloped out of oneself and the other have a strong influence 
upon the construction of the ontological relation with the 
other. This is certainly the case with Sartre, and for this 
reason we claim that his ontological conception of freedom 
cannot be separated from the inwardness of his psychological 
awareness. It is out of the psychic, and out of the inten­
tional quality of consciousness, that the individual projects 
himself into the world in some way or another. As we have 
already stated, we are not reducing Sartre's conception of 
the other and of freedom to psychologism; we are simply stat­
ing the fact that in the Sartrean scheme there is no way to 
separate the immediate psychological awareness of one's situ­
ation from his orientation to the other. This claim will 
appear more justified when we explore, in the following 
section, the feeling of shame in Sartre. But before we do
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so we shall continue our discussion of Sartre and Spinoza 
and the problem of the other.
As we mentioned earlier, while Sartre emphasizes that 
the relationship with the other should be a relation of being 
to being, to Spinoza this relation should be of understanding 
to understanding. This Is the message which we gather from 
his treatise The Improvement of the Understanding and from 
his Ethics as well. A commitment to understanding ourselves 
and to understanding the other Is prerequisite for any ethi­
cal life; without knowledge man is a passive creature and a 
slave of his emotions and passions. Freedom to Spinoza can 
only be arrived at through knowledge, through knowing our­
selves and the others, and through directing and relating 
ourselves to the other and the world rationally. Through 
knowledge, therefore, we can be free, because on the level 
we are exercising our rational activity In directing our­
selves. In Ignorance we are determined because on this level 
It Is our passion and subjective emotions which direct our 
actions. For this reason we can suggest that knowledge Is 
freedom and Ignorance Is determinism to Spinoza. One who Is 
Ignorant of his nature Is determined by the Immediacy of his 
fluctuating passions and also by their external causes such 
as the hate or the love or even the look of the other.
Conversely, the one who knows himself and his nature 
can be free from his passions and from their external causes 
by directing himself rationally through them. Thus, to
193
Spinoza, subjectivity is related to the exertion of one’s
passion in decision making, and objectivity is related to
one’s ability to make a rational judgment independent of the
immediacy of compassion. Erich Fromm in The Art of Loving
gives us an interesting illustration.
In all these cases the person is the slave of a pas­
sion, and his activity is in reality a "passivity" 
because he is driven; he is the sufferer, not the 
"actor." On the other hand, a man sitting quiet and 
contemplating, with no purpose or aim except that of 
experiencing himself and his oneness with the world, 
is considered to be "passive," because he is not "doing" 
anything. In reality, this attitude of concentrated 
meditation is the highest activity there is, an ac­
tivity of the soul, which is possible only under the 
condition of inner freedom and independence. One con­
cept of activity, the modern one, refers to the use of 
energy for the achievement of external aims; the other 
concept of activity refers to the use of man's inherent 
powers, regardless of whether any external change is 
brought about. The latter concept of activity has been 
formulated most clearly by Spinoza. He differentiates 
among the affects between active and passive affects, 
"actions" and "passions." In the exercise of an active 
affect, man is free, he is the master of his affect; in 
the exercise of a passive affect, man is driven, the 
object of motivations of which he himself is not aware. 
Thus Spinoza arrives at the statement that virtue and 
power are one and the same. Envy, jealousy, ambition, 
any kind of greed are passions; love is an action, the 
practice of a human power, which can be practiced only 
in freedom and never as the result of a c o m p u l s i o n . 52
If we apply Spinoza’s principles in establishing a re­
lationship with the other, the other does not appear subject 
to personal jurisdiction and involvement, but as an object 
of knowledge. We know the other first, as objectively as 
possible, the willingness to accept him, according to what
52Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York; Bantam 
Books, Inc., 1956), pi TBl
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he is— this is prerequisite to any sound ethical relation.
The Spinozistic system is more than fair in establishing re­
lationships with the other, but in spite.of its fairness it 
lacks personal involvement; the other appears to be an ab­
straction from the concrete human situation.
If Sartre's conception of the other represents the the­
sis, then Spinoza's approach is the antithesis. What we feel 
is necessary is to come up with a synthesis of these two ap­
proaches. A synthesis is important because when Sartre em­
phasizes a relation of being to being, this relationship ap­
pears to be based on and interpreted according to personal 
involvement and awareness of the situation. Thus, while 
Sartre's program is directed toward establishing an ontologi­
cal relation, we feel that in actuality this relation never 
surpasses the subjective psychological moods from which the 
one establishes his relationship with the other. In our 
judgment, the conflict between the one and the other, which 
dominates Sartre's outlook, is fundamentally related to the 
lack of rational basis, without which psychological immediacy 
cannot be transformed into an ontological relation.
With this in mind we approach Spinoza because we feel 
that the rational openness expressed in his writings is 
needed in order to establish an authentic human relation.
For one thing, Spinoza seeks to understand the situation of 
the other and the modes of human personality as objectively 
as possible, and then to deal with the other according to
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what he is. Vie find Sartre positing an image of the other 
according to his own immediate psychological awareness, with­
out considering that the other may be other than what he 
makes out of him. For this reason, the other appears threat­
ened by me as much as I appear threatened by the other. For 
I can only be a subject in the face of an object; thus ob­
jectifying the other is essential to my subjectivity. A 
synthesis between my subjectivity and the subjectivity of 
the other is not possible for the reason that my relation 
with the other is an either/or proposition: either my sub­
jectivity and the objectivity of the other, or vice versa; 
between the two inevitably I choose to save myself, and in 
order to save myself I have no choice but to objectify the 
other. On the whole, we feel that this picture is an exag­
gerated psychological dualism which does not appear necessary 
or essential for authenticating myself. But on the other 
hand the problem which we encounter in Spinoza's rationalism 
is the unavoidability of abstraction in human relations.
This abstraction takes pLace as a result of regulating or of 
controlling the emotional element of man by means of the in­
tellect. In so doing man does not appear involved in his 
total nature with the other, but only as intellect. We find 
in Spinoza a stoical tendency to distrust human emotions as 
a way of knowing and judging the other. Accordingly, ab­
straction takes place not only in the way of knowing, but 
also in the way of commitment to, and involvement with, the
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human situation. In this respect, we are inclined to agree 
with Sartre's description of the human engagement in the hu­
man situation, and to agree that human emotion cannot be 
neglected as a concrete way to apprehend the world.
Thus, while we find Sartre convincing in his descrip­
tion of man's existential involvement in the human situation, 
we find some difficulty with Spinoza, a difficulty which is 
related to his tendency to abstract man from his total situ­
ation. Conversely, while Sartre appears inflexible and un­
willing to reconcile his subjectivity with the other, we find 
Spinoza helpful in his attempt to establish an open relation­
ship based on objectivity and understanding. Thus, a rela­
tionship of being to being does not appear contradictory to 
a relationship of understanding to understanding. As a mat­
ter of fact, we claim that it is necessary to construct a 
synthesis of the two views. Prom the former view man becomes 
aware of his concrete relationship to the other and to human 
existence; from the latter view, man will be able to regulate 
the immediacy of his intuition and perception of the other by 
an objective understanding. With this in mind, we shall at­
tempt to interpret the notion of "shame" in Sartre, which 
will show us that some form of objective understanding is 
essential to an authentic relationship with the other.
Shame
In the previous section we attempted to show that a 
rational understanding is needed as much as the immediate
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being-to-being relationship in order to render possible the 
establishment of an authentic relation with the other. With 
this in mind, we believe that it is possible for the indiv­
idual to transmute the immediate psychological effect of the 
look into a rational judgment in which the look of the other 
is understood before it penetrates the being of the person 
in question. In other words, a rational understanding of 
oneself and of the other helps to establish an inner psycho­
logical immunity to the invasion of the other’s look. If 
this principle is applied, the feeling of shame cannot take 
place, nor can the deprivation of one's freedom be accom­
plished.
Let us look more closely at the Sartrean notion of 
shame. For Sartre the feeling of shame is a recognition 
that I am as the other sees m e .53 if it is true that in 
shame I recognize myself as the other sees me, this appears 
in contradiction to the notion of self-identity: If it is
true that I am whatever the other conceives me to be, then 
what is the use of accepting the cogito? Certainly Sartre 
must realize this possibility; for this reason he concludes 
that the for-itself remains in total separation from the 
for-others. This separation negates any possibility of re­
conciling or synthesizing with the other. In order to re­
cover from this inner destruction, the for-itself retaliates
53sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 222.
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against the other by objectifying the other and destroying 
his inner unity. The nature of this warfare between the for- 
itself and the for-others is strictly psychological, not so­
cial or political— a view that Edward Tiryakian supports in 
his book Sociologism and Existentialism.^^
. . . It follows that the freedom of the self is con­
tingent upon the freedom of all other men, although, 
paradoxically, man's freedom is not contingent upon 
any metaphysical being. Consequently, Sartre's view 
on intersubjective relationships comes to be virtually 
identical with the Hobbesian notion of the war-of-all 
against all: every consciousness is in potential con­
flict with every other consciousness. His social 
philosophy, if one can call it that, is summarized best 
in his own play. No Exit : Hell is others.55
This is a very simplified exposition of Sartre's social 
philosophy. However, two points need to be clarified.
First, it is true that in Sartre we find an element of the 
Hobbesian urge for self-survival; but while in Hobbes this 
urge is toward the preservation of livelihood through social 
and political power, in Sartre it is more of a struggle for 
psychological survival. Second, it can hardly be justified 
to assume that No Exit "summarizes best" Sartre's social 
philosophy, neglecting La Critique de la Raison Dialectique,55 
which was written for this purpose. To return to the first 
point: when we tell someone to be careful or to be watchful
5^Edward A. Tiryakian, Sociologism and Existentialism 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jerseyl Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962).
55ibid., p. 133.
55jean-Paul Sartre, La Critique de la Raison Dialectique 
(Paris: Gallimard, I960).
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of others, this means, in Hobbes' view, to protect oneself 
from the other, so the other does not take one's property or 
livelihood; whereas, according to Sartre, this simply means 
to be aware not to become objectified or nihilated by the 
other. The psychological motivations can hardly be separated 
from the existential confrontation with the other in Sartre; 
it is almost an obsession, in which one feels that he is con­
tinuously being invaded by spying eyes— eyes that stare and 
penetrate to his inner being. "The look does not carve me 
out in the universe; it comes to search for me at the heart 
of my situation and grasps me only in irresolvable relations 
with instruments."57 The problem involved here is that when 
the look locates me in my situation it does not leave me un­
scarred. On the contrary, when I grasp or become aware of 
the other's look, I feel that my freedom is escaping me,5^ 
and that I become solidified and alienated from my possibil­
ities. 59 What makes me aware and wrapped up in self-conscious­
ness because of the other's look? It is shame, Sartre an­
nounces, "it is shame or pride which reveals to me the other's 
look and myself at the end of that look."^® In shame I lose 
myself by objectifying myself to myself and to the other; in 
shame, therefore, I conceive myself not as I was,^^ but as
57sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 263 
58ibid., p. 261. 59ibid., p. 263.
GOlbid., p. 261. ^llbid., p. 263.
200
the other sees me, as a prostitute, a homosexual, or an ink­
well. Thus while the other sees me as an object objectified 
by his look, I become determined to conceive myself through 
the eyes of the other, not through my own eyes. For this 
reason, the feeling of shame is actually the feeling of los­
ing my freedom and of being shattered and objectified.
For the Other I am seated as this inkwell is on the 
table; for the Other, I am leaning over the keyhole 
as this tree is bent by the wind. Thus for the Other 
I have stripped myself of my transcendence.
This is a lucid and imaginative description of how the 
other sees me. The question involved here is, how can I 
grant that the other truly sees me as an object, say, as an 
inkwell, and not as a subject or simply as a human being?
The answer might be discerned in two questions: 1) Is it
because I see the other as an object and therefore presume 
that the other sees me in the same manner? 2) Is it because 
I am so self-conscious of what I am that I feel that I am 
transparent, so that when the other looks at me I feel that 
he is penetrating me and discovering my inner self? One 
might argue either way, or in other ways; but it is probably 
unsafe to be dogmatic one way or another, or to make a final 
generalized conclusion about how the other sees me. In order 
to escape these questions, one may say that the description 
of the other is independent of all this. Assuming that it 
is an accurate description discovered through the
62Ibid.
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phenomenological method, we can ask how this accuracy is ar­
rived at. Is the phenomenological method an objective 
method? If this is the case then do we say that it is in­
dependent of the psychological ethos of the person involved 
in this inquiry? The answer is negative, because the phenom­
enological method is not an objective method, nor was the 
inquiry independent of the psychological moods of the in­
quirer. For this reason we claim that Sartre's treatment of 
the other is more or less based on his own psychological ex­
perience, from which the other appears as an aggressor of 
his rights, and as an invader of his freedom. The feeling 
of shame cannot be dissociated from these feelings, because 
it is in shame that I locate the other's look which is locat­
ing me in my shame. The question involved here is whether 
the feeling of shame is ontological, psychological, cultural, 
or personal. In Sartre we believe it is psychologically 
felt and ontologically defined.
Shame is the feeling of an original fall, not because 
of the fact that I may have committed this or that 
particular fault but simply that I have "fallen" into 
the world in the midst of things and that I need the 
mediation of the Other in order to be what I am.
Modesty and in particular the fear of being 
surprised in a state of nakedness are only a symbolic 
specification of original shame; the body symbolizes 
here our defenseless state as objects. To put on 
clothes is to hide one's object-state; it is to claim 
the right of seeing without being seen; that is, to 
be pure subject. This is why the Biblical symbol of 
the fall after the original sin is the fact that Adam 
and Eve "know that they are naked." The reaction to 
shame will consist exactly in apprehending as an object 
the one who apprehended my own object-state.
G3ibid., pp. 288-289.
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This exposition not only conveys an ontological de­
scription of shame, but also indicates an element of inevi­
table universality in which the feeling of shame is revealed 
to consciousness with the discovery of man’s fall into the 
world. Of course, Sartre’s conception of the "fall" is more 
Heideggerian than Christian, but regardless of its source, 
shame remains to be defined ontologically. But if we review 
Sartre’s phenomenological analysis of shame as a whole, we 
find that his approach is based primarily on the involved 
person’s immediate psychological reaction to the other, and 
not on his ontological outlook. In other words, Sartre ap­
pears to be guilty of accentuating this point, namely, ana­
lyzing his subjective experience of shame and then establish­
ing a universal and an ontological definition of shame, which 
seems to us to be fallacy involved.
Looking into the notion of shame, we feel that shame 
differs from anguish as much as ontology differs from psychol­
ogy. Thus, while we consider anguish to be an ontological 
state of man as a being-in-the-world, we hold that shame does 
not reach the ontological level, because it is the product of 
immediacy and as such is a psychological reaction of man as a 
being-with-other. However, we are not attempting to draw a 
sharp line between the psychological and the ontological.
What we are stressing is that in shame there is an element 
of a psychological passivity in which consciousness is not 
actually reflective in relation to the other. The other
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appears to be objectifying the for-itself and nihilating its 
freedom.
Furthermore, we contend that, if "consciousness is ab­
solute" and as such is freedom, it should follow that freedom 
is the manifestation of reflection. In other words, through 
reflection consciousness actualizes itself in freedom. Hence 
reflection should be a sign of an existing An I, there­
fore, is an incarnation of reflection. This is precisely 
what we call an ontological actualization of consciousness.
On this level it would be absurd to say that reflection is a 
sign of an I and of a non-^, as much as it would be to say 
that consciousness is a subject and a non-subject. Further, 
if it is true that reflection is an activity, it would be 
absurd not to use this activity when the for-itself is in­
vaded by the other. Consequently, since shame is an effect 
caused by the other, this effect should only take place in 
the passive state of immediacy and spontaneity when con­
sciousness appears to be affected by external forces. The 
look of the other is one of these sources, although the re­
sponse to the look, in our opinion, cannot be analyzed with­
out taking into consideration the personal, the psychological, 
and the cultural situation of the individual involved. Hence 
if a homosexual is looked at, the response to the look varies 
with the variations of the state of his personality. Thus, 
while in some cases a homosexual feels that he is objectified 
and nihilated from his freedom when he is looked at, to
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another the look does not have any effect at all. In fact, 
Jean Genet is a good example of the latter case.
It can also be argued that the feeling of shame and 
guilt varies not only with the psychological make up of our 
personality, but also from one culture to another. Thus, 
while we do not believe in cultural determinism, we find our­
selves forced to acknowledge certain deterministic forces 
acting upon the human personality. But we believe that these 
deterministic forces can operate only on the unreflective 
level, where consciousness is still mere "spontaneity" and 
where the I is not really certain of its ontological identity. 
For this reason we believe that Sartre is right in considering 
the other to be the origin of shame, but we object to giving 
shame an ontological status. When reflection takes place, 
consciousness does not conceive itself through the look of 
the other, but through its own. It follows that reflection 
may conquer shame and forces its ontological identity on the 
other. Thus since in reflection the I does not see itself 
through the eyes of the other, but through its own, it would 
be contradictory to say that on the reflective level the I 
experiences shame.
Our disagreement with Sartre's notion of the other is 
related to his strong emphasis on the other as a determining 
factor in conceiving oneself to the extent that the other 
appears as a constant threat to one's freedom and as another 
form of "facticity." In fact, in his book Anti-Semite and
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Jew he utilizes his notion of the other as a form of facti­
city .
The Jew, because he knows he is under observa­
tion, takes the initiative and attempts to look at him­
self through the eyes of the others. This objectivity 
toward himself is still another ruse of inobjectivity: 
while he contemplates himself with the "detachment" of 
another, he feels himself in effect detached from him­
self; he becomes another person, or pure witness.
Oddly enough, Sartre does not acknowledge any internal causes 
for being a Jew, and he rejects consideration of any histori­
cal, social, political, or religious factor which makes the 
Jew ("it is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew,"^^) or the 
other.^7 The other appears to be "pliers" in which the in­
dividual is caught, with almost no hope for escape from its 
grip. Can this situation be true in reality? Our answer is 
yes and no. Yes, if consciousness remains on the spontaneous 
level, and yes also if consciousness is in reflection hesi­
tant to affirm itself in the world. But the answer is no if 
consciousness becomes aware of its ontological dignity and 
wills to affirm itself against the other. If I were fated
^^Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, trans. George 
J. Becker (New York: Schocken Books, 1966).
GSibid., p. 97.
GGjoseph Sungolowsky, "Criticism of Anti-Semite and 
Jew," Yale French Studies, No. 30 (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press), pp. 68-72.
^^This problem is not our concern in this work, and we
will not attempt any comprehensive analysis. Our interest 
is only to show the extent of Sartre's emphasis on the other
as a power of objectification and nihilation.
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to be a Negro In the South, I could either accept whatever 
the white southerner thinks about me as a Negro, and consider 
that it is my fate to be in shame, or I could will to choose 
my own image, and to reach out for my dignity with an attempt 
to affirm the image which I make of myself for myself and 
pity those who think that I am an object for them. This is 
the ontological level, where man becomes aware of himself and 
of his indissoluble identity in the world. This, we realize, 
is a difficult task to achieve, and we repeat with Spinoza, 
"all noble things are as difficult as they are rare."^^
Thus on the ontological level man does not experience 
shame, simply because he has already surpassed the passive 
state in which he has experienced objectification. On the 
ontological level, however, man remains in anguish. The more 
reflection, the more anguish, not shame. Job did not experi­
ence shame, but he experienced anguish. Abraham did not ex­
perience shame, but anguish. Adam did not really experience 
shame, as Sartre states, but a sense of guilt associated with 
anguish. Nakedness, in this respect, did not symbolize 
Adam’s nudity before the other, because Eve symbolically was 
a part of him; therefore he experienced nudity before himself 
and God. It was an ontological nudity associated with an­
guish and fear of the unknown future.
This analysis should reveal one major point; namely.
68Spinoza, Selections, p. 400.
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that Sartre confuses the psychological experience with on­
tological reflection and considers whatever man experiences 
psychologically as an ontological mode of being-in-the-world. 
For this reason, we claim that his psychological awareness of 
the other and of the world can hardly be separated from his 
ontology. Sartre ontologizes his psychological states and 
attempts to universalize what is psychologically given.
This is Sartre's weakness and may also be his greatness. His 
weakness rests in not being able to see the other with an ob­
jective eye and an open heart, and his greatness lies in his 
perceptive power which enables him to see things objectively 
or subjectively. Whether to see them wrongly or rightly is 
not the question; but to will to see things, to be involved 
and to dwell on things, is all that man can do, and this is 
the irony of it all: a desire to be God with all finiteness.
CONCLUSION
This analysis has demonstrated two important views 
which are related to the nature of Sartre's philosophy. The 
first is that Sartre's conception of freedom emerges basi­
cally from his psychological awareness of the world and the 
Other— not from any ontological disposition. The second 
view is that Sartre's ontology is basically an expression of 
his psychology and not the other way around. Since these 
views appear to stand in opposition to the predominant views 
of Sartre's interpreters, we felt it would be worth-while to 
examine the arguments of different interpreters and to show 
the invalidity of their conclusions. *
This task has been achieved in the first two chapters. 
We have examined the metaphysical arguments made by Fred 
Newman^ and the moral arguments made by Alvin Plantinga and 
Robert Champigny.^ In the course of examining these argu­
ments we have shown the psychological expressions of certain 
Sartrean notions, and we have also shown the psychological 
expressions which are revealed throughout Sartre's ethics
^By metaphysical argument we mean the arguments of 
those who consider Sartre’s philosophy as metaphysical in 
origin and nature.
^By moral argument we mean the arguments of those who 




In the third chapter we have shown systematically and 
chronologically the continuity between Sartre's pre-ontologi- 
cal works (which in our view represent Sartre's psychology 
to a large extent) and his phenomenological ontology. Our 
evaluation not only shows the continuity between his pre- 
ontological and his ontological works, but it also shows 
that the essential notions which are used in Being and No­
thingness and applied in the form of phenomenological ontol­
ogy were discovered and defined in his pre-ontological work.
In the final chapter we have examined Sartre's approach 
in relating himself to the world and to the Other, with an 
attempt to understand the nature of this relationship. We 
argued that the perspective through which Sartre conceives 
the world and the Other is fundamentally structured out of 
his own psychological attitude. For this reason we feel 
that Sartre does not actually describe the Other in the light 
of whatever the Other may be, but rather describes the Other 
according to his speculative intuition, which is primarily 
based on his psychological prehension of the Other. This in 
our opinion constitutes the failure of Sartre's ontology: a
failure because in the practical implications of his ontology 
Sartre fails to achieve an openness to the Other as the Other 
really is.
We conclude this work by suggesting that Sartre's con­
ception of freedom entails a freedom from the Other. This
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Is revealed not only in his philosophy but also in his life. 
The Other is always a burden upon him. He always feels as 
if the Other is choking him, objectifying him, and robbing 
him of his freedom. This message can be clearly gathered 
from The Words, where the struggle of escaping the Other's 
grip and of running from the Other suffuses the whole book.
In short, freedom and the Other are irreconcilable. To be 
free presupposes being free from the Other. The individual 
cogito can never collectively pursue its becoming nor be 
objectified, for if the cogito hopes to be free it has to 
remain a detotalized totality. The one is always struggling 
against the other because the other appears to be always 
threatening in objectifying the one. This notion is not 
accidental in Sartre's thought, but thematic. We have shown 
its roots germinating in L'imagination and L 'imaginaire, 
growing and spreading out in Being and Nothingness, applied 
in his literary works (for example. No Exit and The Reprieve) 
and carried out in his social and political philosophy in 
La Critique de la raison dialectique.
Because we have been concerned in this work only with 
discovering the origins of Sartre's conception of freedom, 
we have not dealt with its applications. This undoubtedly 
deserves study; but a cursory reading of La Critique de la 
raison dialectique reveals that Sartre's attempt to synthe­
size existentialism with Marxism does not actually result 
in a synthesis but an intermarriage arranged by the groom
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which suits his own outlooks and desires. Sartre's Marxism 
in La Critique is not actually Marx's Marxism but that of 
Sartre. The individual does not appear to emerge in the 
group, but rather remains hesitant, cautious, and unwilling 
to give up his own interpretation of the world and the 
Other. The process of socialization remains individuation, 
and the dialogue between the one and the many never is 
actualized. Thus the cogito remains within the sphere of a 
monologue in interpreting the world and the Other according 
to its idiosyncratic categories. For this reason the ego 
does not become totalized, but remains a detotalized total­
ity. Cartesianism yes, Marxism no.
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